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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores how Kurdish nationalists generate sympathy and support for their 
ethnically-defined claims to territory and self-determination in international society and 
among would-be nationals. It combines conceptual and theoretical insights from the 
field of IR and studies on nationalism, and focuses on national identity, sub-state groups 
and international norms. In so doing, this thesis presents a comprehensive 
understanding of the relationship between the self-determination claims of sub-state 
nationalist groups and their interaction with international society. Such assertions for the 
control of a specific territory typically embrace, either implicitly or explicitly, ethnic 
conceptions of national identity. A three-fold argument is proposed and developed to 
explain why these ethnic claims to self-determination gain sympathy and support. 
Firstly, political assertions regarding the identity of a specific piece of land and its 
cartographical depictions are powerful in influencing outsiders’ perceptions because of 
the normative context in which they are framed. The norms related to sub-state 
nationalist groups involve both a specific interpretation of self-determination and the 
norms of human rights and democracy. Secondly, such claims are further reinforced by 
the perception that the history of a territory is identical to the history of the people 
living on it. Although a political association between a people and a territory is a 
relatively novel link, such associations are often assumed and accepted to exist 
throughout all of history. Kurdish nationalists use the maps of Kurdistan effectively to 
convey the message. Finally, the diasporal activities of nationalists who, thanks to their 
location outside the homeland and their ability to communicate their ideas directly to 
international society, play an important role in asserting the rightfulness of their demand 
for self-determination and in promoting the idea of an ethnic territory.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This thesis addresses an important question in the studies of nationalism and 
international relations, namely: how can we explain the success of ethnically-defined 
claims to territory and national self-determination in generating sympathy and support 
from among would-be nationals and in international society?1 The ethnicist 
understanding of nations in the academic and non-academic literature implies that a 
territory is more or less a given feature of groups. The meaning sub-state nationalist 
groups attribute to self-determination and territorial identity is linked to a specific 
normative context that embraces a belief in democracy and human rights for groups 
with distinct cultural, linguistic and ethnic characteristics. Framing their self-
determination claims to territorial autonomy or independence based on their distinct 
cultural and ethnic characteristics helps them to maximise their legitimacy and influence 
within international society. Considering the large number of such struggles – the 
Kurds, Tamils, Chechens, Abkhazians, Sikhs, and others – the question of why 
ethnically-defined claims to territory and national self-determination generate sympathy 
in international society emerges as an important issue that requires explanation. 
This thesis addresses this issue by examining the political and international 
ideational context in which sub-state groups interact with other international actors in 
international society. It draws on the literatures of different fields, particularly 
International Relations (IR) and nationalism studies, and looks more closely at the 
territorial component of nationalisms. It shows that insights from nationalism theories 
regarding the meanings and roles of nations and nationalism is necessary in 
understanding the challenges nationalist separatist movements pose to state sovereignty, 
                                                 
1 ‘International society’ means ‘a group of state (or, more generally, a group of independent political 
communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary 
factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules 
and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining 
these arrangements.’ Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), The Expansion of International Society, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994, 1. This definition enables the incorporation of institutions and rules, ideas 
and other forces, such as nationalism, in the study of international politics. For instance, Mayall, defines 
international society as ‘a society of states’ and looks at the influence of nationalism on international 
society. James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 2. 
This thesis adopts a more general meaning of international society, which is not only limited to states as 
the key actors that constitute the international society and involves domestic and international non-state 
actors. The terms ‘international community’ or ‘world society’ are not used here because, although these 
concepts encompass the non-state domain, these concepts imply ‘some form of moral collectivity of 
humankind which exists as an ethical referent even if not organized in that way, and those who see it as 
some kind of agent possessing the capacity for action.’ Barry Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, “‘International 
community’ after Iraq’, International Affairs, 2005, 81 (1): 31-52, 32. 
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territorial stability, and regional and international security.2 This thesis aims to contribute 
to IR and studies by offering a conceptual analysis of the concept of ‘self-determination’ 
and by providing a specific definition of this concept in relation to sub-state nationalist 
claims to independence or autonomy on a specific territory. It explains the success of 
ethnically-defined claims of sub-state nationalist groups to territory and self-
determination by analysing Kurdish nationalism and Kurdistan. It contributes to the 
literature on Kurdish studies by providing a systematic and eclectic theoretical and 
analytical approach to understanding Kurdish nationalists’ use of territorial features and 
its implications for the relationship between Kurdish nationalism and international 
society. 
 Kurdish nationalism and its ideal national homeland, Kurdistan, is a good case 
to use in explaining how such groups frame their self-determination claims to territorial 
autonomy or independence based on their distinct cultural and ethnic characteristics in 
order to help them to maximise their legitimacy and influence in international society. 
The ethnicist assumptions in relation to territory and national self-determination are at 
their most prominent in the notion of Kurdistan, which encompasses sections of the 
territories of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Armenia. Additionally, these ethnicist 
assumptions underpin maps depicting Kurdistan. Kurdish activists in the region and in 
the diaspora have unfailingly promoted the idea of Kurdistan to international society, 
typically framing their promotions using the language of human rights and self-
determination to make their claims as legitimate as possible to those democratic 
countries whose influence they are trying to gain. They have been quite successful in 
generating support among Kurds and in generating sympathy for their cause in 
international society. Their long-standing promotion of Kurdistan and Kurdish identity 
has enjoyed some success compared to other ethnic groups’ claims to distinct identity in 
the same region such as the Assyrian Christians and Turkmens in Iraq. 
The concept of a national homeland for all Kurds and maps depicting this 
unifying homeland stand in stark contrast to the actual divided status of the Kurdish 
nationalist parties. Each of the main Kurdish political parties – namely the Kurdish 
Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Iraq, the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) 
and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) – and Kurdish societies in these 
                                                 
2 Griffiths argues that these challenges require a deeper understanding of these issues than dominant IR 
approaches have provided so far. Martin Griffiths, ‘Self-determination, international society and world 
order’, Macquarie Law Journal, 2003, 3: 29-49, 29. 
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states face different problems that have emerged as a result of the distinct political, 
social, historical and economic circumstances of each state. Today Kurdish parties in 
Iraq have been enjoying a considerable degree of autonomy since the formation of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).3 Iran is the only country where a Kurdish 
state, the Mahabad Republic, which was established in 1946 and lasted only eleven 
months. The ongoing tension and conflict between Kurdish tribes, Kurdish intellectual 
elites and the Iranian state does not look likely to end in the near future. The Kurds in 
Syria continue to be severely suppressed and have been denied citizenship for years, and 
their future status remains ambivalent due to current turmoil in Syria.  
Turkey is where the most seemingly complicated and pressing Kurdish challenge 
presently seems to lie. The PKK and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), the pro-
Kurdish party with representatives in the Turkish Parliament, repeatedly state their 
desire for Kurdish autonomy within Turkey. In recent years they have become more 
assertive in their insistence that they are ready to negotiate a solution as long as their 
currently imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan who was captured by Turkish armed 
forces in 1999, is released and the Turkish government agrees to sit at a negotiation 
table with him.4 However, as long as the government continues to declare publicly that 
they refuse to negotiate with what they consider a terrorist organisation, there is no 
immediate sign of a solution. 
Given this picture, it is a fair statement to say that each Kurdish nationalist 
organisation typically defines its goals and problems in a way that is strictly limited to 
the country in which they reside and in a way that excludes the Kurds and Kurdish 
parties in other states. No contemporary Kurdish nationalist party in the Middle East so 
far has made an explicit demand to establish a greater Kurdistan that would unite all the 
Kurds living in different states within a new single political entity and each nationalist 
movement has its own understanding of the boundaries of the territory they wish to 
have control over.  
Yet Kurdish nationalism has been quite successful in the promotion of the 
notion of Kurdistan and its maps to international society. Kurdistan, the homeland of 
Kurds, and its maps are commonly used in the rhetoric of almost all Kurdish nationalist 
                                                 
3 The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional President and leader of the KDP, Massoud Barzani, receives official 
receptions from other state leaders, including the US and Turkey. Jalal Talabani, the leader of the PUK 
has been the President of Iraq since 2005. 
4 For a recent update see ‘Öcalan is leader not criminal’, Hürriyet Daily News, 22 May 2012, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ocalan-is-leader-not-criminal-bdp-
deputy.aspx?pageID=238&nid=21293&NewsCatID=338, last accessed 28 May 2012. 
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organisations and activist groups, both in the region and in the diaspora. While all 
Kurdish nationalists have claimed ownership of this territory since 4,000 BCE, 
contemporary Kurdish nationalists in the diaspora are particularly attached to the idea of 
greater Kurdistan probably because of the absence of a Kurdish state or a clearly 
definable Kurdish homeland.5 This is evident from the fact that Kurdish activists in the 
diaspora have produced many historical, sociological and political texts to legitimise and 
prove the Kurdish right to statehood and have created and distributed multiple maps of 
Kurdistan. Maps are useful for presenting ethnicist views because, a territory with clear 
boundaries depicted on the map gives the message that the people inhabiting the 
territories within the borders of the map is homogenous. Some examples of these 
cartographical depictions are the maps produced by the Kurdish Institute of Paris and 
the maps of Kurdish historian Mehrdad Izady.6 
 
Figure 1.1: Kurdish Institute of Paris Map of Kurdistan7 
[This content has been removed for reasons of copyright.] 
 
    
Figure 1.2: ‘Administrative Units of Contemporary Kurdistan’ by Mehrdad Izady  
[This content has been removed for reasons of copyright.] 
 
For any sub-state nationalism seeking autonomy or independence, it is essential 
to have a territory. This territory usually has two components: a more or less existing 
territory (a state, administrative region, or geographical region); and the aspirant territory 
showing what the state is imagined to look like. The ‘existing territory’ in the Kurdish 
case refers to: (1) the Kurdistan used as the name of an administrative region during the 
Ottoman and Selcuklu states; (2) the Kurdistan plans and maps or territorial definitions 
prepared by Kurdish intellectuals and tribal leaders in the early twentieth century, which 
relied on the maps produced by colonial army officers and travellers in the nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century; and (3) the small ‘Kurdistans’ that emerged after the 
establishment of Turkey, Iraq and Syria in the 1920s referring to the areas inhabited by 
                                                 
5 Van Bruinessen, Transnational Aspects of the Kurdish Question, Italy: European University Institute, RSC No. 
2000/22, Mediterranean Programme Series, 2000, 7. 
6 Izady’s maps are available at the Kurdish Institute of Paris website, 
http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama/map_of_kurdistan.php, last accessed 14 September 2011. 
Izady’s maps display a green coloured area indicating regions where the majority of the population is 
Kurdish. The boundaries of the green shade are very similar to the boundaries of the aspirant territory of 
Kurdistan. 
7 Kurdish Institute of Paris, http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama/map_of_kurdistan.php, last 
accessed 14 September 2012. 
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Kurds in each state, such as Iraqi Kurdistan (northern Iraq), Turkish Kurdistan (south-
eastern and eastern Turkey), Iranian Kurdistan (south-western Iran) and Syrian 
Kurdistan (a small piece of land in north-east Syria). 
The aspirant territory, on the other hand, is the extensive area cutting across 
multiple countries as depicted in the map of greater Kurdistan. It relies on the 
assumption that ‘the political and the national should be congruent’.8 It represents an 
ambitious territorial assertion encompassing territories from five regional states, Turkey, 
Iraq, Iran, Syria and Armenia (and sometimes Azerbaijan). Kurdish nationalists insist on 
the Kurdish right to ownership of this territory as opposed to the Armenian, Assyrian, 
Turkish and Arab aspirations. Like all other nationalists, Kurds have a subjective view of 
their existence that goes back to ‘time immemorial’ and deploys past 
geographic/administrative terms and definitions to promote the idea that a Kurdish 
nation existed centuries ago. In so doing, they associate pre-modern meanings of 
concepts to the contemporary uses of national, territorial and political identity.9 Thus, 
there are two Kurdistans: one that exists today or historically existed in the past, and 
one that is politically aspired.10  
Today both Kurdish nationalists and their sympathisers use the aspirant idea of 
Kurdistan to refer to the region. For them, notions such as ‘eastern Turkey’ or ‘northern 
Iraq’ appear as insufficient or inappropriate titles to refer to the region. This 
understanding of Kurdistan has moved beyond the discourse of Kurdish nationalists 
and become embedded in the language used by other influential groups. Some officials 
from certain states have adopted similar conceptions when supporting the Kurdish 
cause and encouraged their states to put pressure on regional governments, particularly 
evident in the cases of Turkey and Iraq.11 For instance a report prepared by the 
Congressional Research Service, a research centre that works for the US Congress and 
provides policy and legal analysis for the members of the House and Senate, included a 
map entitled ‘Kurdish area’, which depicted the same boundaries and territories as 
                                                 
8 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 2nd ed., Introduction by John Breuilly, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 
6. 
9 Maria T. O’Shea, Trapped Between the Map and Reality: Geography and Perceptions of Kurdistan, London: 
Routledge, 2004, 2-3; David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, London: I. B. Tauris, 1996, 3. 
10 These two interpretations of the term do not refer to other current uses of Kurdistan, such as the 
Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq, or other non-official uses such as Iranian Kurdistan, 
Turkish Kurdistan, Iraqi Kurdistan and Syrian Kurdistan.  
11 See US Congressmen Bob Filner and Frank Pallone’s speeches, 
http://capitolwords.org/date/1997/05/01/H2152-2_self-determination-for-the-kurds/, last accessed 25 
May 2012.  
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indicated in the aspirant Kurdish nationalist map.12 Although it is well established that 
these maps overlook the heterogeneous character of the population inhabiting the area 
as well as the political boundaries of the existing states, they appear in almost all types of 
sources, from Kurdish websites to non-Kurdish academic works, journals and 
newspapers.13 They typically refer to the region as ‘Kurdish populated areas’ or the 
‘Kurdish region’.14 
Consequently, Kurdish nationalism has been successful in disseminating the 
aspirant Kurdistan map as the most prominent feature and symbol of Kurdish national 
identity. They have become synonymous with ‘Kurdistan’ in the minds of the Kurds and 
become the most significant feature of Kurdish nationalist discourse. The ‘aspirant 
Kurdistan’ has come to be seen as the ‘existing Kurdistan’ in the eyes of Kurdish 
nationalists and many members of international society. These groups take the existence 
of Kurdistan, as indicated by the aspirant map of Kurdistan, for granted and see this 
map as the cartographical reflection of Kurdish territory. Kurdish sympathisers, Kurdish 
and non-Kurdish scholars, certain state departments, state representatives, and some 
international newspapers adopt and utilise maps of Kurdistan to indicate Kurdish 
territories in their speeches, reports and publications. 
 
Figure 1.3: Kurdish Inhabited Areas, The Washington Post in 1999 and 2009. 
[This content has been removed for reasons of copyright.] 
Map available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/inatl/daily/feb99/kurdprofile.htm 
   
Figure 1.4: Kurdish Populated Areas, by Laris Karklis, The Washington Post, 12 October 2007  
[This content has been removed for reasons of copyright.] 
Map available at  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/linkset/2007/10/12/LI2007101201754.html 
 
                                                 
12 Kenneth Katzman, ‘The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq’, Congressional Research Centre, 3 June 2009, 9. 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/125932.pdf, last accessed 18 June 2012. 
13 http://www.economist.com/node/21551111; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/inatl/daily/feb99/kurdprofile.htm, last accessed 28 May 2012. 
14 Jongerden points to this tendency and indicates that it is necessary to be careful not to attach identities 
to geographical regions because this would be a reification of the nationalist view (Interview with Dr 
Joost Jondergen, 4 February 2011, London). Dr Jongerden is a rural sociologist working on the Kurds in 
Turkey at Wageningen University, The Netherlands. Retired Swedish diplomat and Ambassador Dr 
Ingmar Karlsson, says that most of the Swedish public sees it as natural for every nation to have their 
own state. He states that there is no understanding of the divided cultural structures of nations and ethnic 
groups, and Kurdish nationalist groups in Sweden have been influential in creating the perception among 
the Swedish public that Kurds are a united people and that Kurdistan is an existing national homeland 
(Interview with Ingmar Karlsson, 7 December 2009, London). Karlsson wrote a book entitled ‘Kurdistan 
Landet Som Icke Ar’ [When I asked, a Swedish scholar translated the title as ‘Kurdistan: Land that is 
not’]. This book is published in Turkish as Bir Diplomatın Gözüyle Kürt Sorunu [The Kurdish Problem from 
the Perspective of a Diplomat], İstanbul: Homer, 2008. 
 17 
 
Figure 1.5: ‘Kurdish-populated area’15  
[This content has been removed for reasons of copyright.] 
Map available at http://www.economist.com/node/21551111 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Map of the Middle East Before16 
[This content has been removed for reasons of copyright.] 
Map available at http://www.democracyinlebanon.org/Documents/CDL-World/Better-ME-
Peters06.htm 
 
 
Figure 1.7: Map of the Middle East After17 
[This content has been removed for reasons of copyright.] 
Map available at http://www.democracyinlebanon.org/Documents/CDL-World/Better-ME-
Peters06.htm 
 
 
Figure 1.8: Kurdish Inhabited Area18 
[This content has been removed for reasons of copyright.] 
Map available at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kurdish_86.jpg 
 
 
Figure 1.9: Kurdistan Map in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 199819  
[This content has been removed for reasons of copyright.] 
Map available at http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama/map_of_kurdistan.php 
 
 
A Brief Outline of the Literature on Kurds  
The literature on Kurds is mainly composed of in depth historical analyses of the Kurds 
and histories of the development of Kurdish national identity and Kurdish nationalism. 
These studies provide an alternative historical account of the region and its people, 
different from the historical narratives and arguments of the regional states. Their 
observations on the social structure and political organisation of Kurdish society give 
                                                 
15 ‘Rebellious days: A Fresh wave of protests shows how far Turkey is from pacifying its Kurds’, The 
Economist, 24 March 2012. A similar map also appears under the title ‘Predominantly Kurdish Areas’, in 
The Economist, 16 December 2006, 63, Issue 8508. 
16 Ralph Peters, printed in Ralph Peters, ‘Blood Borders: How A Better Middle East Would Look’, Armed 
Forces Journal, June 2006. 
17 Ibid. 
18 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Map of Kurdish Lands, 1992. An earlier CIA map is published 
in a report: Central Intelligence Agency, The Kurdish Minority Problem, 8 December 1948, p. 16. Another 
maps titled ‘Kurdish Areas in the Middle East and Soviet Union’ produced in 1986 shows Kurdish 
settlement in a wider area. 
19 Maps indicating similar boundaries for Kurdistan are also produced by non-Kurdish scholars such as 
David McDowall, one of the leading scholars in Kurdish studies. O’Shea draws attention to the similarity 
of McDowall’s maps to the Kurdistan map of Kurdish Institute of Paris and the maps produced by the 
CIA and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. O’Shea, p. 166. The 1998 Encyclopaedia 
Britannica map also manifests a similarity to those maps. 
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detailed accounts of a case usually neglected in the academic and non-academic 
literature examining regional states. Among these, the most significant and reliable 
sources have been written by Martin Van Bruinessen, David McDowall and Denise 
Natali and Hussein Tahiri. Combined these works locate the longevity and power of 
Kurdish nationalism in the regional and local historical events, particularly the WWI, 
when the Kurds came closest to a possible Kurdish state in their history. Additionally, 
they emphasise that their peripheral location has given Kurdish tribal leaders in the past 
some degree of authority in their internal affairs. Therefore, centralisation, assimilation 
or exclusion policies of the new states led Kurdish leaders to react and mobilise 
dissident movements against the states they are located. These reactionary movements 
have enabled the endurance of Kurdish nationalism. 
Martin Van Bruinessen’s Agha, Shaikh and the State is one of the most influential 
historical and sociological studies undertaken on the Kurds.20 This work examines the 
social and political structures of Kurdistan and deals with the role of tribal loyalties 
within Kurdish societies. Van Bruinessen tackles the question of how tribal and 
primordial loyalties transform into national loyalties in the Kurdish case, and emphasises 
the role of economic and political circumstances in this transformation. Through a 
detailed analysis of the sheikhly and tribal order among Kurdish society and through his 
observations from his fieldwork in the region, Van Bruinessen’s provides significant 
insights into the internal structures of Kurdish society and how they have responded to 
the formation of new states in the region and to economic, social and political changes.21  
Moreover, Van Bruinessen has provided detailed accounts of Kurds in Iraq and 
Turkey and the relationship between Kurdish groups and their host states.22 Van 
Bruinessen has also undertaken studies on social processes that affect Kurdish society 
and Kurdish nationalism, particularly focusing on migration, refugees, and transnational 
relations. Considering the impact of Kurdish nationalism on the Kurdish cause, Van 
Bruinessen has argued that Kurdish nationalist movements have focused on territorial 
nationalism and political independence without an accurate awareness of the political 
and economic circumstances of the states and societies they live in, and this has 
                                                 
20 Martin Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan, New Jersey: 
Zed, 1992.  
21 Martin Van Bruinessen, ‘Kurds, states and tribes’, in Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawod (eds.), Tribes 
and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East, London: Saqi, 2002, 165-183. 
22 Martin Van Bruinessen, Kürtlük Türklük Alevilik [Kurdishness, Turkishness, Alevism], İstanbul: İletişim, 
2002; Kurdish Ethno-nationalism versus Nations-building States: Collected Articles, İstanbul: The İsis Press, 2000. 
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rendered their aims unrealistic.23 Van Bruinessen’s detailed account of different aspects 
of Kurdish society and politics, and his consideration of Kurdish nationalism as an 
outsider within the context of external factors have informed the way this thesis 
understands the impact of tribal structure on the development of Kurdish society and 
the territorial focus of Kurdish nationalism.  
McDowall’s A Modern History of the Kurds represents a comprehensive historical 
account of the Kurdish society in the Middle East and their interactions with the 
regional states they inhabit. In this book, McDowall traces the problems experienced by 
the Kurds back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the policies of the 
Ottoman and Iranian empires towards their Kurdish populations, and provides useful 
insights in understanding the internal and external dynamics that shape Kurdish 
nationalism.24 In the report he prepared for the Minority Rights Group, McDowall 
explores the issues that affect the identity and political development of the Kurds. He 
argues that although Kurds have mainly blamed the states they inhabit for their inability 
to create their own state, and that this is indeed a contributory factor, in addition 
Kurdish tribal structure and internal rivalry at the beginning of the twentieth century 
(which is a more or less continuing feature of Kurdish society) also defined the political 
progress of the Kurdish society.25 McDowall indicates that the map of Kurdistan he has 
included in the report is not a political map, but merely indicates the location of the 
Kurds. He also acknowledges the heterogeneous composition of the population in this 
region.26  
Denise Natali’s work is another insightful work on the Kurds. Natali provides an 
analytically sophisticated and comparative analysis of the Kurdish societies in the Middle 
East and the implications of state formation processes on the development of the 
Kurdish identity in each state. Natali emphasises the development of transnational 
Kurdish nationalism, but argues that this has not managed to unite the Kurds under one 
movement.27 Another significant work providing a historical account of past and 
contemporary Kurdish society and Kurdish nationalism is Wadie Jwaideh. This is a 
                                                 
23 Martin Van Bruinessen, ‘Kurdish society, ethnicity, nationalism and refugee problems,’ in Philip G. 
Kreyenbroek and Stephen Sperl (eds.), The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, London: Routledge, 1992, 33-
67; Van Bruinessen, Transnational. 
24 McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds. 
25 McDowall, The Kurds, London: The Minority Rights Group International, 1996, p. 4. 
26 McDowall, Kurds, 5-6. But interestingly, although the density of the Kurdish population has been 
indicated in the map, the external boundaries of the map are strikingly similar to the aspirant Kurdistan 
map. 
27 Denise Natali, The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey and Iran, New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 2005. 
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piece of work that is clearly normatively sympathetic with the Kurdish cause and it 
draws on a substantive amount of archival sources to provide a very detailed account of 
the origins and development of Kurdish nationalism.28 In addition to these studies 
mentioned looking at Kurds and Kurdish nationalism, there are many other studies 
looking at the development and structure of Kurdish society and Kurdish nationalism in 
a regional context or more local contexts.29 Most of these studies perceive a pervasive 
Kurdish identity that led to the emergence of Kurdish nationalism back in late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and explain the endurance of Kurdish 
nationalism based on this assumption. 
Although the literature on the Kurds is mainly constituted of historical and 
sociological studies, there is also a considerable number of studies that aims to construct 
a connection between Kurdish nationalism and international politics. Some of these 
studies look at the influence of the problems encountered by Kurds and the activities of 
Kurdish nationalists on Middle Eastern politics and vice versa. Among these, Robert 
Olson’s work is particularly important because of his focus on the centrality of the 
Kurds to understanding Middle Eastern politics in international relations, particularly in 
relation to Turkey and Iraq.30 Olson looks at the policies of regional states, particularly 
Iraq and Turkey, towards the Kurds and the Kurdish parties’ response to those policies. 
He discusses the relationship between Kurdish political parties and regional states and 
the implications of these on the wider Middle Eastern politics, and he addresses the 
issue of Kurdish independence only in relation to the Kurds of Iraq.  
There are also studies that provide regional political and foreign policy analyses 
or international political historical analyses of the region in relation to the Kurdish case. 
They analyse the impact of the Kurdish problem and the activities of Kurdish political 
parties on the foreign policy of the regional states toward each other and non-regional 
states. The studies that look at the Kurds in Turkey are particularly abundant and 
                                                 
28 Wadie Jwaideh, Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development, New York: Syracuse University 
Press, 2006.  
29 Other examples that look at the political and social history of Kurds and Kurdish nationalism are Edgar 
O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995; Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An 
Historical and Political Study, London, Oxford University Press, 1966; Robert Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish 
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Tahiri, Structure of Kurdish Society and the Struggle for a Kurdish state, Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda Publishers, 
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2008; Kamal Madhar Ahmad, Kurdistan during the First World War, London: Saqi, 1994; William Eagleton 
Jr., The Kurdish Republic of 1946, London: Oxford University Press, 1963. 
30 Robert Olson, Blood, beliefs and ballots: the management of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, 2007-2009, Costa 
Mesa: Mazda, 2009; Robert Olson, The Goat and the Butcher: Nationalism and State Formation in Kurdistan-Iraq 
since the Iraqi War, Costa Mesa: Mazda, 2005. 
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provide useful insights to understanding the Kurdish issue from an international 
political perspective.31 Among these Kirişçi and Winrow look at issues related to politics 
and security, as well as using the notions such as nationhood, ethnic group, self-
determination to shed light on the analysis of the case. They argue that ethnic conflict in 
Turkey can only be resolved through political solutions and provide alternative policy or 
administrative solutions to the problem.32 There is an increasing number of sources 
looking at the international political aspect of the Kurdish problem and providing 
alternative views.33  
Other works in the literature that look at the Kurdish case from an international 
politics perspective are the ones undertaken on the Kurds of Iraq and the formation of 
the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Among these Gunter’s and O’Leary, 
McGarry and Salih’s works are particularly insightful. Gunter has contributed to the 
literature on Kurds with insightful political analysis in relation to the Kurds of Iraq as 
well as Turkey.34 He considers the developments taking place in Turkey and Iraq as 
having a positive impact on the status of the Kurds. In Iraq, the KRG has achieved 
autonomy with the potential for independence in the case of a failing Iraqi democracy, 
while in Turkey, the EU accession process has provided Kurds with increased cultural 
and democratic rights. Focusing on the achievability of a political solution to the 
Kurdish problem, Gunter argues that in Turkey this is possible through integrating the 
Kurds into the Turkish political system.35 Gunter seems to envision the possibility of a 
solution that focuses on a democratic solution for Turkey in general rather than on 
territorial-ethnic autonomy for Kurds. Therefore, he seems to be less supportive of 
politics formed around ethnic and cultural distinctiveness. 
O’Leary et al’s edited book, on the other hand, discusses the future of Kurdistan 
in Iraq and argues that a Kurdistan within a federal and united Iraq best serves the 
interests of the Iraqis, other states in the Middle East and other states. This book is 
                                                 
31 Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998; 
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33 Marianna Charountaki, The Kurds and US Foreign Policy: International Relations in the Middle East since 1945, 
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important because of its theoretical contribution to the literature. It incorporates the 
debates on national identity into the analysis of the Kurds in Iraq and argues that a 
political system that acknowledges the distinctive cultural and ethnic characteristics of 
its constituent ‘nations’ within a ‘plurinational’ federation is the best solution for 
avoiding conflict in multi-ethnic societies.36 Their argument constitutes an example of 
the sympathetic view to understanding sub-states nationalist groups’ ethnically-framed 
claims to territory and to autonomist or separatist national self-determination. Such 
views reify the importance of ethnic and cultural distinctiveness of such groups and they 
associate the improvement of these groups’ social and political status with cultural rights 
and democracy.  
Most studies mentioned in the previous pages provide insightful and helpful 
analysis and arguments on the Kurdish case at a domestic and regional context from a 
mainly historical or sociological perspective, or they provide analysis in relation to state 
domestic and foreign state politics. Apart from a couple of exceptions, such as O’Leary 
et al, their analytical focus does not directly incorporate the theoretical and conceptual 
tools of Nationalism or IR studies. They incorporate the international aspect either 
through linking their accounts to developments in international history, or to the foreign 
policies of regional states in a regional or international context, and the foreign policies 
of powerful states, such as the British or the US, toward regional states. This aspect of 
the international is important and has provided a great degree of insights, however, also 
remains limited because these studies do not directly look at the Kurds in an 
international context, but look at them through regional states and their domestic and 
international politics. 
On the other hand, there are a rich number of sources that look at the Kurdish 
case from a nationalism perspective. These works provide interesting insider’s views and 
look at the injustices that Kurdish society has endured throughout its history. Most of 
these works usually take Kurdistan and Kurdish nationalism as given and study its 
development within the framework of human and cultural rights of ethnic communities. 
They mostly adopt an ethnicist understanding of Kurdish identity and consider Kurdish 
national identity to have existed in the pre-modern age. They take ethnicity as an 
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important factor in contemporary Kurdish politics.37 For instance, the Kurdish scholar 
Entessar analyses Kurdish nationalism in regional and international politics in relation to 
the Kurdish people’s rights to self-determination and human rights. He casts doubt on 
the possibility of the social and political integration of Kurdish people into the nation-
states in which they live, and he considers ‘Kurdish ethnonationalism’ as a challenge to 
the nation-state system in the Middle East.38  
In addition to these rather subjective but informative analyses on the difficulties 
Kurdish people have gone through because of their distinct identity, there are also 
insightful historical and political studies that underplay the ethnic factor. These studies 
more effectively link the Kurdish case to wider debates on nationalism. For instance, 
Vali’s edited work involves different theoretical analyses of the Kurdish national identity 
and its origins.39 Halliday suggests the application of modernist nationalism theories to 
explaining the emergence and development of Kurdish nationalism within a historical 
context that takes into account political, military, economic and ideological 
developments.40 Janet Klein draws theoretically and empirically informed conclusions on 
Kurdish activities in the late Ottoman era and argues that Kurdish elites of this era were 
‘Kurdists’ not nationalists in the sense we understand today. Although the leaders 
individually might have adhered to Kurdish nationalism in their mind, rather than 
adhering to the idea of a unified Kurdish nation, they had their own individual political 
agendas and they considered themselves as members of a multi-national Ottoman state. 
Klein’s insights on this period have been useful in developing the argument of this 
thesis on the emergence of Kurdish nationalism.41  
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Other important source Kurdish nationalism is the journalistic writings that 
provide interviews, observations and dynamic stories. For instance Laizer’s book 
provides a detailed and lively descriptive account of Kurdish life through descriptions of 
songs, customs and daily routine both in the villages and cities.42 Hasan Cemal’s work 
provides an account of his interview with key representatives of Kurdish nationalists 
and his insights on the issue.43 As in all nationalist literatures, there are also works that 
are quite superficial and propagandist in nature, written by Kurdish nationalist scholars 
and outsiders, reflecting the perspectives of the Kurds or the regional states. The 
Turkish sociologist Kongar argues that most of the studies on Kurdish nationalism in 
Turkey are generally political and historical analyses, and some are sponsored by the 
state or non-governmental organisations that dominate the general political view in 
Turkey defending the unitary structure of the state.44 Moreover, Henze suggested that 
both Turks and foreigners are discouraged, even sometimes obstructed by the state 
from making in-depth studies.45 This has started to change and indeed there are 
increasing numbers of studies in Turkey undertaken on the Kurds. Additionally, some 
partisan studies have been undertaken by non-regional writers.46 For instance, Kaplan 
argues that the actual border between Iran and Turkey means nothing, since everyone on 
both sides is a Kurd and describes Atatürk’s statue in Doğu Beyazıt – a town with a 
mixed population in the east of Turkey – as having the face of the occupier rather than 
of the nation builder.47  
Although there are some biased accounts on Kurds and Kurdistan the studies 
on Kurds and Kurdish nationalism have largely explored key aspects of Kurdish society, 
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its history and its current status, and its relation with the regional states. All these studies 
have contributed to the establishment and growth of a relatively new and developing 
body of literature, and have effectively explained the endurance of Kurdish national 
identity and Kurdish nationalism. Therefore, the existing literature on this topic has 
been very helpful and has greatly informed this thesis, but what largely remains 
understudied in this literature is the study of Kurdish nationalism as a sub-state 
nationalism within an international context.  
Most of the existing work has projected an international perspective through the 
examination of the status of Kurds in each state and looked at how this influences the 
domestic, regional and international relations of these states. However, Kurdish 
nationalist groups, both in the region and in the diaspora, engage with international 
society and their interaction does not necessarily take place through their regional host-
states. Moreover, these groups’ interactions with international society occur within an 
international normative and political context that influences both the non-state actors 
and international society. Therefore, any complete understanding of Kurdish 
nationalism and Kurdistan requires a consideration of the international context in a way 
that combines an IR theoretical perspective with theoretical understandings of the 
politics of nationalism from nationalism theories.  
 This thesis focuses on the territorial aspect of Kurdish nationalism in particular. 
Territory and territorial identity are not only important for nationalism in justifying their 
self-determination claims, but they are also important component of the contemporary 
international system which is based on territorially defined national units. Despite the 
prominent role of territory in the emergence and development of Kurdish nationalism 
and its centrality to understanding Kurdish nationalist groups’ activities today, the 
territorial aspect of Kurdish nationalism remains understudied and it has not been 
problematised in the academic literature. Although many of the above-mentioned 
studies acknowledge the importance of the territorial aspect of Kurdish nationalism, 
they usually merely describe this feature and what it means for Kurdish national identity 
and depict the history of the region as the history of Kurdistan. In other words, most of 
these studies see the history of Kurdistan as identical to the history Kurdish 
nationalism.48 They see the territorial feature as merely linked to essential and historical 
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ethnic identity. They overlook the political claims behind this feature and underestimate 
its political implications for Kurdish nationalism and other regional and international 
actors. This thesis aims to take territory as an independent factor in influencing the way 
Kurdish nationalism evolved and the way it carries out its activities today. It provides a 
theoretical perspective informed by IR and nationalism studies to sub-state Kurdish 
nationalists’ claims to territory and territorial identity using the notion self-
determination. 
Kurdistan and its maps are the most significant and visible aspects of Kurdish 
nationalism. This is partly because, when defining their national identity, Kurdish 
nationalists often draw upon the territorial characteristics of a Kurdish way of life and 
the importance of geographic features in its culture. But, most importantly, usually using 
the rhetoric of human rights and democracy, Kurdish nationalists often state that 
territorial autonomy or independence is the only way to end the suffering of the 
Kurdish people and bring justice to the region. Therefore, the idea of Kurdish 
habitation in a clearly definable territory has been the most important feature of the 
nationalist discourse and historiography. Despite this, the territorial aspect of Kurdish 
nationalism is a largely unexplored area. An exception to this general trend in studies of 
the Kurds is social geographer Maria T. O’Shea’s study which analyses the social 
structure of Kurdish society from a geographical perspective.49 Although O’Shea does 
not link her examination to the theories of nationalism in a systematic way, her work 
presents a very good background for studies that seek to analyse Kurdish nationalism 
from a territorial aspect. O’Shea’s insights have provided a significant basis and 
inspiration for this thesis.  
O’Shea focuses on the territorial aspect of Kurdish national identity and 
Kurdish nationalism. She considers maps of Kurdistan as a discourse and as symbols of 
the effort to construct a Kurdish nationalist myth based on historical and territorial 
perceptions or imaginations. She takes these maps and historical narratives about the 
origins of the Kurds as constructions created in order to produce a sense of solidarity 
and unity in the minds of the people in the region and to enable them to connect their 
identity to the territory they inhabit. She argues that the history and present condition of 
Kurdistan are bound up with its geography and this geography influences Kurdish 
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people’s perception of themselves and their territory. She uses the term ‘geography of 
nationalism’ and considers the map of Kurdistan as a ‘propaganda map’ and as an 
obvious aspect of the Kurdish nationalist mythology.50 However, O’Shea argues that the 
Kurdistan map does not reflect the realities of Kurdish society or of the region as a 
whole.  
This thesis agrees with O’Shea’s argument that the map of greater Kurdistan is a 
propaganda map and that it has an unrealistic basis. Building on her argument, this 
thesis argues that the promotion of the Kurdistan map as the Kurdish homeland has a 
strong role in the success of Kurdish nationalists in drawing sympathy among would-be 
nationals and in international society for their ethnically-defined claims to territory and 
national self-determination. The parallels between the way Kurdish nationalists 
understand the concept of Kurdistan and its maps, and the way in which some 
government representatives, scholars, journalists and writers in international society use 
this notion and map are striking. The ways these two groups conceive Kurdistan are 
similar, because both groups attribute an ethnic identity to the territory of Kurdistan 
and its map. One of the reasons for this is the influence of the international political and 
normative framework – particularly self-determination for ethnic groups, human rights 
and democratic rights – on both groups’ perceptions. In this framework, self-
determination appears to justify the right to autonomy or statehood for groups with 
distinct ethnic, cultural, linguistic and territorial features. There is an increasing tendency 
within international society to interpret self-determination in a similar way, especially if 
the separatist or autonomist group claims that the government of the state in which they 
reside abuse their human, cultural or democratic rights. Kurdish nationalists effectively 
use this interpretation of self-determination to further their pursuit for independence, 
and their claims fit well with the prevalent norms in international society in relation to 
the territorial and ethnic identity of sub-state nationalist groups and their right to 
democracy. With this in mind, this thesis offers an analysis that deals with issues, 
particularly self-determination claims for territorial autonomy or independence, which 
intersect the fields of IR, Nationalism and Kurdish studies.  
 
Analytical and Theoretical Focus 
As mentioned in the previous pages, this thesis argues that a combination of the insights 
of IR and Nationalism provides a useful, more holistic and encompassing approach to 
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understanding the issues in question. It focuses on the activities of sub-state nationalist 
groups and their interaction with international society. The case of Kurdish nationalism 
and its promotion of the notion of Kurdistan within international society illustrate and 
prove the necessity for adopting an approach that brings together different fields and 
perspectives for the study of sub-state nationalist actors, their territorial claims and their 
relationship with international society. Moreover, the analysis of the territorial claims of 
sub-state nationalists from a theoretical perspective is largely neglected both in the 
studies of nationalism and IR. Therefore, through the study of the territorial aspect of 
Kurdish nationalism, this thesis aims to show the necessity of overcoming this neglect. 
 
International Relations 
In IR there is a lack of substantial research dealing with self-determination and 
nationalism with a focus on territorial demands. Mainstream IR theories usually treat the 
domestic and the international spheres as separate and consider nationalism as an 
ideology related to the domestic sphere and see the principle of self-determination as 
mainly related to international law.51 Considering nationalism as a domestic 
phenomenon and understanding self-determination merely in terms of its legal 
implications rather than its political implications limits the ability to incorporate these 
phenomena into the study of IR theory. 
Self-determination is a policy, a norm, a goal and an institution that is located at 
both the domestic and the international levels. The international normative context 
informs and shapes domestic and sub-state actors and their activities by providing a 
framework for what is legitimate and what is not. Three different theoretical 
perspectives in the existing IR literature will be used in a complementary way in order to 
achieve an international analysis of sub-state nationalists and their interactions with the 
international soviety. These three theoretical views are realist IR theory that is informed 
by historical sociological methodology, the English School’s international society 
approach (particularly Mayall), and Risse and Sikkink’s constructivist view. 
 Realism and neo-realism see the ‘international’ as defined by the relations 
between states and by the structure of the international system. Power and interest 
define the norms and rules states adhere to and the behaviours they follow. Therefore, 
neo-realism would be explanatory in understanding how and why the ‘external’ meaning 
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of self-determination has begun to be used in relation to the human and democratic 
rights of sub-state groups.52 A rational choice perspective assumes that a particular usage 
of self-determination serves the political and economic interests of the actors that use it. 
But this approach cannot explain how this norm has come to be interpreted in this way 
or what has changed in the ‘international’ to create new norms and principles.  
 A historical sociological interpretation of the neo-realist theory allows a better 
contextual understanding of what goes on within the state and how this influences the 
international, as well as providing increased awareness of the historical context.53 
Historical Sociology in IR shows the interconnectedness between the domestic and the 
international spheres by questioning the dominant understanding of the ‘international’ 
as being separate from other spheres and questioning assumptions about the 
unchanging character of international relations.54 The historical sociology of 
international relations acknowledges the role of domestic political, social and economic 
structures and non-state actors, as well as international structures, and looks at long-
term historically contingent structural factors.55 Still, a historical sociological 
interpretation of neo-realist theory would not provide a complete answer to why sub-
state groups that make ethnically-defined territorial claims and demand self-
determination in the form of autonomy or separation succeed in generating sympathy in 
international society. Therefore, this thesis also incorporates a constructivist view of the 
relationship between ideas and politics.  
 Constructivists emphasise the role of norms and ideas in shaping the actions of 
political actors. As such, constructivist theorists assume that politics is socially 
constructed and that specific occurrences do not take place independently from the 
international constitution in which more or less recognised principles and ideas exist.56 
Risse and Sikkink’s constructivist approach is particularly useful for the purposes of the 
thesis. Based on the general constructivist argument, they argue that international 
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democratisation is central to understanding the norms of socialisation.57 Risse and 
Sikkink, through an analysis of a number of cases, look at the conditions under which 
international human rights norms are implemented.58 Therefore, this thesis adopts the 
argument of Risse and Sikkink to understand the use of Kurdish sub-state nationalist 
groups’ use of self-determination in relation to human rights and democracy discourses.  
 However, politics cannot be explained purely through reference to the 
socialisation process and constructivism somewhat overlooks the importance of the 
contingent historical and political context in the domestic and international realms. The 
English School of IR, particularly international society thinking, provides the possibility 
of studying sub-state groups’ activities within an international context with an emphasis 
on the common interests, rules, norms and values in inter-state relations that influence 
the states’ and other actors decisions and behaviour.59 According to this view, ideas 
seem to disseminate not only through interactions between states but also they become 
part of a set of international institutions that are separate from individual states.60 The 
international society approach to understanding international relations sees international 
society as the result of shared interest and identity among states which creates and 
maintains norms, rules and institutions.61 Therefore, the English School’s international 
society approach provides the conceptual and theoretical tools to study and understand 
why self-determination in relation to human rights and democracy is increasingly used 
by sub-state groups and why international society provides a normative framework for 
this use. Mayall’s analysis is particularly useful for the purposes of this thesis because he 
argues that nationalism and international society historically have been in interaction 
with each other and concepts such as self-determination, state formation/legitimacy and 
sovereignty have evolved as a result of this interaction. This enables the analysis of the 
nationalist goals and activities of sub-state groups in relation to international society.  
 Overall, these theories assume that norms, rules and patterns of behaviour 
disseminate among states and transnational actors, but the way they explain the 
formation and dissemination of norms and shared behaviour vary. When taken as 
complementary explanations, these theories and arguments in IR provide a more 
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complete analytical and conceptual framework to understand the relationship between 
sub-state nationalist groups and international society. However, the study of nationalism 
as an international phenomenon is largely neglected in IR studies. A small number of 
scholars, namely, Griffiths and Sullivan, Halliday and Mayall acknowledge the 
importance of understanding nationalism in IR and see nationalism as an international 
phenomenon.62 Following these scholars, and using the IR conceptual and theoretical 
frameworks explained above, this thesis considers self-determination as an international 
political principle with normative implications. It understands sub-state nationalist 
movements with self-determination claims as international actors. Sub-state nationalist 
separatist groups influence and are influenced by international political circumstances as 
well as by international normative frameworks. Such a perspective provides instructive 
insights not only into the analysis of sub-state groups and how they develop, but also 
into understanding how sub-state nationalist groups interact with international society. 
In more general terms, it also highlights the importance of understanding domestic 
conditions and structures when studying international relations, and the significance of 
taking into consideration the international political and normative context to understand 
the motives of non-state international actors. 
Social geographers and political sociologists have often argued that the concept 
of ‘territory’ is a taken for granted issue in the mainstream IR literature, particularly 
realist and liberal IR theories. Most prominently, Agnew challenges the geographical 
assumptions IR scholars employ concerning the role of territory in political and 
economic life and argues that these assumptions lead social scientists to take the 
territorial extension and boundaries of state power for granted.63 The IR scholar Ruggie 
argued that modern territorial space is based on ‘territorially disjoint, mutually exclusive, 
functionally similar, sovereign states’.64 Similar to Agnew, Ruggie argues that IR scholars 
tend to take space and time for granted as ‘self-evident attributions’.65 Brenner and 
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Elden, argue that the question of territory has been ‘oddly undertheorized in the post-
1970s literatures on international relations’.66 
Although Agnew, Ruggie, Brenner and Elden mainly focus on state territories, 
their arguments are also applicable to non-state groups, particularly sub-state groups. 
Ruggie argues that politics is about rule, and in the modern world this rule is based on 
‘territorially defined, fixed, and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate dominion’.67 
However, he criticises the assumption that states have political and economic authority 
over their jurisdictional territory. Deriving from this it could be argued that sub-state 
nationalist groups desire to have their own territorial dominion because they also 
embrace the idea that the modern world is based on territorially defined entities. They 
do this through attributing a national/ethnic identity to the territory they claim and to 
the people inhabiting that territory. If politics is about rule then, in the case of separatist 
nationalisms, politics is about the attempt to self-rule. A sub-state nationalist group aims 
to create, in Ruggie’s terms, their ‘territorially defined, fixed, and mutually exclusive 
enclaves of legitimate dominion’.68 Moreover, in achieving their aim they use the 
discourse and methods of politics, such as collective security and international 
legitimation through reference to human and democratic rights. This shows the need 
and possibility to study sub-state nationalist groups from an IR perspective and this 
thesis, through analysing the territorial aspect of Kurdish nationalism from a combined 
IR and nationalism perspective, aims to illustrate the need to further open up the issue 
of territory in IR theory. 
 
Nationalism 
Nationalism and ethnicity studies generally look at sub-state separatist movements from 
a historical, sociological or political perspective and refer to the international context 
usually only in relation to international political history. These studies generally look at 
elements as language, culture, ethnicity, state institutions and territory in order explain 
the phenomena of nations and nationalism. For culturalist primordialists and 
perennialists, for instance, nations can be identified through their distinctive way of life, 
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their attachment to a territorial homeland and their struggle for political autonomy.69 On 
the other hand, ethno-symbolists concentrate on the myths and memories, sacred 
territory, collective destiny and the golden age as important determinants in explaining 
nationalisms.70 For instance, Smith accepts that territory is socially constructed and that 
it is humans who give meaning to that territory, but he also seems to assume that 
specific territorial associations asserted by nationalists are given and argues that their 
assertions should have an implication on the political life of a group of people.71 
Scholars that study nations and nationalism from a modernist perspective, 
however, do not offer clear-cut definitions of nations and nationalism. Instead they take 
them as novel processes of modernisation that are used to mobilise and unite 
populations in new ways to cope with modern conditions.72 They are interested in 
ethnicity, territory, culture and identity primarily as consequences and necessities of the 
modern processes of capitalism and imperialism, industrialisation, print-capitalism and 
state-formation, or as suitable instruments for the states, elites and nationalists in order 
to impose their ideology on the people. For instance, according to Gellner, territorial 
attachment is something that loosens as a result of the culture of industrialism and with 
the emergence of a unified state.73 He argues that whether nations have ethnic pasts or 
not is irrelevant to understanding nations today because the reason for their emergence 
is due to modernisation processes rather than their given or constructed cultural, ethnic, 
territorial or linguistic traits.74 Anderson offers some insights on the territorial aspect 
that help to create the ‘imagination’ of nation-states and considers the census, the map 
and the museum as three institutions that shaped colonial states’ imagination of their 
territory. For Anderson, the census showed the nature of the human beings the states 
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ruled, the map illustrated the geography of their domain and museums represented the 
legitimacy of their ancestry.75  
Nationalism theories provide significant insights to understand cultural, political, 
ethnic, and linguistic sources of nation formation and the role of nationalism in 
affecting the political and social structure of societies. Therefore, particularly the 
modernist theories of nationalism have greatly informed this thesis. But most theories 
of nationalism neglect the impact of the structure of international society and the role of 
international norms and rules in creating or leading to certain movements and in 
shaping their political behaviour. The institutions and structure of international society 
provide the context for nationalism and its politics, and international norms give 
legitimacy to certain ideas and behaviours. Sub-state nationalist groups, like any 
international actor, act within a framework of internationally legitimate or illegitimate 
rules and ideas. Therefore, their activities and the consequences of their activities in 
regional and international settings cannot be studied without an awareness of wider 
regional and international politics as well as the norms that constitute the international 
normative framework.  
Additionally, within studies on nationalism territory is usually mentioned as one 
of the key dimensions of national identity, together with language, culture, ethnicity and 
religion. Most nationalism scholars seem to agree that there is a connection between 
territory and nations. For primordialists and ethno-symbolists the connection is more 
organic than constructed, while for others it is mostly a consequence of modern nations’ 
need to define their territorial boundaries for the purposes of economic, political and 
administrative efficiency.76 In any case, the connection between territory and national 
identity is often acknowledged in Nationalism theories, but the reasons for this link and 
its implications for the formation and development of nationalist movements are 
typically neglected. Furthermore, in nationalism theories, the territorial dimension is 
usually seen as a feature related to political authority and, compared to other features, it 
is understood as a less problematic feature of nations and nationalisms and as 
dependent on other factors such as politics, economics or geographical characteristics. 
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Social geographers emphasise the importance of a more extensive study of the 
territorial aspect of nationalism.77 They argue that nationalism is a territorial form of 
ideology firmly rooted in territory, place and space, and that nationalist movements 
construct alternative geographies and histories upon place and time. These scholars 
emphasise the significance of territory in nationalist ideologies, politics and strategies, 
which have generally been underestimated and passed over in writings on nationalism. 
They see nationalism as a territorial and political response to the changing world.78 
‘Territoriality’ is ‘the attempt by an individual or group to influence, affect or control 
objects, people and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic 
area’.79 This definition is applicable to many nationalism cases, including Kurdish 
nationalism, which has a very visible territorial aspect both in its emergence and 
throughout its development.  
In short, ‘territoriality’ provides a key to the analysis of nations and nationalism 
and territory should be appreciated as the basis and political source of nation-building in 
a world of states.80 Surely the territorial basis of nationalisms cannot be understood 
completely detached from factors such as history, politics, economy and international 
politics. Nevertheless, studying sub-state nationalist groups’ attempts to attain 
autonomous or independent authority on a particular territory requires more careful 
study of the territorial feature than has been done so far. Therefore, this thesis aims to 
show this necessity through a close examination of the notion of Kurdistan, its role in 
the emergence and development of Kurdish nationalism, and its use in the promotion 
of Kurdish nationalist claims to the outside world. 
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Kurdish nationalism 
This thesis perceives Kurdish nationalism from a modernist perspective and emphasises 
the crucial role of international, historical and political factors in the construction of 
national identities and in the formation of the Kurdish nationalist movement. Most of 
the studies on the Kurds adopt an essentialist and primordialist view, and overlook the 
modern and constructed character of Kurdish identity and the socially constructed 
nature of its features. Kurdish national identity did not emerge in a context defined by 
most modernist theories that typically focus on industrialised and developed contexts, 
and there was no existing Kurdish state to forge a Kurdish national identity. Therefore, 
the argument that nations and their attachments, like culture and territory, are given and 
primordial and that these primordial features precede all social and political interaction, 
appear to be strong in the Kurdish case.81 
Nevertheless, modernist approaches to understanding nations and nationalisms 
have significant implications for the study of the Kurdish case.82 A number of scholars 
have drawn attention to the necessity of a more direct application of the debates on 
nationalism to the nationalisms of the Middle East.83 Fred Halliday offers a modernist 
reading of the history of Kurdish nationalism, applying four broad processes of 
modernism – war and conflict, state building, ideology and socio-economic change.84 
His analysis provides a vision for incorporating the political and historical development 
of nationalist movements within a theoretical framework and challenges the general 
assumption that modernism is not explanatory in understanding how nationalism 
emerges in less developed or less industrialised contexts.85 
Vali, in his attempt to understand the emergence of Kurdish nationalism from 
the perspective of nationalism theories, also adopts a modernist perspective for the 
analysis of Kurdish nationalism. Vali argues that Kurdish nationalism is ‘a product of 
modernity’ that is associated with the application of the modern nation-state system in 
the Middle East.86 He argues that although an established nation-state did not directly 
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create Kurdish nationalism, the institution of the nation-state led and contributed to its 
creation through assimilationist policies towards their minorities.87  
Building on Halliday’s and Vali’s insights this thesis argues that Kurdish 
nationalism emerged as a result of the formation of nation-states in the region. This is 
not only because newly formed states imposed their chosen identity on their 
populations, which caused reactions, but also because the idea of creating their own 
state defined the purposes of many political organisations in that period and after.88 The 
WWI period, and the state building processes that followed it, had the most important 
impact on the emergence of Kurdish nationalism. Here, John Breuilly’s explanation on 
the politics of nationalism and its relation to the nation-state institution is particularly 
useful in understanding the role of the state in the emergence of Kurdish nationalism. 
Breuilly argues that ‘nationalism as politics is distinctively modern’ and ‘nationalism is 
inconceivable without the state and vice versa.’89 The goal of nationalism is the desire 
for autonomy, usually in the form of a sovereign state, on behalf of the nation on a 
national territory.90 Especially in the twentieth century, after which clear examples of 
nation-state formations had taken place and the nation-state was accepted as the 
political norm, popular nationalist movements began to emerge without existing state 
institutions.91 Based on this, it could be assumed that a modern and political conception 
of nationalism not only applies to state nationalisms but also to sub-state nationalisms. 
In this sense, the idea of a national territory, which emerged as a result of the 
establishment of the nation-state system based on nation-state territories, provided a 
context for the emergence of Kurdish nationalism.92  
Based on this background, for the study of Kurdish nationalists’ political 
activities and their interactions with international society, this thesis uses, (1) IR theory 
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with a wider definition of international actors, encompassing not only states but also 
other non-state actors, and acknowledging the role of international institutions and 
norms;93 (2) a modernist understanding of nations and nationalism, with a focus on the 
territory and the state as political institution; and (3) a modernist interpretation of 
Kurdistan and Kurdish nationalism.   
To sum up, the issue of sub-state nationalist groups’ demands for territorial 
autonomy and independence is undertheorised and understudied. Considering the 
general status of the Nationalism and IR literatures in relation to self-determination and 
sub-state nationalist groups, this thesis contributes to these literatures by studying and 
problematising the role of Kurdistan as an independent factor in the emergence and 
development of Kurdish nationalism, and the implications of Kurdish nationalists’ 
promotion of their right to self-determination for territorial autonomy or independence 
on international society. 
 
Summary of the Argument and the Chapters 
This thesis suggests that the perceptions of Kurdistan as an ethnic territory in the eyes 
of both Kurdish nationalists and sections of international society are enabled by three 
features of international society and Kurdish case. Chapters 2 and 3 analyse the first 
feature, Chapters 4 and 5 analyse the second feature and Chapter 6 analyses the third 
feature. 
 
1: Kurdistan is perceived as an ethnic territory due to the intertwining of the 
internationally prominent principle of self-determination with Kurdish nationalist 
claims. 
 
The normative assumptions behind the principle of self-determination combine 
ethnicist understandings of national identity with democratic rights, and the manner in 
which self-determination is utilised to further Kurdish nationalist claims influences the 
way outsiders perceive the ideal homeland of Kurdistan. Political assertions regarding 
the identity of a specific piece of land and cartographic depictions of that territory are 
powerful in influencing outsiders’ perceptions because of the normative context in 
which they are framed. There is an association between sub-state nationalist groups’ 
claims for autonomy or independence based on a specific territory and the human rights 
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and democratic rights rhetoric in the international normative context. This association 
can be observed in the articles and resolutions of some international legal and political 
covenants and organisations, and in the actions and decisions of sections of 
international society. This international normative context influences the perceptions of 
outsiders towards the nationalist groups’ territorial assertions and their maps. 
 Chapter 2 (Self-determination, Nationalism and Liberal Democracy) analyses the 
relationship between the key concepts of the thesis, namely self-determination, 
nationalism and liberal democracy. It provides a general conceptual definition for the 
central theoretical argument of the thesis in relation to self-determination (which is set 
out by Chapter 3): self-determination can be understood as a principle that 
simultaneously incorporates ethnic, territorial and cultural definitions of nationhood on 
the one hand along with liberal democratic principles related to human and democratic 
rights discourses on the other. This connection has emerged as a result of the way self-
determination is linked to liberal democracy and nationalism, defined and understood in 
relation to the separatist claims of sub-state nationalist groups. 
 Chapter 3 (A Theoretical and Conceptual Framework for Understanding Self-
Determination) sets out the theoretical argument of the thesis and the theoretical 
framework that is best suited to generating such an argument. The argument developed 
in this chapter has two parts: (1) The realm of international norms, common 
understandings and activities deployed by actors in the international arena provides a 
framework for the promotion of ethnic territorial claims and the way in which these 
claims are received by outsiders; and (2) The principle of self-determination today 
reflects a condensed amalgamation of two contrasting principles: an idealist/liberal view 
of the achievability of peace through self-determination and a culturally defined national 
identity that reflects ethnic conceptions of nationhood and primordial/perennial 
perceptions of the territorial origins of nations. With this critique in mind, the chapter 
provides a historical, legal, and conceptual account of the development and evolution of 
the principle of self-determination in a way that is applicable to sub-state nationalist 
groups and their ethno-territorial claims. This argument concerning sub-state groups’ 
use of self-determination and how their usage fits within the international normative 
context needs a theoretical perspective drawing from multiple fields, such as IR, 
Nationalism and History, and requires the complementary use of three different 
theoretical perspectives in IR. These three theoretical views are: realist IR informed by 
historical sociologicy; Risse and Sikkink’s constructivist view; and, the English School’s 
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international society approach, particularly Mayall’s work on the implications of 
nationalism on international society. 
 
2: The perception that Kurdistan is a given ethnic territory is facilitated through the 
generally accepted assumption that the history of territory in question is identical to the 
history of the Kurdish nation. 
 
This assumption is at its most prominent in the use of the idea of Kurdistan and its map 
by Kurdish nationalists in relation to their self-determination claims. There are two 
reasons for the way in which they perceive and use the notion of Kurdistan. Firstly, the 
Kurdish nationalist discourse and some of the non-Kurdish academic historiography on 
the Kurds project contemporary conceptions of national territory on to historical 
notions of Kurdistan. Their contemporary conceptions of national territory are loaded 
with ethnicist and primordial interpretations of national identity. The ethnicist and 
primordialist understandings of nations in the academic and non-academic literature, 
which sees territory as a given feature of groups, strengthens and gives credibility to the 
Kurdish nationalist statement that Kurdistan is a historical and ethnic homeland. Linked 
to this, Kurdish claims on a historical and ethnic homeland fit in well with the 
resonance of the notion of territoriality in the contemporary international system, which 
is based on territorial nation-states, combined with the political power of maps as 
propaganda tools for promoting the idea of a ‘natural’ or ‘given’ border. 
 These arguments are developed across both chapters 4 and 5, each of which 
deals with a different time frame in the history of Kurdistan (Chapter 4 - Kurdistan and 
Kurdish Nationalism until WWI and Chapter 5 - Kurdistan and Kurdish Nationalism since 
WWI). The main reason for the division into two time periods is related to the argument 
of the thesis that Kurdish nationalism emerged as a political movement only after WWI. 
Chapter 4 looks at the historical uses of the concept of Kurdistan until WWI and 
explains the territorial and tribal structure of Kurdish society. This led to the emergence 
of a form of nationalism that is defined in territorial terms. However, competition 
between different Kurdish tribal elites led to a divided Kurdish nationalist movement, 
which hindered the emergence of a unified or coherent Kurdish nationalism. Chapter 5 
looks at the emergence and development of Kurdish nationalism during and after WWI 
and the attempts by Kurdish nationalist movements to use the notion of Kurdistan and 
maps of Kurdistan in the twentieth century.  
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3: The assumption that Kurdistan is an ethnic territory is facilitated through the 
constant use of maps of Kurdistan by Kurdish nationalists in the diaspora. 
 
Thanks to their location outside the homeland and their ability to communicate their 
ideas directly to international society, Kurdish activists in the diaspora have played an 
important role in publicising the rightfulness of Kurdish nationalists’ demand for self-
determination and promoting the idea of an ethnic Kurdish territory to international 
society. These actors are particularly effective in using the contemporary international 
normative context embodying human and democratic rights, particularly the right to 
self-determination, to promote the legitimacy of their pursuit of an independent 
Kurdistan. The increasing role of diasporas in international affairs, their growing ability 
to mobilise (due to developments in technology, communication and transport) and 
their role in influencing (through lobbying) their host-state’s foreign policies and 
regional and international affairs, gives strength to their propaganda. 
 This argument is developed in Chapter 6 (Kurdish Nationalism in the Diaspora). 
This chapter will show that Kurdish nationalists in the diaspora are long-distance 
nationalist actors. They act in an international sphere and use transnational methods. 
They have played a crucial role in the development of Kurdish nationalism both inside 
and outside the region thanks for their direct access to the international political arena 
due to their location. Therefore their lobbying, together with an increased appreciation 
of ethnic struggles in the name of democracy and justice, has enabled the Kurdish 
nationalist activists in the diaspora to promote the idea of Kurdistan as the ethnic 
territory of the Kurds. They have used the rhetoric of suffering, the incidents of human 
rights abuses and their right to statehood to manipulate the way host-states, other states, 
international organisations, scholars, journalists and the international media perceive 
their case. 
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Chapter 2: Self-determination, Nationalism and 
Liberal Democracy  
  
Introduction 
This chapter concerns the relationship between the key concepts of the thesis, namely 
self-determination, nationalism and liberal democracy. It aims to provide a general 
conceptual basis for the central theoretical argument of the thesis in relation to self-
determination: self-determination can be understood as a principle that simultaneously 
incorporates ethnic and cultural definitions of nationhood on the one hand along with 
liberal democratic principles related to human rights and democratic rights on the other. 
The chapter will show that the right to self-determination for smaller units has become 
an increasingly widely accepted idea. This has been made possible by the manner in 
which self-determination is connected to liberal democracy and nationalism, the two 
most widely accepted political ideologies in the contemporary world. 
 The connection between self-determination, liberal democracy and nationalism 
can take different forms depending on the way nationhood is understood. Nationhood 
can be defined in two main forms: a civic and solidarist understanding of nationhood 
that emphasises citizenship, or an ethnic form of nationhood that emphasises the 
common ‘objective’ traits of a group of people. This chapter focuses on the inter-
connection between self-determination, liberal democracy and a form of nationalism 
that is based on a mainly ethnically defined nationhood. The first half of the chapter 
examines notions of nationalism and liberal democracy, giving a general overview of 
each concept from the perspective of the overarching argument of the thesis and 
explaining how and why they are related to each other. The second half of the chapter 
offers a brief account of the historical and political origins of the principle of self-
determination, explaining self-determination’s roots as a political principle that seeks to 
obtain sovereignty. 
 
Nationalism and Liberal Democracy 
This section looks at the interconnection between nationalism and liberal democracy in 
relation to the activities of sub-state nationalist groups or movements. Traditionally, 
liberal democracy is associated with positive and progressive notions such as 
individualism, freedom and development. In contrast, nationalism is associated with 
both positive and negative implications: on one hand, it has the potential to bring 
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individuals together in the name of national unity for developing together, and on the 
other hand, it has the potential to create differences and conflict between groups. Yet 
particular interpretations of these notions complete each other and provide a suitable 
international conceptual context for understanding self-determination claims of sub-
state nationalist groups.  
 
Nationalism 
Nationalism is one of the most significant modern ideologies that shaped the modern 
international system. It has been a key cause in the transformation of monarchical and 
colonial empires into new states since the eighteenth century within the context of the 
collapse of monarchical and colonial empires and wars.94 In the last two hundred years 
more than 140 new states have formed, all taking the form of nation-states.95 In the late 
eighteenth century the British colonies in North America rejected the monarchical 
authority of the British Empire and declared an independent United States of America 
which took the form of a sovereign nation. Similarly, in Europe the French Revolution 
was based on the ideas of nationhood, republicanism and liberty. Both revolutions saw 
the nation as the legitimate sovereign as opposed to their hitherto monarchical rule. 
Latin American independence movements followed in the early nineteenth century 
against the Portuguese and Spanish colonial empires which also led to the creation of 
new nation-states.  
The first half of nineteenth century Europe witnessed many nationalist 
rebellions, but only Belgium and Greece actually achieved independence, and later 
German and Italian unifications were realised.96 After WWI the dissolution of the 
Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman empires led to the formation of new states based on 
the principle of nationality. During the nineteenth century and early twentieth century 
nationalisms were commonly opposed to multi-ethnic empires to avoid competing 
against each other’s territory.97 At this point in time, nationalism was recognised as a 
strong ideology and nationality became an internationally recognised legitimate principle 
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for the new states. The formation of new states in other parts of the world followed in 
the decolonisation period at the end of WWII and following the collapse of the USSR.  
In the post-WWI and post-WWII periods and post-USSR era the concept of 
self-determination was used more widely than Mill’s ‘nationality principle’. Self-
determination referred to forming nation-states out of colonial and communist empires 
based on existing administrative territorial rules. Today national self-determination is 
more often seen as the legitimate principle for the creation of new nation-states out of 
existing nation-states. This meaning of the principle is extensively used by sub-state 
nationalist groups or movements who adopt a particular interpretation of national 
identity that sees nations as constituted of given and objective features. 
There are a number of different strands of thinking within the diverse body of 
literature that comprise the academic field of nationalism studies, each embodying 
somewhat different interpretations of the meaning of the term ‘nation’.98 This literature 
offers a rich debate between ‘Modernism’ and ‘Primordialism/ Perennialism/ 
Ethnosymbolism’ on the origins of nations. The latter three approaches are variations of 
one approach which mainly contends that nations have an essential, a priori core. The 
differences between primordialism, perennialism and ethnosymbolism derive from how 
much prominence they attribute to this core. In contrast, the key premises of modernist 
approaches are that nations and nationalism are modern phenomena which only 
emerged within the last two centuries and that nations have no preceding existence. In 
short, nationalism created nations.  
Modernism perceives both the nation and nationalism as contingent and 
dependent on historical, political and economic circumstances. This approach has many 
variants focusing on different aspects of modernity, such as industrialisation, capitalism, 
print-capitalism, the state and its political institutions.99 Primordial and perennial 
approaches, on the other hand, claim that nations existed before the modern era and 
that the division into nations and the content of their nationalisms are given or 
historically fixed. Primordialists perceive nations as natural and given, while perennialists 
see them as communities that have always existed in different forms throughout human 
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history.100 Ethnosymbolists are seen to offer a middle position between modernist and 
primodialist/perennialist approaches. Smith, the main proponent of this approach, 
argues that the modern nation has a pre-modern and perennial basis in the form of an 
ethnie and a territorial attachment. Smith states that, ethnie is a community of common 
myths and memories and the six main attributes of ethnies are ‘a collective proper name, 
a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating 
elements of culture, an association with a specific ‘homeland’, a sense of solidarity for 
significant sectors of the population.’101 On one hand, he seems to contend the 
modernity of nations, yet on the other, he links the nation to primordial attachments.102 
Smith sees the transition from ethnie to nation as a natural process which became 
possible as a result of the emergence of the modern ideology of nationalism and the 
historical circumstances of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Consequently, this 
framework predisposes sub-state nationalists to prefer primordialist, perennialist or 
ethnosymbolist conceptions of national identity rather than modernist explanations 
given that they offer more succour to their aspirations for statehood. 
The debate on civic-ethnic nationalism, another significant debate in nationalism 
studies, is useful in contextualising the conceptual preference of sub-state nationalisms. 
Here the civic form of nationalism (the classic historical example of which is taken to be 
France) is generally associated with modern democratic notions of citizenship, 
individual choice and democracy, and the willingness to be part of a nation, whereas the 
ethnic form is generally linked to features of nationhood that are perennially and 
objectively ascribed, thus overriding the choices of individuals.103 Ethnic types of 
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nationalism (the classic historical example of which is taken to be Germany) generally 
claim a long historical and perennial existence of a distinct group, whereas civic 
nationalisms make reference to state institutions and political culture in constructing 
groups collective identities. In other words, modernist scholars perceive cultural, 
linguistic and ethnic features as constructed or as factors that influence the character of 
nationalist movements, rather than seeing these features as essentially determining the 
past, present and future of these groups.  
There are many problems with this ideal civic-ethnic dichotomy due to overlaps 
between the two forms of nationalism and due to prominent exceptions to these ideal 
types, especially in the contemporary world. These exceptions and overlaps make the 
association between liberal and civic as opposed to that between dictatorial and ethnic 
debatable.104 This is particularly obvious in the case of sub-state nationalisms. Although 
sub-state nationalist groups make reference to the historical existence of their distinct 
identity and ethnicity, in line with the ethnic type of nationalism, they also attempt to 
justify their cause by invoking the liberal and democratic principles that are prominent 
in the contemporary world, particularly self-determination. This exemplifies the 
combination of ethnic and civic forms of nationhood. Sub-state nationalism assumes a 
pre-determined ethnic identity while, at the same time, resembling voluntaristic forms of 
nationalism because of their emphasis on the freedom of choice of a group to decide on 
their political rule. Therefore, sub-state nationalist goals are not usually perceived as 
incompatible with liberal democracy and its associated principles. 
In the case of sub-nationalist groups, primordially defined ethnic and cultural 
indicators of nationhood are believed to define ‘the people’ or ‘the self’ in self-
determination. This association they construct between the right to self-determination 
and their self-identification as a historically given and bounded distinct group leads to 
their assertion that they possess a democratic right to form their own states. Therefore, 
the definition of these common characteristics and their recognition by others as given 
features of a people rationalise their democratic project within a specific territory.105 The 
general adopted view, even by modernist scholars, is that human communities evolve 
from smaller units to larger units, and that the cultural and linguistic uniformity brought 
by nationalism enables individuals to become part of a process of economic growth and 
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political development.106 Therefore, considering the historical role of nationalism in 
forging nation-states and the claim of sub-state nationalist movements on a particular 
territory appears normal and rational. 
 
Liberal Democracy 
As stated at the beginning of this section, the other idea at the core of self-
determination is liberal democracy. The connection between liberal democracy and 
nationalism is important for understanding the way sub-state nationalist groups and 
their external supporters perceive the meaning and usage of self-determination. 
Democracy, in Schumpeter’s words, is ‘the institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote’.107 Liberalism is an intellectual and political 
philosophy that embraces individual human liberty and equal rights as key political 
values. There are several strands within liberalism, but its overarching core is a belief in 
the unconstrained individual. The adjacent and peripheral aspects of a liberal ideology 
are a belief in those institutional arrangements that ensure the freedom of the 
unconstrained individual, such as constitutional government, human rights, equality and 
the right to private property.   
 Nationalism and liberalism are sometimes interpreted as contradicting notions in 
the literature. Liberalism singles out the individual and therefore divides the community, 
while nationalism singles out national communities and therefore divides humanity. 
Liberalism aims to enhance of individual liberty, nationalism aims to create a coherent 
national and communal identity and tends to overlook the differences within a defined 
national community. Therefore, some scholars perceive nationalism to be in conflict 
with liberalism.108 Nineteenth century classical liberals saw popular sovereignty and the 
general will of the people as the best and only option against dynastic rule. The general 
will could only be realised within a democratic state since only state power could 
guarantee and protect the rights of individuals which also had to be organised on 
national lines.109 An important historical period that put liberalism and nationalism at 
odds was when racist forms of nationalism and later the appropriation of the national 
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principle by the Soviet state for administrative purposes became central during the 
interwar period and after 1945 respectively.110 The experience of fascism and Nazism led 
most liberals after WWII to denounce nationalism.111 Another historical reason for 
liberalism’s denunciation of nationalism is the association between national self-
determination and the Third World due to the decolonisation process. This led many 
liberals to portray nationalism as a ‘backward ideology’ given the underdeveloped and 
seemingly tribal nature of these new states.112 Yet it would be a mistake to assume that 
all scholars see nationalism and liberalism as being fundamentally at odds. This is 
particularly the case when considering the fact that both national acts and liberation 
movements are seen to be undertaken in the name of protecting individual rights due to 
the connection between the collective right of self-determination and individual 
freedom.113  
 Nationalism’s link to liberalism derives from the idea that nationalism provides 
the collective ideology and legitimacy for the state to undertake the endeavour to 
accomplish individual freedom through institutional arrangements at the state level. In 
this sense, liberal nationalist thought sees self-determination as a liberal principle, and its 
roots, according to Mayall, go back to Grotian solidarity, to Kant’s visions for peace 
through republican federalism, to Wilson’s definition of collective security and to the 
UN Charter.114 Liberals envision the possibility of a community bound together through 
common memories, therefore they see nationalism as a benign force. But, liberals 
overlook the historical and emotional aspect of nationalism. Whereas historicist 
nationalists, Mayall argues, see use of force as legitimate and war as an ethical act for 
freedom.115 This distinction that Mayall draws between liberals and historicists echoes 
the distinction between civic and ethnic understandings of nationhood. 
With regard to the creation of democratic nation-states in ethnically diverse 
geographies, a distinct national identity and the desire for self-rule are essential for 
setting a rational route to establish any new democratic system. For example, according 
to Fukuyama a democracy can only thrive when accompanied by moderate or tolerant 
nationalism, especially within the context of the post-communist nations of the East 
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with their authoritarian histories. But he also argues that in societies where ethnicity has 
become politicised, democracy and nationalism are incompatible.116 Similarly, Nodia 
perceives liberal democracy as compatible with civic forms of nationalism, but not 
compatible with ethnic forms. For him, nationalism should be a component of liberal 
democracy and as such nationalism needs democracy. Some scholars even argued, rather 
provocatively, that the coexistence of nationalism and liberal democracy has worked 
best in countries where the dominant culture is more or less racially and culturally 
homogeneous.117 Some sections of international society have even openly supported the 
formation of homogeneous states or regional autonomies to stave off ethnic conflict, as 
seen in the cases of Bangladesh, Eritrea, Kosovo, and the KRG in Iraq, amongst others.  
 Within the context of the above discussion, in some cases, the link between 
liberal democracy and separatist nationalism emerges in a way in which the source of 
governing becomes ‘the collectivity’ or ‘ethnic group’, and democracy appears to be 
achievable only through giving these groups their right to govern. Recent studies in 
political theory indicate a ‘shift of interest from universalist forms of argument towards 
favouring communities or groups … or collective forms of particularity’.118 Therefore, 
the emphasis on group over individual in eighteenth and nineteenth century thinking 
has been revitalised. This revitalisation has revealed itself as a shift towards 
‘communities, nations, cultures and ethnic groups.’119 Then, if liberal democracy is 
interpreted in relation to nationalism, it refers to the collectivist forms of identities, 
rather than individualistic forms as the source of governing. 
Consequently, democracy and nationalism complement each other because of 
their relation to liberalism, especially in the case of nationalist groups claiming their own 
state or some form of political authority. Nationalist groups or movements who claim 
self-determination see this right as a democratic collective right.120 By definition, the 
democratic enterprise has always been based on a defined group of people and for the 
last couple of centuries this group has been understood to be the nation. As a result, 
constructing and defining a distinct nation came to be seen as a prerequisite for the 
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formation of a democratic state. In turn, determining who belongs to the ‘we’ and who 
should form the nation is seen as a prerequisite for this democratic endeavour.121 
Building a democratic state based on a claimed distinct identity is perceived as a rational 
route due to the belief that it brings solutions to political problems and it provides 
suitable political and social circumstances for the advancement of freedom of thought 
and civil liberties. In this context, self-determination as a political principle is 
understood as a democratic right of peoples with distinct ethnic, national, cultural or 
religious identities. The next section focuses on the notion of self-determination and 
how it became a principle, explaining how it is linked to nationalism and liberal 
democracy in the case of sub-state nationalist groups.  
 
Self-determination 
The international ideational context that created the discourse of self-determination and 
enabled its application in the twentieth century was defined by nationalism, liberalism 
and democracy.122 The relationship between these ideas represents a tension between 
the collectivist approach of nationalism and the liberal emphasis on individual freedom 
and democracy.123 Self-determination’s relevance to sub-state nationalist groups or 
movements derives from a particular way of interpreting these notions. For nationalist 
groups and their supporters within international society, national self-determination is 
interpreted as a means for resolving ethnic conflict and promoting democracy, human 
cultural creativity and diversity. It is believed to imply the right to determine the future 
of a specific territory and a people’s entitlement to establish their own state in a territory 
where they constitute the majority.124 It is generally understood as a doctrine with the 
following assumptions: humankind is divided into nations and this division is natural, 
the denial of the right of self-determination to a nation means a denial of fundamental 
human rights, and every nation has a right to constitute a separate state. 
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Sovereignty  
Understanding and explaining sub-state nationalist groups’ perception and use of self-
determination requires explaining self-determination’s relation to the notion of 
sovereignty, because national self-determination derives its meaning from the idea of 
popular sovereignty. Sovereignty is a concept ‘without which modern international 
relations does not exist.’125 International political rules and norms are centred on a 
complicated relationship between sovereignty and self-determination in the international 
system for the last couple of centuries. Sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is territorial 
control or supreme authority within a territory.126 Self-determination is the peoples’ right 
to ‘freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.’127 The difficulty in defining ‘the people’ is the reason why self-
determination poses a challenge to sovereignty.128 If the national boundaries of a people 
are compatible with the boundaries of the state, in theory no conflict arises between 
self-determination and sovereignty. The problem arises when a group claims that their 
national boundaries are different from the state/s they live in. This causes a tension 
between a people’s right to self-determination and a state’s right to territorial integrity, 
depending on how the people are defined.129  
Definitions of sovereignty vary widely from the absolute sovereignty defined by 
Hobbes and Bodin to Rousseau’s popular sovereignty and to modern sovereignty 
defined in national covenants of states and international law.130 Krasner’s definition of 
types of sovereignty is useful in understanding this concept as it reflects the 
transformation of the meaning and function of sovereignty throughout history. Krasner 
distinguishes between four types of sovereignty: domestic sovereignty, Westphalian 
sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty and international legal sovereignty.131 The first 
refers to the classical meaning of sovereignty – the control of domestic affairs and 
territory.132 It could be argued that this meaning of sovereignty is linked to the Weberian 
sociological sovereignty that sees the state as the institution with the monopoly of 
coercive and administrative control over a specific territory. Westphalian sovereignty 
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alludes to the historical importance of sovereignty as a concept in IR and international 
history.133 It goes back to the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia and Osnabrück where a state’s 
domestic administrative, political and economic control over its territory together with 
the idea of the sanctity of its borders and immunity from external intervention was 
adopted. Therefore the only difference between Westphalian sovereignty and domestic 
sovereignty is the emphasis on the international dimension. Interdependence 
sovereignty refers to a state’s ability to control its boundaries and particularly in the 
context of increasing globalisation.134 It describes state’s decreasing ability to control 
movements and issues that cut across its boundaries mainly due to the increasing 
accountability and responsibility of states to the outside world through individual 
petition processes, international organisations, limits on issues such as use of force, 
greenhouse gas emissions and human rights abuses.135 Most states perceive these 
processes as resulting in a weakening of their sovereignty. Krasner’s fourth type of 
sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, refers to the issue of the international 
recognition of a state,136 which is particularly important for the purposes of this thesis 
especially due to the development of ‘popular sovereignty’ and its contemporary 
conflation with self-determination.  
The notion of sovereignty discussed until now referred to the different kinds of 
sovereign power a legitimate state can enjoy. Popular sovereignty, on the other hand, is 
a concept about the legitimacy of a state. This is related to Krasner’s fourth type of 
sovereignty, international legal sovereignty. Popular sovereignty is a product of French 
and democratic revolutions, moulded into the nineteenth century concept of 
nationalism. Since its emergence in the eighteenth century, the idea of popular 
sovereignty has increasingly implied national sovereignty and become connected to self-
determination. It emerged as a principle in Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau’s writings on 
the social contract and general will. The principle of popular sovereignty’s emphasis on 
the consent of the governed and the general will was perfectly applicable to a political 
rule that relied on a wider social stratum and the principle has been crucial in the 
transition towards democratic political regimes within Europe. Over the course of the 
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the meaning of sovereignty evolved from the 
sovereignty of monarchs to the sovereignty of people.137 What is important here is 
recognising the shift over the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to popular 
sovereignty which was the result of the replacement of monarchical rule with republican 
political systems. Here the people, or the nation, came to be seen as the source of state 
power and established itself as one of the rights in the 1789 Declaration of Rights of 
Man and of Citizen by the National Assembly of France: ‘The nation is essentially the 
source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual, or any body of men, be entitled to any 
authority which is not expressly derived from it.’138 This meaning and usage became 
internationally widespread particularly after the dissolution of the empires following 
WWI and during the wave of decolonisation in the 1960s and 1970s.139 
The development of popular sovereignty and Krasner’s notion of international 
legal sovereignty, when discussed together, highlight the importance of the link between 
people and territory. Within this historical evolution, a state’s absolute control 
transformed from control over a specific territory to control over a specific territory 
filled with national meaning, which directly associates people with that territory.140 The 
understanding of sovereignty as absolute control over a determinate people and a 
determinate territory implies the existence of a clearly definable territory. If Krasner’s 
international legal sovereignty refers to the recognition of a state’s legitimacy of its rule 
over a specific territory and people, then issues arise regarding over which people a state 
is entitled to wield legitimate authority.  
The association of sovereignty with a specific group of people, the nation, 
brought with it challenges to the notion of sovereignty and led to the further 
transformation of the concept of sovereignty in a way directly connected to the 
principle of self-determination. Sovereignty is today understood as having ‘more to do 
with the concept of independence in arriving at decisions rather than exclusive and 
absolute power in making them’.141 Its key aspect is the independence of a people in 
making its own decisions. Therefore sovereignty is increasingly defined in terms of the 
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principle of self-determination (meaning the right of people to make their own political 
decisions). This has led to a conflation between the meanings and functions of 
sovereignty and self-determination. This conflation has become particularly prominent 
with the expansion of claims to self-determination from states to sub-state groups. 
Claims of separatist nationalist groups to their right to self-determination began to mean 
a right to sovereignty. An inevitable consequence of this has been most visible in the 
political arena – an increased contradiction between existing sovereignties and new 
claims for self-determination. In these cases, the goal of nationalism is the desire for 
autonomy, usually in the form of a sovereign state, on behalf of the nation on a national 
territory.142 Groups or movements that challenge the sovereignty of one particular state, 
such as those in Kosovo or Palestine, do so in the name of establishing their separate 
sovereignty.  
Sub-state national groups aspiring to become their own sovereigns perceive a 
strong link between national identity and territory. For them, sovereignty over a defined 
territory should be exercised by the people due to their alleged territorial identity. Here 
territory is seen as a material necessity to enforce laws and policies in order to help 
protect the national/cultural identities of peoples.143 In relation to sub-state groups or 
movements, such as the Kurds, Tamils, Kosovars, or Chechens, their claim to a national 
territory relies on national sovereignty and identity.144 From the sub-state nationalist 
groups’ perspective, this implies that the claimed territory exists with clearly defined 
boundaries or else that it is possible to draw clear boundaries that coincide with the 
‘natural’ boundaries of the group. Their argument draws its legitimacy from ethnic 
nationalist claims as well as from a specific interpretation of the principle of self-
determination, namely, that the territorial boundaries of a state should coincide with the 
boundaries of ethnic or national groups. In this sense, the argument goes that territorial 
sovereignty should be exercised by a government that represents a national identity.145 
As a result, the concept of popular sovereignty and a specific reading of the 
principle of self-determination become entwined and difficult to differentiate. The 
                                                 
142 Breuilly, ‘State and Nationalism’, 32. 
143 George W. White, Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe, Canham: 
Rowman & Littlefied, 2000, 22. 
144 Arie Marcelo Kacowicz, Peaceful Territorial Change, Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1994, 7. For 
a debate on morally justifiable circumstances for secession see Allen E. Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of 
Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, and Allen E. 
Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-determination: Moral Foundations for International Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003. 
145 Tamir, Kacowicz and White adopt a similar view on the relationship between national identity and 
political/territorial control.  
 55 
 
conflation of sovereignty and self-determination weakens the idea of a state’s 
sovereignty as absolute jurisdiction over a land.146 Griffiths argues that although 
secession might be a solution in some cases, it remains limited in avoiding civil wars and 
collective violence. He argues that the only solution to this problem is through cutting 
the historical links between self-determination, nationalism and territorial sovereignty.147 
Therefore, claims for territorial change pose a big challenge to the traditional 
understandings of domestic sovereignty, to territorial integrity and to the maintenance 
of the existing boundaries and thus to the protection of international stability in general. 
However, claims for self-determination do not wish to displace sovereignty entirely but 
rather only to advance a particular understanding of sovereignty, namely sovereignty for 
a self-defined nation.   
 
Self-determination: History and Meaning 
Self-determination is a critically important concept in international relations and politics. 
Historically, national self-determination has become one of the most crucial 
international norms in relation to nationalist claims to justify separation from empires, 
gaining independence through decolonisation, and in shaping borders during the 
dismemberment of the communist states at the end of the Cold War, as well as in more 
recent secession claims from existing nation-states. Self-determination as a concept is 
widely discussed in the literature, and one thing that is agreed upon is the difficulty in 
defining this concept. Self-determination has multiple meanings in three specific fields: 
legal, political and analytical. It is a principle of international law and defined in a way 
that prioritises the stability of the international system and protects the sovereignty of 
states. International lawyers, the UN and states adopt and implement this meaning. 
Politically it is interpreted in a way that justifies the rights of people to determine their 
political future. Nationalist groups and their supporters (lobby groups, diasporas, states, 
some international organisations) are proponents of this meaning of self-determination. 
Lastly, self-determination as an analytical concept is used to understand state formation, 
nation building, ethnic conflict, nationalist political movements and other issues related 
to nationalism, especially in the fields of international relations, nationalism and conflict 
resolution.  
Discussions concerning nationalism and self-determination are certainly not 
new, and these were discussed by thinkers like Mazzini, Mill, and Lord Acton at the 
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height of the wave of romantic nationalism when it swept through central and Eastern 
Europe and spread to the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. The first 
examples of self-determination under the label of a ‘nationality principle’ go back to the 
separation of the American colonies from the British, Portuguese and Spanish colonial 
empires in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth centuries. The ‘national idea’ 
emerged in the nineteenth century, especially in the writings of Mazzini and Mill. 
Mazzini argued that the individual has an intimate connection to the people with whom 
s/he shares a common identity, and that the community or nation has a common and 
homogeneous nature and this collective existence needs to be recognised.148 Mazzini put 
special emphasis on the connection between the individual and national self-esteem. He 
saw nations as given units of humanity and assumed that individual identity can only be 
realised within a national community and a country.149 From a Mazzinian perspective, 
the nation is a community that shares objective features based on culture and national 
consciousness and members of a nation have the right to protect their distinct existence 
within a communal life in line with their distinct identity.  
Mill adopted a more civilizational interpretation of the ‘nationality principle’ and 
argued that not all peoples are ready to self-governance. Only when they reach a 
required level of civilizational development should the nationality principle apply to a 
people.150 According to Mill’s perspective the nation refers to a group of individuals 
living under the same system of rule and self-determination is the right of the governed 
to participate in the governing process. Therefore, it is clear that Mazzini attributed a 
natural existence to the nation whereas Mill had a civic, liberal and individualistic view 
of the concept; however both saw it as the legitimate source of political rule. But, 
eventually, both seems to assume that the division of mankind into collective units is a 
given.151 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the idea of a national identity had become 
prominent in relation to the state and popular sovereignty.152 In the nineteenth century 
self-determination was perceived as a principle of independence against the imperial 
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powers, such as the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, and as a justification for 
overthrowing the ruler or ruling class and for separation to establish a new state. When 
independence movements achieve separation they would be deemed nations and thus 
be able to realise the ideal of popular national sovereignty.153 This national idea played 
an important role in the formation of new states in the nineteenth century in Europe 
and South America.154 In the first half of the nineteenth century the emergence of new 
states in Central and South America, and in Europe (Greece and Belgium) were based 
on the nationality principle. In the second half of the nineteenth century many new 
states were formed in Europe and elsewhere in the world emanating from suppressed 
nationalisms. Although self-determination did not enjoy widespread general acceptance 
as a political principle at this time, it was clearly being applied in a growing number of 
cases by the nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth century.155 Popular 
sovereignty became understood as national sovereignty and the idea that ‘popular 
sovereignty belongs to the nation’ became widely accepted. Especially since the early 
twentieth century, nationalist ideology and self-determination have become important 
components of popular sovereignty and modern liberal democracy.156 A combination of 
Mazzini’s and Mill’s views of the nation – the nation’s natural existence combined with a 
democratic right for political recognition – gave national self-determination its meaning 
in the post-WWI era and throughout the rest of the twentieth century. 
Throughout the twentieth century the meaning and use of self-determination 
varied mainly within the context of three different key political events with wide ranging 
international implications: WWI and its legacy; the process of decolonisation following 
the end of WWII; and, the political and geographical alignments post-1989. The use of 
national self-determination in these periods reflected the system of the empires that 
dissolved – monarchical, colonial and communist empires respectively – and the way 
nationhood was defined under these imperial systems. New states formed on the 
territories of these empires referred to self-determination in a way that reflected the 
constitutional, administrative and political status they enjoyed under the empire. 
Decolonisation period in the 1960s and 1970s did not include an application of self-
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determination in the form of secession, except in the case of Bangladesh. Rather the 
secessions that took place in formerly communist countries were mainly result of 
administrative and legitimacy crises that manifested themselves in some of the multi-
ethnic communist regimes (USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia). 
Self-determination sat at the centre of the international relations agenda in 1917 
and afterwards, and was one of the key principles that shaped the post-WWI order 
imagined by Woodrow Wilson. At the beginning of the twentieth century Lenin 
supported self-determination movements in the colonial and imperial territories and 
defined the concept as ‘the right to existence as a separate state’.157 The Bolsheviks 
adopted self-determination and talked specifically about national self-determination, but 
this was done for administrative purposes and it was only anticipated as lasting until 
socialism was achieved and states ceased to exist. It is indeed interesting to note that 
Wilson borrowed the term self-determination itself from the language of the Bolsheviks. 
It was during the WWI period when self-determination became internationalised and 
was eagerly adopted by the peoples of the world from the Americas to Europe and East 
Asia. Its institutionalisation was part of a newly forming international order based on 
self-rule, in which the nation-state was the primary legitimate political form. In this 
period self-determination heavily permeated requests for self-rule in the old Habsburg 
and Ottoman territories, and partly permeated claims for independence from Western 
colonial rule.158 
The emergence of self-determination as a modern democratic entitlement dates 
from the 1919 Paris Peace Conference by Wilson in his capacity as the main instigator 
of the new post-war order.159 He had developed his plans for the post-war world before 
the War had ended and he was successful in convincing other state leaders at the 
Conference to support the implementation of these policies. But, of course, Wilson’s 
ideas were not uncritically endorsed by all world leaders. Many European leaders in 
particular were quite critical of the ideas in the address.160 Wilson and his team had 
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already begun publicly declaring plans for a new order as early as 1916. By 1917 his 
speech ‘Peace without Victory’ provided the first clear description of his vision for a 
new order and was disseminated to the world throughout the war and was extensively 
discussed.161 
Wilson’s most famous speech was his 18 January 1918 address to the Congress, 
also known as ‘Fourteen Points’, which set out clearly Wilson’s plans for the post-War 
peace. Wilson’s introduction to his Fourteen Points began: ‘What we demand in this 
war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe 
to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like 
our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice 
and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish 
aggression.’162 Two of the three key components of Wilson’s plan for the future 
international order were ‘equality of nations’ and ‘right over might’. The equality of 
nations meant that all states - small, big, weak or powerful - would have the same 
rights.163 Later the League of Nations and the mandate system were created to enable 
the developed powers to observe and support populations to reach a stage where they 
can govern themselves. ‘Right over might’ emphasised the importance of law and 
voluntary and peaceful means, such as international mechanisms, in resolving problems, 
and avoiding other methods, such as resorting to war or conflict.164 
‘Consent of the governed’ – a third key component of Wilson’s plans for future 
international order – was the one that was particularly related to self-determination. It 
meant that peoples should be free to determine their type of government and it implied 
that all international arrangements should receive the consent of the group of people 
concerned. According to this principle, for the attainment and maintenance of 
international peace no nation should try to dominate another.165 Wilson later started to 
call this principle ‘self-determination’, although in his Fourteen Points speech he did not 
mention the term ‘self-determination’ at all.166 Less than a month later, in a speech given 
to the US Congress on the 11 February 1918, Wilson used ‘the rights of peoples to self-
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determination’ publicly for the first time.167 In this speech, which is also known as Four 
Points, the president called for respect for national aspirations and the right of peoples to 
be dominated and governed only by their own consent. Wilson also added that only 
well-defined national aspirations that did not create conflict would receive serious 
consideration, but he did not come up with criteria to delimit claims.  
The Versailles territorial settlement starkly highlighted the difficulty in 
implementing Wilson’s new vision of a world based on the principle of self-
determination. Although the principle was presented and perceived as a universal ideal 
applicable for all nations, it was not applied universally. Plebiscites were mostly not 
applied even in territories where self-determination was implemented.168 Although 
implementation of self-determination was limited to Europe, this did not stop the 
leaders of other communities and colonised peoples elsewhere from perceiving self-
determination as legitimating their claims for statehood, but their hopes ended in vain.169 
Wilson stressed the burden on the peace conference to deal with territories related to 
Europe – such as Italy, Turkey, Austro-Hungary, Poland, Romania, Montenegro, Serbia 
and other Balkan states and said that un-responded claims would be taken up later by 
the League of Nations.170 Knight states ‘even Wilson himself eventually questioned the 
principle because, as he put it, nationalities began appearing everywhere.’171  
It is also argued that the Versailles treatment of self-determination was not 
consistent because of French and Italian opposition and due to Wilson’s ‘unequal 
sympathies for different nationalities.’172 Self-determination was applied in accordance 
with the pragmatic necessities of drawing lines for new political entities in the post-
empire territories. As a result, members of the same ethno-national group potentially 
became either members of a coherent nation or minorities in an adjacent nation, 
depending on where the line was drawn.173 Therefore, it actually served as a political 
principle rather than as a universal rule and was implemented in accordance with the 
political circumstances of the time. 
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The difficulty in implementing the principle of self-determination also derived 
from the difference between the way the principle was presented and the way it was 
implemented. The principle was presented as a democratising principle that provided 
distinct national and cultural groups with the ability to determine their own political 
future. Self-government ‘implied people’s right to select their own democratic 
government’, but it required that the people or the nation were ethnically identifiable.174 
This necessitated the identification of specific groups that would be granted the right to 
self-determination. As a result, the principle implied a call for differentiating between 
groups on the basis of language, culture, race, religion, and aspirations. However, 
Wilson did not come up with a clear plan on how this principle would be implemented 
in Europe, let alone throughout the world.  
Hence the question that emerged was ‘who are the people in question?’. 
Wilson’s Secretary of State, Robert Lansing wrote in April 1921 in the Saturday Evening 
Post, ‘When the President talks about “self-determination”, what has he in mind? Does 
he mean race, a territorial area, or a community? Without a definite unit which is 
practical, application of this principle is dangerous to peace and stability.’175 In his 
narrative of the peace negotiations he argued that while it was a desirable principle in 
theory, self-determination was practically almost impossible to implement without 
causing trouble because it legitimated anti-government movements.176 Sir Ivor Jennings, 
another critic of the principle, was aware that its implementation required, most 
importantly, a definition of the ‘self’: ‘[o]n the surface it seemed reasonable: let the 
people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because people cannot decide until someone 
decides who the people are’. Due to this impossibility Jennings found Wilson’s doctrine 
ridiculous and he was puzzled by its wide acceptance.177 
Self-determination spread across the world within a legal context during the 
process of decolonisation in the 1960s and 1970s. These legal definitions of self-
determination indicate that since the end of WWII the meaning of self-determination 
has gradually become more encompassing. Initially ‘the people’ referred to the citizens 
of a nation-state and self-determination was seen as their right to participate in the 
governing process. Until the 1970s self-determination functioned within the 
decolonisation context where coherent units sought to attain self-government in the 
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colonised lands of Africa and Asia. The aim was the ‘freeing of colonial peoples from 
their colonial masters, and their right to govern themselves’178 rather than defining 
ethnically or culturally distinct peoples and their states. Self-determination was granted 
to the peoples of the already existing colonial entities within the existing colonial 
administrative boundaries.  
The implementation of self-determination during colonial independence and its 
definition in the UN Charter and other international covenants transformed self-
determination into a widely recognised international norm. Here the application of self-
determination was strictly limited to the colonial territories and was territorially defined 
in a way that guaranteed the distinct identity of the colony and enabled legal recognition 
of its territorial unit. The aim was to maintain territorial stability as much as possible.179 
In this historical and legal context the implementation of self-determination in non-
colonial territories was prohibited and the sovereignty and self-determination of the 
state was emphasised. The 1945 UN Charter explicitly refers to self-determination in 
Articles 1(2), 55 and 73(b). Article 1 (2) states that one of the purposes of the UN is ‘To 
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
right and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace’.180 Higgins interprets the context in the Article to be related 
to the rights of peoples of one state to be protected from interference by other states or 
governments.181  
From 1945 onwards self-determination was defined in several international legal 
covenants. Again, none of these legal uses explained what constitutes a nation or 
provided criteria for defining who has the right to self-determination. A more 
encompassing meaning of self-determination appeared in the twin UN 1966 Covenants, 
Article 1, which was adopted from the United Nation General Assembly Resolution 
1514 (1960) that provided a more comprehensive statement on self-determination: ‘All 
peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of their right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.’
182
 According to Castellino, the Resolution had contradicting aspects: it 
affirmed the norm of self-determination, linking it to ‘better standards of life and larger 
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freedom’ on one hand, but it emphasised ‘stability’ on the other.
183
 Resolution 1541 
(1960) defined a full measure of self-government: ‘[i]t must result in a decision where 
the people concerned vote in free and fair elections to decide whether to, (a) constitute 
themselves as a sovereign independent state; (b) associate freely with an independent 
state, or (c) integrate with an independent state already in existence’.
184
 Although these 
resolutions seemed to provide a basis for the implementation of self-determination to 
form a new state, in actuality the emphasis in international law was on maintaining 
international order.
185
 Another important aspect of these resolutions was that they 
focused on territory and accorded the right of independence to the inhabitants of a 
territory, not nations.  
The 1966 International Covenants of ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ and 
‘Civil and Political Rights’ laid down the foundations of what has subsequently 
developed as International Law of Human Rights. However, Franck argues that Article 
1 is unlikely to be interpreted as self-determination requiring governments to accept 
readily the demands of secessionists. He also says that Article 27 of the Covenants 
permits minorities the right ‘to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their 
own religion, or to use their own language’ but not to secede.
186
 The ‘Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’ (1960), ‘General 
Assembly Resolution 2625’ (1970), and the ‘Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations’ (1970) also make similar statements.
187
  
After the 1970s, the right to self-determination began to expand to cover all 
peoples – people of a state, people within one state and a group people that reside in 
more than one state. People without a state were increasingly deemed to possess the 
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right to form their own political entity. However, the implementation of self-
determination in the ex-communist territories after the end of the Cold War was based 
on existing administrative divisions, that of the non-Russian republics, which themselves 
were nationally defined. The question therefore remained whether the principle of self-
determination could be applied to cases that are not part of a decolonisation process or 
of the dismemberment process of the ex-communist states.
188
 As mentioned above, the 
compliance of the incumbent state with the principles mentioned in the UN Charter is 
considered as a criterion in deciding on the legitimacy of a secessionist group that 
attempts to separate from that state. Based on this, it is often indicated that outsiders, 
third states or international society, generally expressed through the UN, decide on the 
legitimacy of secessionist movements based on an evaluation of the actions of the 
incumbent state. If the secessionist movement has developed as a result of human rights 
or minority rights violations, international society or the UN is more likely to recognise 
the independence of these movements.
189
  
The 1990 Charter of Paris repeated similar statements.
190
 These statements are 
in line with the 1970 ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations’ which had stated that the territorial integrity of states should be 
respected as long as those states act in compliance with the principle of self-
determination and therefore have ‘a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.’
191
 More 
recently, the 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1542 stated that self-determination is 
only applicable ‘in respect of a territory which is geographically separate and is distinct 
ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it’.
192
 
As a result of the above-described process, legal definitions of self-
determination indicate that since the end of WWII the meaning of self-determination 
has gradually become more encompassing. Initially, ‘the people’ referred to the citizens 
of a nation-state and self-determination was seen as their right to participate in the 
governing process. Until the 1970s self-determination functioned within the 
decolonisation context where coherent units sought to attain self-government in the 
colonised lands of Africa and Asia. The aim was the ‘freeing of colonial peoples from 
their colonial masters, and their right to govern themselves’ rather than defining 
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ethnically or culturally distinct peoples and their states.
193
 Self-determination was 
granted to the peoples of the already existing colonial entities within the existing 
colonial administrative boundaries. Recently, the cultural/ethnic distinctiveness of a 
group coupled with bad treatment at the hands of state government have become a 
recognised basis for the self-determination claims. 
Still, a legal definition of the norm of self-determination has remained quite 
limited in terms of encouraging sub-state nationalists to use the legal meaning for their 
political goals. These legal documents do not provide a set of principles that specify the 
criteria necessary to comprise a territory or people worthy of being granted 
independence by international society. Rather the legal framework was developed in an 
ad hoc way under the shadow of decolonisation and the aftermath of the Cold War. 
However, in the course of international society using self-determination as a legal tool 
for dismantling colonial and communist empires, sub-state nationalist groups also saw 
this principle as a device for breaking up states that have already attained independence 
from imperial systems.
194
  
Political expressions of self-determination are far broader thank its legal 
expressions and have wider implications. Political self-determination emerged within the 
currents of nationalism and democracy in the nineteenth century, and by the time of 
WWI, it had evolved into an international political principle related to minority and 
mandate regimes.
195
 The political use and expression of self-determination is more 
extensively used by sub-state nationalist groups. The formation of new states based on 
the principle of self-determination outside the context of post-imperialism, post-
colonialism and post-communism is not clearly defined in international law but is 
generally seen as linked to human rights discourse and democratisation in ethnically 
diverse societies.  
Due to the resurgence of competing ethnic and national identities since the end 
of the Cold War ethnic conflict has become an urgent issue. Franck calls these resurgent 
movements ‘postmodern tribalism’, which he defines as a movement that seeks to 
promote both a political and a legal environment conducive to the breakup of the 
existing sovereign states.
196
 Postmodern tribalism promotes the transfer of defined parts 
of the populations and territories existing in multinational or multicultural states in 
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order to constitute new uni-national and uni-cultural states – that is, postmodern tribal-
states. These movements indicate a new context, according to Franck, which allowed 
self-determination to be defined as a valid criterion for the redefinition of territories.
197
 
Higgins, commenting on Franck’s work on ‘postmodern tribalism’, argues that the shift 
to acknowledging legitimacy of uni-national and uni-cultural societies is indicating a 
move towards illiberal formations, therefore, she favours multicultural societies.
198
  
Beginning in 1991 with the collapse of the USSR and the former Republic of 
Yugoslavia the world witnessed a series of declarations of independence based on the 
principle of self-determination, both within the territory of these empires and beyond, 
such as Eritrea, East Timor, and Yemen. Secessionist nationalist movements claiming 
their right to self-determination have frequently used the denial of this right as a 
justification for their engagement in armed conflict and civil war. This has been an 
increasingly common phenomenon since the early 1980s in cases as diverse as the 
Kurds, the Tamils, the Sudanese, East Eritreans, the Chechens, the Catalans, the 
Basques, East Timorians, the Abkhazians, the Sikhs, and republicans in Northern 
Ireland. 
Throughout the above-explained historical and legal evolution of the principle 
of self-determination, the two concepts ‘consent of the governed’ and ‘self-
determination’ (even though Wilson used them as referring to the same principle) have 
had different implications.
199
 The notion of the ‘consent of the governed’ came to 
reflect the civic and modernist conception of nations because ‘consent’ implied a 
people’s ability to approve or reject policy decisions or choose the representatives to 
take the decisions on their behalf. ‘The governed’ seems to refer to the people or 
citizens of an existing political entity. It was even possible to detach ‘consent of the 
governed’ from national connotations.
200
 On the other hand, self-determination came to 
embody an ethnic and primordial conception of nationhood in relation to separatist 
nationalist groups. The term ‘determination’ implied deciding on a policy from its outset 
or creating a new policy, and the term ‘the self’ did not necessarily refer to an existing 
group of people and was much more ambiguous. Therefore, although Wilson saw ‘self-
determination’ and ‘consent of the governed’ as identical, actually self-determination 
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posed a bigger challenge to the system and had more potential to change or disrupt the 
status-quo than the original version of the concept.  
Ultimately the debate boiled down to the debate on defining the ‘nation’ and the 
civic-ethnic dichotomy. If the nation is defined as a given, primordial, constant and 
homogenous entity with clear territorial and cultural boundaries, deciding who has the 
right to self-determination would be a straightforward endeavour. However, as 
modernists argue nations are formed as a result of contingent historical, political, 
economic and social processes of modernisation and the state and its institutions have 
the determining role in the development of nations. The way self-determination was 
defined and implemented in the aftermath of WWI, as well as in later periods, reflected 
the difficulty in differentiating these different understandings of the nation.  
The civic-ethnic dichotomy also relates to the classification of self-determination 
into internal and external types. Internal self-determination is linked to internal 
democracy and participation in governing processes.
201
 This reflects what Knight calls 
‘territory over people’. In the post-colonial context, international law and international 
covenants generally prioritise territory over people.
202
 External self-determination refers 
to the idea of a state government’s legitimacy within the international society of states. 
In relation to sub-state nationalist groups this offered the possibility of a process by 
which sub-state groups could break away from a state in order to gain entry to the 
international society of states through secession or irredentism.
203
 The emergence of 
new sub-state groups, such as groups based on regional identities, autonomous 
nationalisms and ethno-regional movements in the postcolonial period, challenges the 
traditional definition of self-determination which prioritises territory over people. Sub-
state regionalism is potentially the most divisive of these new formations in its desire for 
self-determination.
204
 Originally, by definition, self-determination implied the transfer of 
identity from the group to a delimited territory but Knight, writing in the 1980s, saw an 
increasing tendency to return to prioritising people over territory due to the increasing 
demands of sub-state or regional nationalist groups for self-determination.
205
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Therefore, the meaning of self-determination that this thesis focuses on is 
today’s contemporary evolution of the concept from its original formulation in 1919 
and through the conditioning events of WW1, decolonisation and the end of the Cold 
War. Today it is clearly and directly linked to democratic rights and human rights 
discourse, but this democratic right is increasingly understood as the representation of 
the distinct character of a community within governing institutions.
206
 It is also 
particularly related to minority group claims to liberal democracy based on the 
primordial definition of themselves as a distinct group. The Human Rights Committee 
Report in 1979 illustrates this link clearly: ‘How could there be self-determination 
without freedom of opinion? Article 1 of the Covenant referred to the right of self-
determination of peoples, not of Governments.’
207
 For instance, Turkey’s limited 
granting of Kurdish political participation is used as a precedent for Kurdish claims to 
their democratic right to self-determination. The Kurdish Human Rights Project 
(KHRP) based in London is one of many diaspora groups around the world that works 
to promote this idea. As a result it could be argued that the political transformation of 
self-determination has been more decisive than its legal evolution, particularly in relation 
to the increasing demands of sub-state groups for external self-determination.  
 
Conclusion 
Nationalism’s relation to popular sovereignty is at the core of the connection between 
democracy and self-determination when it comes to the claims of sub-state nationalist 
groups for autonomy or statehood. Traditionally, nationalism is founded on popular 
sovereignty which relies on the requirement to obey laws that have been self-imposed. 
Self-determination has been heralded as the principle that rationalises this requirement. 
Today, the self-determination claims of sub-state groups are perceived and promoted as 
claims to form culturally homogenous states. Human rights and democracy discourses 
are enmeshed with this principle, as manifest in many post WWII international 
covenants. As such, the way these groups define their identity is related to primordial 
and ethnic understandings of nationhood and it is a mistake to assume they are purely 
rooted in liberal modern and civic conceptions of national identity. The groups seeking 
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self-determination emphasise their racial, ethnic and cultural differences and claim that 
their territory is homogenous and deserves to be considered distinct from the overall 
state’s territory. Nationalism, liberal democracy and self-determination are related, 
however, as I have demonstrated, this connection is predominantly assumed only to 
exist between tolerant and civic forms of nationalism and liberal principles. Yet there is 
also a strong and more recent connection between liberalism and the ethnicist-
primordialist form of nationalism that has been largely under-explored. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
for Understanding Self-Determination 
 
Introduction 
The meaning of self-determination in relation to sub-state nationalist groups is 
influenced by the international context of commonly accepted policies, rules and norms. 
This context influences the perceptions and activities of sub-state groups, states and 
other actors in international society when it comes to defining rights to self-
determination and who can exercise these rights. Within contemporary international 
politics, the range of acceptable and legitimate policies, activities, rules and norms are 
defined by the spheres of democratic rights and human rights. This is particularly 
evident when examining international society’s approach to exploring solutions to ethnic 
conflict, which are overwhelmingly framed with the discourses and mechanisms of 
human and democratic rights.  
 This chapter develops two interrelated arguments. Firstly, international norms, 
common understandings and activities deployed by actors in the international arena 
provide a framework for the promotion of ethnic territorial claims. Secondly, it argues 
that the principle of self-determination today reflects a condensed amalgamation of two 
contrasting notions: an idealist/liberal view on the achievability of peace through self-
determination and a culturally defined national identity that embodies ethnic 
conceptions of nationhood and primordial/perennial perceptions on the origins of 
nations. This chapter aims to justify the theoretical choices made in this thesis. It 
explains how the specific meaning of self-determination adopted in this thesis provides 
a suitable framework for a sub-state group’s promotion of a distinct ethnic territorial 
identity. It will be shown that this form of self-determination is already seen as an 
international norm by scholars such as Berlin, Tamir and White who all associate ethnic 
understandings of national identity with liberal democratic principles. In short, the 
chapter defines self-determination claims of nationalist groups within a theoretical 
context. 
 These two arguments provide the overarching theoretical background for the 
subsequent arguments developed in the following three chapters. The development of 
Kurdish nationalism with a specific territorial focus, Kurdish nationalists’ claims to self-
determination based on a direct reference to the notion of Kurdistan, and the Kurdish 
diaspora’s efforts in promoting the Kurdish cause to international society, can all be 
 71 
 
understood within an international normative context that combines the norms of 
democratic and human rights with ethnic conceptions of nationhood. This highlights 
how certain norms influence international politics and the relationship between the 
international normative context and sub-state political movements. However, norms are 
not the only determinants of the way international politics develop in relation to sub-
state groups and movements. The international historical context, the relationship of a 
sub-state group with the state in which it is located, internal power structures within a 
group, and the way these groups interact with international society are also important 
determinants that need to be taken into account. Combining these factors leads to a 
comprehensive explanation of the way Kurdish nationalists see and use the notion of 
Kurdistan and the way international society perceives Kurdistan.208 This chapter does 
not claim that the right to self-determination of all ethnic groups has become an 
international norm accepted by all members of the international society, but rather it 
highlights the emergence, acceptance and application of a specific meaning of self-
determination in international politics which has significant parallels with the way sub-
state nationalist groups interpret self-determination. 
 
The Necessity of Adopting a Multi-Theoretical Approach to Understanding Sub-
State Nationalist Groups’ Self-Determination Claims 
Sub-state nationalist groups are non-state actors which are not typically a direct focus of 
analysis in mainstream IR theories. Therefore, insights from theoretical perspectives that 
look at units other than states are necessary when trying to understand the behaviour 
and motivations of sub-state actors. Moreover, the notion of self-determination is also 
important in many fields beyond international relations. Self-determination is linked to 
the historical evolution of the contemporary international system, to state nationalism 
and separatist nationalism, to the development of international law and to the political 
and legal discourses of cultural rights, minority rights and human rights. Therefore study 
of self-determination requires a combination of historical, legal, sociological and 
political analyses. As such, understanding sub-state nationalists groups’ use of a 
particular meaning of self-determination and its international implications requires a 
theoretical perspective that combines different views.209 Self-determination is a policy, a 
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norm, a goal and an institution that is located in both domestic and international levels. 
Consequently, sub-state groups’ use of self-determination and how their usage fits 
within the international normative context210 needs a theoretical perspective that draws 
from multiple fields. Three different theoretical perspectives will be used in a 
complementary way in order to achieve this. These three theoretical views are realist IR 
theory as informed by an historical sociological methodology, the English School’s 
international society approach (particularly Mayall), and Risse and Sikkink’s 
constructivist view.  
 Realism and neo-realism see the ‘international’ as defined by the relations 
between states and by the structure of the international system. Power and interest, and 
according to Waltz, the anarchical structure, define the rules states adhere to and the 
behaviours they follow.211 Therefore, whilst it would be unfair to say that the realism of 
Carr, Morgenthau, and the neo-realism of Waltz underestimate the importance of ideas, 
they do primarily see norms as developed and disseminated through the interactions 
between states and their competing political, economic and military interests.212 Neo-
realism would be explanatory in understanding how and why the ‘external’ meaning of 
self-determination has begun to be used in relation to the human and democratic rights 
of sub-state groups. A rational choice perspective would be useful because it would be 
able to explain the relationship between the adoption of a particular usage of self-
                                                                                                                                          
relationship between nationalism and international relations are Francis H. Hinsley, Nationalism and the 
International System, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973; William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity 
and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; Kristen P. Williams, Despite 
Nationalist Conflicts: Theory and Practice of Maintaining World Peace, Westport Praeger, 2001; James Summers, 
Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations, 
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007; Rajit Ganguly, Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International 
Dimension, New York: Longman, 1998. 
210 This international normative context informs and shapes actors and their activities by providing a 
framework for what is legitimate and what is not. 
211 Waltz, 39-59, 93, 131; Morgenthau, 4-6. 
212 Neo-liberalism, like neo-realism, is a problem solving theory that use rational choice framework in 
explaining actions of the international actors. But neo-liberalism is less relevant to this thesis because of 
its different focus. Neo-liberal theory attributes an unchanging character to the system and a conceptual 
unity to the state and fails to explain the changes in the way units interact with each other. For a critique 
of mainstream IR theories see Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond 
International Relations Theory', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1981, 10 (2): 126-155. For a 
critique of Waltz’s neo-realims see Robert W. Cox (ed.), Neo-Realism and its Critiques, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986. Liberal theories of the inter-war period, and neo-liberalism in the second half of 
the century emphasise the economic relations and trade between the states and the importance of 
institutions, international regimes and cooperation that regulate economic, political and social relations. 
For these theories, the relations and processes define what ‘international’ is and states are not the sole 
actors in defining these relations. Transnational organisations, international organisations and trade are 
influential actors in international politics. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the 
World Political Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 49-63; Robert O. Keohane and 
Joseph Nye (eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1972. 
 73 
 
determination by actors and their political and economic interests. But this approach 
cannot explain how this norm has come to be interpreted in this way or what has 
changed in the ‘international’ to create new norms and principles.  
 Neo-realism is also criticised for its neglect of the domestic context and for its 
ahistoricity. It assumes more or less unchanging and repetitive historical conditions and 
functionally identical units, which renders the domestic context irrelevant for explaining 
the international. Incorporation of the insights of historical sociology into realist theory 
allows realism to have a better understanding of what goes on within the state and how 
this influences the international, and provides an increased awareness of the historical 
context.213 Historical Sociology in IR shows the interconnectedness between the 
domestic and the international by questioning the dominant understanding of the 
‘international’ as being separate from other spheres and questions assumptions on the 
unchanging character of international relations.214 The historical sociology of 
international relations acknowledges the role of domestic political, social and economic 
structures and non-state actors, as well as international structures, and looks at long-
term historically contingent structural factors.215  
 Constructivism, on the other hand, emphasises the role of norms and ideas in 
shaping the actions of political actors. Constructivists argue that ideas and political 
actions are socially constructed and they give legitimacy to institutions and provide a 
social theory of international relations.216 As such, constructivist theorists assume that 
politics is socially constructed. Adler, explains how socially constructed ideas become 
institutionalised and how these institutions begin to be taken for granted as part of the 
natural order of the world. He argues that more or less recognised principles and ideas 
exist and function within an international constitution. Therefore, according to Adler, 
specific occurrences do not take place independently from the international 
constitution.217 Risse and Sikkink’s constructivist approach is particularly useful for the 
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purposes of this thesis. Based on the general constructivist argument that normative 
structures are as important as material structures, they argue that international 
democratisation is central to understanding the norms of socialisation states use for 
providing international recognition and the domestic human rights frameworks groups 
use to criticise their governments.218 Risse and Sikkink’s arguments can be applied to 
sub-state nationalist groups’ use of self-determination in relation to the norms of human 
rights and democratic rights. However, politics cannot be explained purely through 
reference to the socialisation process. Constructivism somewhat overlooks the 
importance of the contingent historical and political context in the domestic and 
international realms. Still constructivism, especially Risse and Sikkink’s framework, helps 
to explain how a normative framework that gives legitimacy to certain actors and their 
political behaviour emerges and how it influences state and non-state actors alike. In this 
case, international democratic and human rights norms provide useful guidance to 
explain sub-state nationalist groups’ normative framework as well as understanding the 
attitude of international society towards these groups. 
 Lastly, the English School’s international society approach has the potential to 
provide a comprehensive and compelling explanation on why self-determination in 
relation to human rights and democracy is increasingly used by sub-state groups and 
why international society provides a normative framework for this use. It looks at 
historical processes and acknowledges the importance of key international actors and 
states in shaping international society as well as the constituent role of institutions, 
norms and rules. The English School of IR encompasses a variety of approaches and 
scholars. It adopts methodological pluralism and uses three notions for describing the 
‘international’: the international system, international society and world society.219 The 
international system puts more emphasis on states and their interests in constituting the 
international system. World society is a more progressive notion that implies the 
possibility for international society to develop into a world society where interests of 
different units may potentially converge. International society represents a middle way 
between an international system and world society and implies the existence of an 
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international whole, related but separate from its constituents. Bull and Watson define 
international society as ‘a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent 
political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour 
of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established 
by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their 
relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements’.220 
International society offers the idea that the society of states is composed of 
common interests, rules, norms and values in inter-state relations.221 According to this 
view, ideas seem to disseminate not only through interactions between states but they 
also become part of a set of international institutions that is separate from individual 
states.222 The international society approach to understanding international relations sees 
international society as the result of shared interest and identity among states, which 
creates and maintains norms, rules and institutions.223 James Mayall’s thoughts on the 
interaction of nationalism with international society, and his historical approach to the 
evolution of concepts such as self-determination, state formation and sovereignty, are 
especially useful for the purposes of this thesis. Mayall argues that nationalism both 
challenged and accommodated itself to the traditional model of a society of states.224 
The traditional model of a society of states, particularly prevalent in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of states within a 
legal system and the undisputable control of a state over its people and territory. Mayall 
provides an account of how nationalism impacted the traditional model and how it 
played a role in transforming monarchical states into nation-states. Today it is difficult 
to think of an alternative political model to the nation-state. Therefore, Mayall argues 
that nationalism challenged the traditional model. However, he also states that 
nationalism did not manage to transform the international system, it merely 
accommodated itself to the existing structures of power.225 Based on this, Mayall argues 
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that, although the role of nationalism in shaping the modern nation-state system is 
obvious, little is said about how the transformation from the traditional model of state-
system to the modern model took place. He suggests that this transformation can be 
explained through studying how the principles of sovereignty and national self-
determination adapted to each other and led to the creation of new states formed 
throughout the twentieth century.226 
 All these theories metioned above suggest that norms, rules and patterns of 
behaviour diffuse between states and transnational actors. But, the way these theories 
explain the formation and dissemination of norms and shared behaviour vary. For 
realists, the dissemination and formation of these rules and norms take place through 
relations of power; for liberals or liberal institutionalists it takes place through 
international interaction and cooperation; for the English School this process takes 
place through institutions, norms and rules that emerged historically out of interactions 
between political units at the international level, while for Constructivists they are 
socially constructed and have an independent role in affecting international politics. 
 Therefore, a combination of the international society perspective (that the 
international is shaped by norms, rules and institutions), the historical sociological 
approach to international relations and Risse’s framework on legitimacy, informs this 
thesis in its attempt to explain sub-state groups’ use of a particular interpretation of the 
principle of self-determination. The main premise of the argument of this thesis is that 
the behaviour and aims of actors (such as Kurdish nationalists) can best be explained, 
from a realist perspective, by looking at their political motivations and calculations of 
expected gains. But at the same time, it argues that their political aims and calculated 
gains are shaped by the normative framework that legitimises or prohibits certain 
political activities. Norms and shared behaviours constitute an influence upon 
international politics, as Carr argued in the 1930s, since ideas and interests are directly 
connected to each other.227 This thesis also argues that understanding why sub-state 
nationalist groups adopt a particular meaning of self-determination and how 
international society perceives the goals of sub-state nationalist groups requires an 
appreciation of the interaction between grand historical processes, the normative 
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framework that defines what is legitimate or not, and the historically, politically and 
socially contingent factors that affect individual cases.  
 Halliday’s concept of ‘international society as homogeneity’ involves 
components of the above mentioned historical sociological contribution to neo-realism, 
Mayall’s interpretation of international society in relation to nationalism, and Risse’s 
constructivist argument on the influence of the international normative context. 
Halliday considers ‘international society as homogeneity’ as similar to the above-
discussed approaches in terms of the definition of ‘international’ as this notion implies 
the existence of shared values and the diffusion of ideas. The difference between 
Halliday’s ‘international society as homogeneity’ and other approches is that, it entails a 
direct or indirect imposition of ideas and values – by great powers, states, media, 
international organisations, government institutions, or schools.228 In an international 
society approach and in a constructivist approach, as well as in problem solving theories, 
shared norms rely on the idea that members of the international should be 
homogeneous, should believe in the same values and should have similar domestic 
governmental systems.229 However, international homogeneity implies totality. This 
means that the domestic structures of states are directly connected to the interactions 
between states and to international society. As a result of the totality between the 
domestic and international spheres, states are under pressure to organise their political 
and social structure in a way that is similar to each other.230  
 International society as homogeneity, and the values and norms it creates and 
carries, shape and influence international interactions, policy decisions and the domestic 
structures of states, as well as the activities of non-state groups and organisations. It 
defines the prevalent values, norms and ideologies through which actors understand the 
world around them and interact with it. Certain values and norms created within 
globally powerful societies are reproduced within other societies and international or 
local organisations and this leads to the dissemination and reproduction of ideas and the 
similarity of social and political structures.231 Global actors, such as international 
                                                 
228 Fred Halliday, Rethinking International Relations¸ London: MacMillan, 1994, 122-23. 
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organisations, define international values and ideas, as well as utilising and enforcing 
them. International organisations formed after WWII, such as the United Nations, the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, were based on the interwar ideas of 
liberal internationalism. But they also have contributed to the institutionalisation of 
those ideas and principles. Therefore, ‘international society as homogeneity’ explains the 
conditions for a sub-state nationalist group or movement to challenge a state’s policies 
or jurisdiction through engaging in international actions and seeking international 
support. In order to do this, these groups use the dominant international ideas and 
norms to justify their cause and actions.  
 Daniel Philpott’s ‘constitution of international society’ is another concept that is 
useful in explaining how sub-state nationalist groups are linked to the international level 
through the rules and norms available at the ‘international’. Looking at three historical 
periods where the interaction of ideas played a particularly important role in bringing 
about change, such as the periods of Westphalia, the Reformation and decolonisation, 
Philpott describes the constitution of international society as a set of norms that are 
mutually agreed by political actors in the system and which define the relationships 
between polities in the system and their policies, and the conditions for authority and 
legitimacy.232 Halliday also makes a similar point on the recognition and reproduction of 
norms and principles, however he approaches it differently. He assumes that ideas and 
norms are actually imposed, and whether they are followed or believed is less important. 
By imposition he does not mean that they are openly forced. Rather he says that these 
ideas are presented as the best way of doing things. Therefore there is an indirect, but 
equally effective, imposition. But for Philpott the ideas and norms are more consensual. 
 According to Philpott, constitutions of international society could take the form 
of a system of equal and independent states, or the form of supranational organisations 
such as the European Union. Constitutions have norms, such as ‘stateless nations may 
become states’, ‘states may have colonies’, ‘colonies should achieve independence’ or 
‘intervention in the affairs of another state is necessary and acceptable’.233 Constitutional 
norms could be codified and regularly reaffirmed in official documents of international 
organisations, protocols, pacts and treaties, such as the UN Declarations, the Treaty of 
                                                                                                                                          
based on liberal democratic principles have peaceful interactions, echoes Doyle’s theory, which builds on 
Kant’s thinking (or a particular interpretation of his thinking) on the possibility of peace. Michael W. 
Doyle, ‘Kant, liberal legacies and foreign affairs’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1983, 12 (3): 205–235 (Part I) 
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232 Philpott, 6, 12.  
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Rome and the Maastricht Treaty. Sometimes norms are not codified and are not written 
in the texts of the treaties, but they could be embedded in the shared understandings of 
the parties that signed it, such as the idea of sovereign statehood during the signing of 
the Treaty of Westphalia.234 There are also customary norms that are created as a result 
of certain actions. For example, intervention has become a permissible action since the 
end of the Cold War even though it has not been codified. It has gained legitimacy 
through the UN Security Council’s approval. Therefore, for uncodified and customary 
constitutional norms to be effective they should be legitimate in the eyes of all 
international society and should be practiced.  
 Norms and ideas exert their influence on politics by converting people to new 
identities through ‘reason of reflection’ as a result of which people request new political 
conditions. Initially, entrepreneurs of ideas create new ideas or come up with new ways 
to utilise existing ideas, then these ideas start to diffuse through several channels such as 
discussions, writings, and speeches.235 Ideas also affect the political decisions and aims 
of the heads of governments, lobbies, parties, unions, military groups, the armies they 
create, and the statements made by rulers of polities.236 Ideas exert their influence on 
politics through publics (intellectual communities), government institutions, and the 
international context (a cosmopolitan layer of diplomats, national government officials, 
and officials from international organizations).237 For example, self-determination was 
disseminated by Wilson and his team before, during and after the Paris Peace 
Conference that followed the end of WWI. This fits in well with Philpott’s argument 
that heads of government have a particularly important role in creating and 
disseminating ideas. Manela explains the dissemination of the principle of self-
determination during and after the WWI era by placing a strong emphasis on the role of 
President Wilson. In his compelling account of the Wilsonian Moment, he explains how 
Wilson’s ideas for the post-war international order were formed and disseminated to the 
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237 Ibid., 69-70. Philpott gives examples to these groups: intellectual communities – Protestant theologians 
or colonial nationalists in European universities); activist networks – preachers and town leaders who 
spread the Reformation ideas or anticolonial lobbies in Britain. 
 80 
 
rest of the world.238 According to Manela, the nationalist activists inside and outside 
Europe in the post-WWI era adopted Wilson’s rhetoric. They adjusted Wilson’s 
principles to their own perceptions, goals, and circumstances and disseminated them via 
publications, pamphlets, and newspapers within their community.239 
 Overall, a combination of an historical sociological understanding of the 
domestic aspects of states and non-state actors, acknowledging the role of interest and 
power in shaping politics, an international society approach that emphasises the role of 
norms, institutions and rules in the constitution of the international, and Risse’s 
constructivism that assigns a greater role for independent norms and the ideational 
context, is necessary to explain the multi-faceted cases of self-determination claims of 
sub-state nationalist groups. This thesis does not aim to make any normative 
statement.240 It merely seeks to show the validity and necessity of incorporating multiple 
theoretical views to understand and explain why some sub-state groups use self-
determination in connection with human rights and democracy discourses.  
 Through adopting an eclectic approach, the thesis aims to make a number of 
different insights. Firstly, it argues that the meaning of self-determination associated 
with the norms of human rights and democratic rights is adopted by some sub-state 
nationalist groups because there is an emerging international normative framework that 
perceives the use of this meaning of self-determination as legitimate. This normative 
framework can be observed in the way international legal documents and UN 
resolutions have evolved. Secondly, through adopting a realist perspective, it shows that 
this international normative framework fits in well with the political interests and aims 
of the Kurdish leadership. Thirdly, it emphasises that a sufficient understanding of the 
case of Kurdish claims for self-determination requires an awareness of historically 
contingent economic, political and social factors. This view challenges the assumption 
that Kurdish nationalism has been a consistent and unchanging movement throughout 
history. Additionally, an historical focus helps to explain the causes for the changes 
Kurdish nationalism has gone through and analyses these reasons within a domestic and 
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international political and normative context.241 This chapter now turns to elaborating 
on the argument in relation to self-determination by using the varied theoretical 
framework explained in the previous pages. Other points will be illustrated in the next 
chapters. 
 
The Conceptual Framework to Understand Sub-State Nationalist Groups’ Self-
Determination Claims 
Self-determination has had different political, legal and philosophical meanings since it 
first emerged as a concept in direct connection to popular sovereignty and nationalism 
in the late eighteenth century. The focus here is on a particular meaning of self-
determination that gives legitimacy to the break-up of nation-states for the formation of 
new states or for the establishment of new administrative systems (in the form of 
autonomous regions, federal systems or local political authorities) within a state. Claims 
for the application of this meaning of self-determination are usually justified by making 
a claim to ethnic, linguistic and cultural distinctiveness by the sub-state nationalist 
groups that seek self-determination (e.g. Kurds, Kosovars, South Ossetians, Sikhs, and 
others). Therefore, this focus on the notion of self-determination in relation to Kurdish 
nationalism excludes understandings of self-determination used in the post-imperial, 
post-decolonisation, and post-USSR contexts.  
Such a conceptual focus reflects the aim to understand and explain the parallel 
between the way sub-state nationalist groups define their right to self-determination and 
the way certain members of international society (the UN, certain government officers, 
some scholars and international newspapers) perceive ethnically-defined self-
determination claims. Sub-state nationalist groups and certain members of international 
society understand self-determination in the context of the norms of human and 
democratic rights. Since the early decades of the twentieth century, national self-
determination has been the key route to changing status for the Kurdish nationalist elite 
and many other nationalist groups. They have seen self-determination as a principle that 
could potentially make them rulers and, in their view, liberate them and bring 
recognition to their national identity. They have seen democratic struggle as necessary 
for their national, as well as individual, dignity, and perceive a close connection between 
their dignity as human beings and the recognition of their existence as a distinct 
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community. Therefore, for nationalists, their national struggle is crucial to satisfy their 
desire for recognition.242 Only a liberal democratic system would enable such 
recognition, for it provides the most suitable conditions for the needs of these groups.243 
In this context, self-determination appears as a liberal, democratic and progressive route 
for aspiring nations. Almost all nationalist groups, including Kurdish nationalists, justify 
their aspiration to form a state or to attain autonomy through reference to democratic 
national self-determination. 
However, a struggle for democracy that is directly linked to protecting a specific 
identity entails also an exclusion of other identities from the future planned territory 
because the task of ‘self-redefinition’ for peoples involves division and the creation of 
smaller units.244 In relation to sub-state nationalist groups’ claims, self-determination 
refers to an ethnic, primordial and perennial interpretation of nationhood, rather than a 
modern and civic interpretation.245 Nationalist movements that derive their 
understanding of nationhood from ethnic and primordial conceptions use self-
determination to seek democratic liberation. Achieving this aspiration entails 
international recognition as a distinct identity with a specific territory and exclusion of 
other identities from claims to that territory as a homeland. Sub-state separatist groups 
claiming their right to statehood through self-determination pitch the territory they 
claim as an ethnic territory, as a space to which they attach their identity and desire full 
control over it.246  
In this sense, liberal democratisation and primordialist/ethnicist nationalist 
assumptions become indispensable for each other. Therefore, in the case of sub-state 
nationalist groups’ claims for self-determination, a link emerges between liberal 
democracy and ethnic nationalism. This link is revealed in legal definitions of the right 
to national self-determination and in the norms of democratic rights and human rights, 
as well as in the sub-state nationalist groups’ use of this conception of self-
determination for their political purposes. Hence, this thesis argues that primordial and 
ethnic interpretations of national identity are deeply embedded within national self-
                                                 
242 Halliday, Rethinking, 118. 
243 Nodia, 15-16. 
244 Bishai, 117. Bishai provides a normative reading of the relationship between secession, self-
determination and liberalism and emphasises the ‘exclusionary character of self-determination’. She argues 
that this exclusionary character is in contrast with the inclusionary character of liberal democracy. Also see 
Thomas M. Franck, ‘Tribe, nation, world: self-identification in the evolving international system’, Ethics 
and International Affairs, 1997, 11: 151-169, 152. 
245 Scholarly perspectives on the meaning of nation explained in Chapter 2.  
246 Knight, ‘Identity and territory’, 526. Knight argues that most claimants of self-determination right 
embrace such an understanding of territory, which is ‘clearly provocative’. Knight, ‘Territory and people’, 
251. 
 83 
 
determination claims of sub-state nationalist groups. In this sense, sub-national, 
minority or ethnic groups’ desires to determine their political future in order to have a 
political entity congruent with their identity,247 and presenting this using claims to liberal 
democracy, is connected with an ethnic/primordial self-projection.248 
This thesis uses ‘ethnic territories’ to refer to the territories claimed by groups 
that define their identities in ethnic terms. The notion of ‘ethnic territory’ can be 
explained by the increasing popularity of the understandings of nationhood that see the 
nation as a primordial and universal ethnic entity. Such understandings serve as a 
suitable intellectual justification for Kurdish nationalists and other sub-state 
nationalists.249 Vali argues that, in the Kurdish case, the primordialist and ethnicist 
conception of nationhood is ‘nurtured by an established trend in nationalist scholarship’ 
that perceives the political claims of Kurdish nationalists as the objective manifestation 
of the national will latent in history’.250 As explained in Chapter 2 ethnicist approaches in 
nationalism studies also adopt similar conceptions. For instance, Smith perceives the 
core of ethnic communities as ancient social formations that have persisted in modern 
times and admits that his conception of ethnicity is mildly ‘primordialist’.251 This 
conception is particularly obvious in the way Smith perceives the territorial features of 
nations and their right over their claimed territory.  
Smith’s argument regarding the importance of territorial memories in the 
construction of national identities is quite convincing. The territory and its past are 
indeed central to nationalism, and nationalists see the territory as the holder of the 
past.252 Smith calls this the ‘territorialisation of memory’ in which specific places such as 
sacred sites, mountains, battlefields, tombs and monuments come to define definite 
territories and ‘ethnospaces’.253 Smith accepts that territory is socially constructed and 
that it is humans who give meaning to that territory. But he seems to assume that 
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specific territorial associations asserted by nationalists are given and he argues that their 
assertions should have an implication on the political life of a group of people. Smith 
does not consider this as particularly destabilising. Contrarily, he argues that the failure 
to implement the national ideal is what provokes instability.254 Other scholars also have 
argued that ethnic group identity should be the decisive factor in re-drawing territorial 
boundaries, and that new political maps should accommodate the nationalist aspirations 
of new peoples and create boundaries that make the political and ethnic boundaries 
consistent.255 Within this framework, creating homogenous ethnic boundaries appears as 
the best way for the establishment of stable democratic regimes that are respectful to 
the human rights of collectivities and individuals. 
There is a reasonably large body of literature that illustrates this connection. An 
example is Yael Tamir’s Liberal Nationalism.256 Tamir argues that the doctrines of 
nationalism and liberalism are actually based on a broad consensus. They ‘[b]oth share 
the view that free, rational, and autonomous human beings are capable of exercising full 
responsibility for the conduct of their lives, and both share a belief in the human ability 
to attain self-rule, self-expression, and self-development.’257 The capabilities of an 
autonomous and free individual can be better supported within a cultural community 
where belonging, loyalty, and solidarity are experienced and where individuals are 
allowed ‘to live within the culture of their choice, to decide on their social affiliations, to 
re-create the culture of the society they belong to, and to redefine its borders’, and 
requests to have such a cultural space is at the core of the right to self-determination.258 
Tamir supports the use of cultural interpretations of nationhood and the abandonment 
of the civic interpretation. She argues that civic nation states ignore the existence of 
different national groups within their jurisdictions. Therefore, she advocates the creation 
                                                 
254 Smith writes, “habitat, folkways, extent and location as territorial ‘givens’, the objective data, so to 
speak, from which the nationalist, who wants to create or sustain a ‘nation’, must set out and with which 
he must work if he is to succeed in his self-appointed task.” Smith, ‘States and homelands’, 191, 199. 
255 See Tamir; White, 19. The examples White gives for these cases are ‘[r]eunification of Germany, de 
facto secession of Kurdistan from Iraq, the possible secession of East Timor from Indonesia, the possible 
unification of North and South Korea, of Moldova and Romania, the secession of Eritrea from Somalia, 
dismemberment of the Soviet Union, secession and independence of Slovenia and Croatia from 
Yugoslavia, secession and independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia, the partition of 
Czechoslovakia, the possible secession of Quebec from Canada.’ 242. However, the world does not 
consist of hundreds of individually homogenous nations with clearly bounded territories. Even the 
existing nation-states are rarely culturally homogenous. Peter J. Taylor (ed.), Introduction, Political 
Geography of the Twentieth Century: A Global Analysis, 1993, London: Belhaven Press, 5-6. 
256 For other examples see Isaiah Berlin, John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life, London: Council of Christians 
and Jews, 1960; Claude Galipeau, Isaiah Berlin’s Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994; 
Kacowicz; White.  
257 Tamir, 4, 16-17. 
258 Ibid., 5-9. 
 85 
 
of new political entities in the form of new states, autonomous regions or pluralistic 
societies that adopt liberal nationalism which appreciates both the particular (cultural) 
and the universal (human rights) rights of the individuals.259  
Since Tamir believes that it is only through the preservation of their distinct 
cultural identity that individuals can protect and maintain their national identity and 
rights, she argues that the idea of a homogeneous nation-state can no longer meet the 
political and social challenges of the twenty-first century, such as social, economic and 
political upheavals, migrations and minorities.260 Even though members of national 
minorities in liberal democracies – Quebecois and the Indians in Canada, the Aborigines 
in Australia, or the Basques in France – enjoy political rights, such as participation, 
speech, press, assembly and association, they may still not feel part of the society they 
live in because their government reflects a different political and communal culture than 
their own. Therefore, for Tamir, the expression of communal identity in a relevant 
political space is necessary for an individual to have a meaningful life and security of 
one’s communal identity. In short, a political culture that members can identify with, is 
necessary.261  
This form of nationalism and a desire for self-determination is very similar to 
the goals followed by what Franck defines as ‘tribalist-nationalism’. Tribalist-nationalism 
aims to reconstruct states ‘along the lines of a dominant or exclusive mutually 
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compatible ethnonational community’ such as the Quebecois, the Ashanti (Ghana), the 
Sikhs, or the Bavarians, the Serbs, the Hutus, the Scots, the Welsh, the Kashmir region, 
the Karen region of Burma, the Basques.262 Franck defines the term ‘tribe’ as a 
substitute for ‘nation’ because he states that tribe also means a community that is 
conscious of their common ethnic, social and cultural identity, and ‘tribalism’ means a 
community’s ‘desire to preserve, enhance, and give political content to their perception 
of group identity’.263 Franck argues that many of these nationalisms are driven by the 
idea of creating a single homogenous nation rather than being in response to 
injustices.264 He draws attention to the UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 
warning of the possibility of ‘brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife’ 
caused by these types of movements.265  
Notions of liberal nationalism and cultural self-determination illustrate the link 
between liberal democracy and ethnic/primordial conceptions of national identity. This 
link is suitably applicable to sub-state nationalist groups’ claims about their identity and 
desire for self-determination. In this context, the ‘consent of the governed’ is seen as the 
‘consent of the distinct people’. Ethnic, national, and cultural characteristics are 
perceived as natural or given characteristics. The purpose of self-determination appears 
not only as the determination of the political but, more importantly, as the assertion of 
the national (defined in ethnic and cultural terms) existence and the aspiration for 
international recognition. In this sense, defining the self becomes crucial for sub-state 
nationalist groups. Identifying the distinctiveness of a community requires the division, 
differentiation and particularisation of peoples along ethno-cultural-national lines. 
Therefore, the self-determination principle in relation to sub-state nationalist groups 
appears and functions in a way that implies the ‘determination of the self’ or the right to 
express and deploy a linguistic, cultural, religious, ethnic or territorial ‘self-national 
identity’. Moreover, a sub-state nationalist group’s self-determination claim derives its 
justification from universal human rights and political and cultural rights.266 Such groups 
argue that their nation can have a meaningful life only if their cultural and ethnic 
distinctiveness is recognised in a political environment compatible with their identity 
and which gives them the chance to experience and cherish their distinctiveness and 
gain entry to the international world of states as a recognised distinct national identity. 
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 As explained in the previous chapter, the evolution of the meaning and 
interpretation of self-determination in legal documents also seems to indicate an 
increasing emphasis on the cultural and human rights of communities linked to their 
claims for self-determination. The 1975 Helsinki Accord also builds upon the UN 
Charter and makes it clear that self-determination is a right of peoples. Principle VIII 
says that ‘participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to 
self-determination … all peoples have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and 
as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, 
and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development’.267 
However, it is not clear what is meant with ‘people’ in the articles of these international 
covenants - a population of a state or any group that includes minorities and ethnic 
groups? 
The principle of self-determination is further strengthened by some other recent 
international texts. Principles IV and VIII of the Helsinki Accord talk about respecting 
the territorial integrity of each of the participating states. But on the other hand, 
Principle VII requires that states should respect the equal rights of peoples and their 
right to self-determination, should act in conformity with the purposes and principles of 
the UN Charter and with the relevant norms of international law. The 1990 Charter of 
Paris repeats similar statements.268 These statements are in line with the 1970 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations which 
states that the territorial integrity of the states should be respected as long as those states 
act in compliance with the principle of self-determination and therefore have ‘a 
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction 
as to race, creed or colour.’269 More recently, UN Security Council Resolution 1542 
(2004) stated that self-determination is only applicable ‘in respect of a territory which is 
geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country 
administering it’.270 Overall, since the 1970s and through these documents the 
secessionist potential of self-determination has been highlighted in a way that challenges 
existing sovereign structures. In this sense, these legal statements imply that when 
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internal self-determination is not achievable, external self-determination in the form of 
secession could be acceptable. 271 
 The political uses of the concept of self-determination also seem to indicate an 
increasing emphasis on the cultural and human rights of peoples claiming national self-
determination.272 These uses of self-determination can be understood through the 
concept of ‘international society as homogeneity’ which, as already discussed, indicates 
that certain values and norms are globally created and reproduced within other societies 
and international or local organisations.273 Global actors contribute to the process of 
defining and deploying certain values over others. In return, other actors, both state and 
non-state, use or reject these norms and values for their own political aims and interests. 
These rules, and norms disseminate and become part of the political decisions and 
interactions between state officials in international negotiations, conferences and 
treaties, and therefore come to define legitimate or illegitimate political entities and 
actions.  
 Developments and trends in the international political arena occur not only 
within the context of contingent historical, political, economic and social determinants 
but also within an international context of rules, values, norms and institutions. As 
Hedley Bull argues, the international is not only constituted by states and organisations, 
but also by rules, norms and institutions that are embedded into the international order 
and shape and affect the behaviour of its actors.274 Rules, common practices and norms 
define what is just or unjust conduct and the rights that states, individuals and groups 
are entitled to in the international arena.275 As certain ideas and norms are adopted by 
states and international organisations, and the more they are expressed in their official 
and political statements and declarations, the more these ideas and norms become part 
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Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 120. Self-determination 
refers to ‘participatory democracy: the right to decide the form of government and the identity of rulers 
by the whole population of a state and the right of a population group within the state to participate in 
decision making at the state level. Internal self-determination can also mean the right to exercise cultural, 
linguistic, religious or (territorial) political autonomy within the boundaries of the existing state. By 
external self-determination (described by some as "full" self-determination) is meant the right to decide 
on the political status of a people and its place in the international community in relation to other states, 
including the right to separate from the existing state of which the group concerned is a part, and to set 
up a new independent state.’ pp. 12-13 (‘The Implementation of The Right to Self-determination as a 
Contribution to Conflict Prevention’, International Conference of Experts, organised by the UNESCO 
Division of Human Rights, Democracy and Peace and the UNESCO Centre of Catalonia, 21-27 
November 1998, Barcelona. 
272 For a discussion on the differences and similarities between the legal right to self-determination and 
the political expression of the doctrine see Shaw, ‘Peoples, Teritorialism and Boundaries’, p. 479. 
273 Halliday, Rethinking International Relations, p. 122.  
274 Bull, Anarchical Society, 51-73.  
275 Terry Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations of Sates, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983, 34. 
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of a reification and institutionalisation process.276 Self-determination for nationalist 
groups has become one such norm.277 
 In this context, self-determination claims by sub-state nationalist groups and 
movements have become more acceptable, especially when these claims are connected 
to the abuse of human rights and the cultural, political and economic rights of the 
group, and the non-democratic policies of the state they reside in. Some scholars argue 
that liberal postulates are becoming linked to the interests of all states and international 
society. For instance, Kegley argues that liberal and idealist assumptions are now more 
respected by states. Therefore, he suggests that international political theory should aim 
to develop ‘neo-idealism’ in order to re-define realism in line with liberal and idealist 
values.278 The neo-idealism he talks about is linked to Wilsonian idealism which saw self-
determination as directly connected to international stability and foresaw an 
international mechanism as being necessary for the protection of human rights and 
minority rights.279 International stability in Wilsonian thought is linked to the type of 
government at the domestic level, not to the structure of the international system or the 
relationship between the states.280 
                                                 
276 Adler, ‘Seizing the middle’, 340. 
277 Barkin and Cronin argue that when nationalist claims do not meet the jurisdictional borders of the 
state, national self-determination provides legitimation for the alteration of borders. Barkin and Cronin, 
111. Barkin and Cronin use the concept of ‘legitimation’ defined by Claude. According to Claude in 
particular eras different concepts of legitimation may become dominant, such as balance of power or 
dynastic conservatism in the past. In the modern era national self-determination has become the basis for 
a legitimate state authority. Inis L. Claude, Jr., ‘Collective legitimization as a political function of the 
United Nations’, International Organization, September 1966, 20: 367-169, 367. 
278 Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ‘The neoidealist moment in international studies? Realist myths and the new 
international realities’’, International Studies Quarterly, 1993, 37 (2): 131-146, 142.  
279 As defined by Kegley, 134-142. Also mentioned in Peter Wilson, ‘The Twenty Years’ Crisis and the 
Category of ‘Idealism’ in International Relations’, in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), Thinkers of the 
Twenty Years’ Crisis, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, 1-24, 11. The Wilsonian idealism or liberalism is 
linked to the inter-war liberalism or ‘Utopianism’ as defined by Carr who provided a realist critique of the 
utopian thinking of inter-war liberal internationalists. Carr, 25-36. Most significant thinkers that are 
considered within the liberal internationalist thinking of the inter-war era are Norman Angell, The Great 
Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage, London: Heinneman, 1933; Leonard 
Woolf., International Government, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1916 and Leonard Woolf (ed.), The 
Intelligent Man's Way to Prevent War, London: Gollancz, 1933; Alfred E. Zimmern, The League of Nations and 
the Rule of Law, 1918-1935, London: Macmillan, 1936. Their ideas were followed by supporters of 
scientific methods to studying international politics after WWII. Morgenthau defines this trend as 
‘contemporary utopianism’ and argues that scholars who pursue this method believe that ‘the world is 
thoroughly accessible to science and reason’ and harmonious cooperation is possible when science detects 
the elements that lead to cooperation. Morgenthau, p. 43. The terms such as ‘good frontier’, ‘scientific 
tariff’, ‘plebiscites’, ‘geopolitics’ reflect these scientific propositions that were widely accepted since WWI. 
Morgenthau, 46. 
280 See Michael Doyle, ‘Liberalism and world politics revisited’, in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed.), Controversies 
in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995, 83-
106. Waltz’s neo-realism theory is based on the assumption that the structure of the system defines the 
relations between the units of the system. Waltz’s theory assumes that all units are identical and their 
domestic structure is irrelevant to the working of the international system. Waltz, 40. 
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Today the resurgence of Wilsonian idealism in international politics can be 
observed in the invocation of the Wilsonian paradigm by Western governments in order 
to justify international interventions such as Iraq in 1991 and 2003 and Serbia in 1999.281 
Lynch indicates that nationalist leaders and their democratic supporters in Slovenia, 
Croatia and the Baltic states have often used the Wilsonian paradigm to legitimize and 
mobilize support from Western countries for their secession in the early 1990s.282 
Therefore, Wilson’s attempt to create a new international order after WWI, his ability to 
convince other great powers about his world vision, the appeal of his ideas to groups 
and peoples outside Europe, and the creation of the League of Nations (and 
subsequently the UN) are relevant to understand and explain issues today and they are 
very important factors in showing ‘the relationship between democracy and 
nationalism.’283 This relationship is particularly obvious in the increase in the number of 
issues related to self-determination in the last few decades. Wilson’s call for self-
determination for small nations about a century ago has turned into a framework that 
justifies micro-nationalisms since 1990s.284 Lynch draws a parallel between Wilson and 
his supporters and post-Cold War liberals in the way they respond to nationalism 
cases.285  
Moreover, the legitimacy of border alterations or changing the administrative 
system from a unitary state to a federal one, are perceived as related to the aim of 
achieving improvements in the areas of human rights and democratic governance based 
on ethnic distinctions. Therefore, there are parallels between the legitimacy of external 
self-determination and human rights and the statehood or autonomy claims of sub-state 
nationalist groups or movements based on a distinct cultural and ethnic identity. The 
national ethnicist interpretation of national identity is transforming into a notion that is 
widely accepted as the source of the nationalist sentiments of sub-state nationalist 
groups. There is increasing support for such cases from outsiders, particularly liberal 
Western states.286 
                                                 
281 Allen Lynch, “Woodrow Wilson and the principle of ‘national self-determination’: a reconsideration,” 
Review of International Studies, 2000, 28: 419-436, 419. 
282 Ibid., 421. 
283 Idem.  
284 Bruce Cumings, ‘Still the American Century,’ Review of International Studies, 1999, 25 (5): 271-299, 288. 
285 Lynch, 421-22. 
286 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002, 11. Additionally, Hinsley argued that the nation as an ethnic or cultural group is primordial. 
Hinsley, 20. Moynihan and Hinsley support the idea that ethnic attachment is an important determinant in 
international politics. 
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The relationship between the norms of democracy and human rights and 
national self-determination can be observed in the support provided by some of the 
states, international organisations, lobbies, media and scholars to the humanitarian 
interventions in Northern Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Interventionists 
presented these instances, as well as the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions, as 
humanitarian liberal actions.287 For instance, Iraq is composed of different and 
conflicting sects and ethnic groups, and this division is reified through power-sharing 
between these groups in order to stabilise and democratise post-intervention Iraq. 
Behind this justification lies the liberal democratic assumption that the redivision of 
nation-state territories based on ethnic or cultural homogeneity is more suitable for 
creating and maintaining democratic regimes in multi-ethnic societies because it helps 
the establishment of democratic institutions that would enable avoiding the tyranny of 
the majority.288 Therefore, the creation of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region in 
Northern Iraq is generally seen as a positive step for the establishment of a liberal 
democratic regime in this region.  
Humanitarianism and the implementation of self-determination for increasingly 
smaller communities have become widely accepted methods for realising those values 
and rules such as democratisation, peace building, enforcement of human rights and 
elections. The 1990 Conference on Security and Cooperation ‘explicitly associated 
internal self-determination with Western-style democracy’.289 The European Community 
declared that they would recognise the new republics emerging in the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and in the Soviet Union territories as long as their peoples 
enjoyed the right to internal self-determination.290 The US announced that it expected 
self-determination claims to be based on a democratic political process in the 
dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia.291 The European Community declared that it 
would recognise the new republics if they followed the rule of international law, human 
rights and democracy as described in the main international covenants, such as the UN 
                                                 
287 Michael Mann, ‘The first failed empire of the 21st century,’ Review of International Studies, 2004, 30: 631-
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288 For an illustration of such arguments see Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000. Gareth Stansfeld, ‘Governing Kurdistan: The Strenghts of Division’, 
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Charter, Helsinki Act and Charter of Paris.292 Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, and all the republics of the Soviet Union accepted these conditions and 
received international recognition.293 
As a result, international recognition of self-determination as a principle that 
protects and maintains cultural identity and political freedom has practically become an 
international norm in practice.294  This is evident especially in the last 20 years from 
cases such as parts of Eastern Europe as well as nationalist and secessionist or 
autonomist minority groups in modern states such as the Kurds, the Basques and the 
Catalans, East Timor, Eritrea, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, South Ossetia, Tamil Eelam, 
Abkhazia, and Somaliland.295 Many of these groups demand independence claiming their 
dissatisfaction about their political status in the country in which they reside. According 
to Fabry, these demands correspond to the historical period starting from the 1950s, in 
which statehood through self-determination began to be understood as a legal right, 
whereas since 1895 statehood through self-determination was a de-facto process.296 
They correspond to what Doyle describes as a set of universal values that should be at 
the basis of all political organisations. The main value is peoples’ right to express their 
identities in public forms, which requires national independence, the recognition of 
cultural identity and pluralism, and according to Doyle this value is directly related to 
democracy, participation, equality and self-determination.297 States that fit in with these 
international norms, in other words, states that have achieved a balance between 
democracy, liberalism and nationalism, are deemed to be successful. Therefore, 
becoming like them and attaining a liberal democratic sovereign state, is seen as the only 
way to be part of international society and receive recognition.298 As a result, 
international society perceives the democratic struggle of groups for national autonomy 
or independence as legitimate and progressive within a democracy and human rights 
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framework. This helps to explain the levels of international support and sympathy for 
the Kurdisth cause and their claims to national self-determination through autonomy or 
secession. For instance, the KRG was created with the support of international society, 
and federalism based on a regional or ethnic basis is often suggested by the EU as a 
solution to Turkey’s Kurdish issue.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has argued that the meaning sub-state nationalist groups attribute to self-
determination is linked to a specific international normative context defined by the 
norms of democracy and human rights for groups with distinct cultural, linguistic and 
ethnic characteristics. This chapter advocated the use of multiple theoretical frameworks 
for understanding such cases. Firstly, sub-state nationalist groups are active within an 
international context. This international context reflects the totality of domestic and 
international spheres. It involves norms and rules that define legitimate and illegitimate 
actions and reflects the interaction of states, non-state actors and international norms. 
Self-determination claims of sub-state nationalist groups and the way their claims are 
received by actors in international society cannot be understood without an awareness 
of the norms and rules that legitimates international actors and their activities. This also 
requires a definition of the concept of ‘international actor’ in a broad sense so that it 
incorporates states and all types of non-state actors (including sub-state groups and 
diasporas) in international society. Therefore, a theoretical approach that allows, on one 
hand, an awareness of individual social, political and historical structures and the 
context in which sub-state groups exist and, on the other hand, an awareness of the 
grand historical context in which movements and ideas emerge, evolve, and change is 
required. 
In relation to the key concept of the thesis - national self-determination - the 
chapter argued that national self-determination relies on liberal principles such as self-
rule and democracy, but at the same time it reifies primordially defined features of 
national identity. Liberal democracy and national self-determination are two important 
principles enshrined within current international affairs, both in legal and political 
contexts. Powerful state governments, heads of committees of international 
organisations, lobbies, powerful individuals and companies that have interests in certain 
policy decisions of states, international media, and scholars carry and generate the ideas, 
values and norms prevalent in the international framework. Dominant norms adopted 
 94 
 
by most of international society, especially the right to self-determination, perceive 
nation-states with liberal democratic regimes as legitimate and respectable members of 
international society. However this particular meaning of the self-determination 
principle seems to refer to national identity as a cultural and ethnic phenomenon, 
especially in relation to sub-state nationalist groups. The meaning of self-determination 
adopted by these groups and some of international society legitimates the claims to 
form new political entities based on distinct cultural characteristics. As a result, this 
normative framework provides suitable conditions for the promotion of such claims 
and sometimes also creates the circumstances for their realisation. This is why Kurdish 
nationalists that promote Kurdish claims, especially those in the diaspora, and the map 
of Kurdistan as the Kurdish homeland, manage to generate support and sympathy for 
their cause among would-be nationals and in international society. 
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Chapter 4: Kurdish Nationalism and Kurdistan Until 
WWI  
 
Introduction 
This chapter is about Kurdish society and the concept of Kurdistan in the history until 
WWI, and how Kurdish nationalists and the scholarship interpret the historical events 
related to the Kurdish society and historical uses of the notion of Kurdistan. It aims to 
illustrate the historical, political and social reasons for why territorial feature is 
prominent for Kurdish nationalists and to show the importance of territory and tribal 
structure in the emergence and development of Kurdish nationalism.  
Kurdish nationalists have a strong attachment to their place of origin and, to a 
great extent, to the concept of Kurdistan. The concept of Kurdistan has served as an 
influential instrument for Kurdish nationalist ideology. Kurdish nationalists, similar to 
other nationalist groups, interpret any past data that indicates Kurdish ethnic existence 
in a way that applies to a wide territory and to a very long and continuous Kurdish 
habitation in this area. They imagine this territory as a unified territory that has remained 
more or less unchanged in its extent and content throughout history, but which was 
unfairly divided by the emergence of modern states in the last century. This perception 
is generally adopted by Kurdish nationalists and by some outsiders alike, including 
Kurdish sympathisers, some scholars, journalists and certain government agencies in 
international society. This claim is facilitated through the general assumption that 
Kurdistan is a given feature of Kurdish identity, not a national aspiration, and that the 
history of the region is identical to the history of Kurdish nation. 
 Kurdish and non-Kurdish academic historiography on the Kurds deploy 
contemporary conceptions of national territory on the concept of Kurdistan that was 
used in the past to define administrative or geographic regions. Their contemporary 
conception of national territory is loaded with ethnicist interpretations of Kurdish 
territory and national identity. Ethnicist understandings of nations see territory as a 
given feature of national groups, therefore strengthen and give credibility to the Kurdish 
nationalist claim that Kurdistan is a historical and ethnic homeland. This chapter does 
not discuss the credibility of the Kurdish nationalist claims on Kurdistan but merely 
aims to show that ethnicist assumptions on nations and their territories facilitate positive 
reception of Kurdish claims by providing a historical background for the imporantcec 
of territory in Kurdish society and its importance for Kurdish nationalism. This 
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historical context will help explain why Kurdish nationalists’ claim to an ethnically-
defined territory and national self-determination has generated support among would-be 
nationals and in international society. 
This chapter looks at the status of Kurds and the region they resided in the 
Ottoman Empire and discusses territorial and tribal attachments in Kurdish society. It 
argues that territorial focus of the Kurdish elite and the tribal structure led to the late 
emergence of Kurdish nationalism. It argues that, Kurdish nationalism emerged out of a 
negotiation between tribal leaders’ understandings of their interest over a territory and 
nationalist ideas about the idea of a Kurdish state within the context of the 
transformations in the region before and during WWI. Additionally, Kurdish elites’ aim 
for territorial control and their frustration over inability to have control over that 
territory have been the main drivers of Kurdish nationalism.299 
The first section of the chapter examines the definitions and uses of Kurdistan 
in the history and the debates in the literature on the origins of Kurds and the 
emergence of Kurdish nationalism and shows that Kurdish tribal leadership’s strong 
attachment to their own tribal territorial dominion was a highly important factor in the 
timing and development of Kurdish nationalism.300 It also discusses major Kurdish 
activities until 1918, particularly the Kör Muhammed, Bedirhan and Ubeydullah 
movements, with the aim to show the importance of desire for control within a defined 
territory among the Kurdish leadership. The second section of the chapter looks at the 
process through which Kurdish nationalism emerged and diversified, and provides an 
account of the way in which Kurdish nationalist movements have used the concept of 
Kurdistan. Following on this, Chapter 5 discusses the emergence of Kurdish 
nationalism in the early post-WWI period in the midst of the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire, Great powers’ intervention in the region and the debates that took place on the 
creation of a Kurdistan along the lines of the old Ottoman territories. 
 
 
                                                 
299 Kurdish nationalist historiography considers the existence of certain Ottoman administrative regions 
governed by local tribal elites and the existence of the notion of Kurdistan in historical texts as indicators 
of existence of a distinct Kurdish national identity in the past, which justifies their claims for a future 
Kurdish state. Overall, in the related literature territorial claims can be justified in mainly three ways: 1) 
Through decolonisation and uti possidetis; 2) Through effective control of the area through annexation; 3) 
Through claims on distinct ethnic identity therefore self-determination right in the form of secession. 
Kurdish claims for the creation of Kurdistan primarily fall into this last category.  
300 Tribal territorial mentality, although less prevalent now, still influences the contemporary situation of 
Kurdish nationalism as observed in the Barzani-Talabani rivalry in Northern Iraq until recently. 
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Kurdish Society and the Use of the Notion of Kurdistan in the Ottoman Empire 
 
Brief Historical Background  
The earliest use of the term Kurdistan in historical documents goes back to the twelfth 
century when Selçuklu Sultan Sancar created a province (administrative unit) called 
Kurdistan in 1157.301 This province was located in the eastern parts of the Zagros 
Mountains. Its capital was Bahar and it encompassed the vilayets of Sinjar, Shahrazur, 
Dinawer and Kermanshah.302 It was governed by the Sultan’s nephew Süleyman Shah as 
the Selçuklu Empire preferred to administer its provinces through Turkoman officers.303 
The province covers parts of the territories of modern Iraq and Iran and indicates a very 
small area compared to the desired borders of Kurdistan today.304  
The Mongol invasion that started in the twelfth century was the beginning of a 
period of departure and nomadic life for many people in the region.305 During the 
Mongol devastations throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and Tamerlane’s 
                                                 
301 Houston, 19-20. The Selçuklu State was the dominant power in the area, encompassing today’s more 
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clear that the Kurds themselves did not create the term. Özoğlu, 26-27. Also see Baki Tezcan “The 
Development of the Use of “The development of the use of ‘Kurdistan’ as a geographical description and 
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Arfa, draws attention to the fact that Arabs gave the name to the people inhabiting the area, and the tribes 
in the region during the Arab invasions used the ‘tribal or clan name of the particular region or valley they 
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Arfa, 7. The earliest known historical documents on the region that Kurdish nationalists claim to be 
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‘Kurdistan’ and referred to the region as Jibal (Mountain), Zozan (Summer Pastures), Azerbaijan, and 
Armenia. Özoğlu, 26. 
305 Chaliand, 23. 
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campaigns in the fourteenth century, many Kurdish and non-Kurdish tribes rejected 
urban civilisation, and at the same time agriculture declined. Therefore nomadic culture 
became dominant for centuries.306 During this period the Kurds and other tribal 
communities spread out to the north and west, reaching both Greater and Lesser 
Armenia, and the Anatolian plateau.307 This explains the existence of disparate and 
scattered small Kurdish tribal communities in southeast and northeast Anatolia. A 
nomadic way of life continued longer in this region than in surrounding areas because of 
constant upheaval and instability. A shift in the trade routes was another reason for the 
continuity of nomadicism because it resulted in the loss of economic importance of the 
region.308 Due to more or less constant nomadic life until at least the mid-twentieth 
century, institutions and relations that would transcend the current fragmented status 
(linguistic, cultural and religious) of the Kurdish society did not emerge.  
Until the sixteenth century, historical accounts do not indicate any significant 
development regarding the Kurds. From the mid-fifteenth century until the mid-
sixteenth century the Ottomans and the Safavids had been in conflict for the control of 
Eastern Anatolia. After the Ottoman victory at Çaldıran (1514) over the Safavid 
Empire309, the Ottoman Sultan Selim gained control of most of the region. He entrusted 
the integration of the Kurdish tribes into the Ottoman imperial system to Kurdish 
diplomat İdris Bitlisi. Following approaches through İdris Bitlisi before the conquest, 
many Kurdish emirs had already declared their allegiance in advance of Selim’s 
invasion.310 In the period after the occupation of eastern Anatolia and the victory at the 
Çaldıran war against the Safavids and the establishment of Ottoman authority in these 
areas, the rivalry between the Ottoman and Safavid empires defined the role of Kurdish 
tribes in this region. Kurdish tribes benefited from this rivalry, and some tribal 
confederations even enjoyed semi-autonomous status during the competition between 
the Ottomans and Safavids until mid-seventeenth century.  
With the signing of the 1639 Zohab Treaty between the Ottomans and the 
Safavids, a clear borderline was drawn which has remained almost unchanged until 
today, apart from some small adjustments as a result of the 1980-1988 wars between 
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Iraq and Iran.311 It was the first mutual acceptance of a broad border (over 100 miles) 
from the Zagros in the east to the Tigris in the west. This broad border is often 
considered as having provided a peripheral location for the Kurdish tribes.312 This 
interpretation has become one of the key assumptions in Kurdish nationalist 
historiography.  
After the consolidation of power in their peripheral territories, both the 
Ottomans and the Safavids gradually increased their dominance over the Kurdish tribes 
and principalities. Their centralisation policies were completed by late 1870s in the 
territories of both the Ottoman and Safavid Empires.  
 
Past Uses of the Concept of Kurdistan 
Kurdish nationalist historiography assumes that a nationalist state of mind has existed in 
history independent from the development of the Kurdish political ideology. It 
perceives Kurdish identity as a constant and distinct identity on a historic Kurdish 
territory that has been unjustly partitioned.313 There is thus a clear attempt to link 
Kurdish identity etymologically to the historical inhabitants of the region. This is why 
the history of Kurdistan and the history of the Kurdish people are fused.314 In the 
Kurdish case, as in almost all other nationalist ideologies, it is possible to observe the 
construction of an historical link between an ideal territory and people, and a reading of 
historical texts with today’s conceptual framework. 
The two issues widely debated in the literature on Kurdish nationalism are the 
origin of the Kurds and the emergence of Kurdish nationalism, and both these issues 
are directly connected to the territorial identity of Kurdish people.315 For some scholars, 
defining the origin of the Kurds is crucial in analysing Kurdish identity and nationalism, 
because they believe that the historical origin of a nation is what actually determines it.316 
These scholars see a clear connection between an alleged Kurdish ethnic self-
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International Publishers, 1992, pp. xiii-xiv, 32-72.  
315 Abbas Vali judiciously elaborates on this debate. Vali, ‘Introduction’, Essays on the Origins of Kurdish 
Nationalism, 1-39. 
316 Such as Chaliand, Hassanpour, Izady, Jwaideh and Nezan. Abbas Vali defines them as the ‘nationalist 
scholarship’. Vali, ‘Genealogies’, 59-60. 
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consciousness in the past and a Kurdish identity and nationalism at present. For 
instance, two historical texts – Şerefname (1596) and Mem u Zin (1695) – are widely used 
as indicators of the existence of a nationalist state of mind (awareness of distinct 
national identity) back in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and to show that 
historically Kurds were aware of their distinct ethnic and national identity. 
Şerefname, written by Şerefhan Bitlisi – ruler of the Bitlis Emirate of the Ottoman 
Empire – is one of the most significant historical sources on the Kurdish chiefdoms and 
emirates and also of Ottoman-Safavid relations in the sixteenth century. It was 
completed in 1596 immediately after the Ottoman authority in the eastern territories of 
Anatolia was fully established. Şerefname has become one of the most important features 
of contemporary Kurdish nationalist historiography due to its definition of the areas 
inhabited by the Kurds: ‘The Boundaries of the Kurdish land begin at the sea of 
Hürmüz [the Persian Gulf] and stretch on an even line to the end of Malatya and Maraş. 
The area north of this line includes Fars, Irak-ı Acem [the Khuzistan region of 
southwest Iran], Azerbaijan, and Little and Great Armenia. To the south, there are Irak-ı 
Arab, Mosul, and Diyarbakır…’317 Kurdish nationalists see Şerefname as proof of the 
existence of Kurdish ethnicity and Kurdish ethnic territory. For example according to 
Kurdish scholar Hassanpour, Şerefhan had a Kurdish ‘geo-ethnic entity’ in mind when 
defining the areas where Kurdish families lived and Şerefname was a nationalist text 
against the control of non-Kurdish powers. He argues that Şerefhan’s verbal definition 
of Kurdistan was a ‘symbolic creation of such a country/state’.318 
Another historical source often mentioned in Kurdish nationalist historiography 
is Mem u Zin written by Ahmed-i Hani.319 Mem u Zin is a love story that involved 
references to Kurdish people and their political status at that time. It is argued that Hani 
demonstrated a clear group consciousness when he distinguished Kurds from Arabs, 
Turks, and Iranians, and that he was an early advocate of national self-determination. 
Hani was critical of the division and rivalry among Kurdish leaders. He did not try to 
define the borders of Kurdistan, but he assumed that Kurdistan was a coherent 
                                                 
317 As quoted in Özoğlu, 28. Interestingly, Şerefhan writes that many Kurdish families originally belonged 
to the Arabic dynasties of the Umayyad and Abbasid. 
318 Hassanpour, ‘Making of Kurdish identity’, 114-115. Although Şerefhan Bitlisi uses the word ‘Kurd’, he 
does not clearly explain what this term means. It seems to indicate a collective identity linked to a 
geographical region, Kurdistan. Özoğlu, 27. 
319 Hani’s use of the terms ‘Kurd’ and ‘Kurdish land’ has been presented as Kurdish ethnic self-
consciousness in the sixteenth century by the Kurdish nationalists. 
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territorial unit, if not politically united.320 He described Kurdistan as a region lying in the 
middle of Persian (Ajam), Ottoman (Rum), Arab, and Georgian land.321  
Another document that mentions Kurds and Kurdistan is by Evliya Çelebi, an 
Ottoman traveller who conducted his travels in the region between 1640 and 1656 and 
wrote his extensive observations about the area in his Seyahatname.322 He used the notion 
of Kurdistan to define the area: ‘Kurdistan is a vast land. It includes Erzurum, Van, 
Hakkari, Cizre, Imadiyye, Mosul, Şehrizor, Harir, Ardalan, Baghdad, Derne, [and] 
Derteng. Until it reaches Basra, this land which includes seventy stages is regarded as the 
rocky land of Kurdistan…if six thousand Kurdish tribes and clans did not constitute a 
powerful block between Irak-ı Arab and the Ottomans, it would be very easy for the 
Iranians to invade Anatolia…Kurdistan’s width is not as great as its length…’323 
Although Çelebi uses the notion of Kurdistan, his account of the inhabitants of the 
region indicates a culturally and religiously mixed population,324 his Seyahatname has been 
used by Kurdish nationalists as another historical text that proves the existence of a 
Kurdish ethnic territory in the past.  
Another historical source used to show the existence of Kurdish nationalist state 
of mind is the writings and poems of the Ottoman intellectual Haji Qadir Koyi (1817-
1897). Koyi was a Kurdish writer and is considered the earliest intellectual proponent of 
Kurdish nationalist ideas.325 He came up with a detailed description of the boundaries of 
Kurdistan which encompassed a very large area: ‘Iskenderun and the Taurus mountains 
to the west, Black Sea, Ardahan and the River Aras to the north, Alvand peaks and the 
River Aras, Euphrates to the east and Hamrin Mountains, Sanjar and the Nassibin road 
                                                 
320 O’Shea, 168. 
321 Özoğlu, 32. O’Shea, 168-9. Van Bruinessen argues that Hani cannot be declared Kurdish nationalist. 
He did criticise the division and disagreements among the Kurds but we cannot speak of a Kurdish 
nation, or any nation, in Hani’s time. Martin Van Bruinessen, ‘Ehmedî Xanî’s Mem û Zîn and its role in 
the emergence of Kurdish national awareness’, in Abbas Vali (ed.), Essays on the Origins of Kurdish 
Nationalism, California: Mazda, 2003, 40-57, 41, 54-56.  
322 Özoğlu, 33-34. 
323 As quoted in Ibid., 34. 
324 For example in Çelebi’s account Bitlis had seventeen Muslim and eleven Armenian Christian quarters. 
Houston, 59. Van Bruinessen provides a detailed analysis of Celebi’s Seyahatname in Martin Van 
Bruinessen, ‘Kurdistan in the 16th and 17th centuries, as reflected in Evliya Çelebi’s Seyahatname’, The 
Journal of Kurdish Studies, 2000, 3: 1-11. 
325 Edmonds, 89. Jwaideh argues that Kurds had a national identity before Kurdish nationalism emerged 
because he considers the election of Saladin (believed to be ethnic Kurdish) to the vizierate as an indicator 
of Kurdish national consciousness. Jwaideh also sees the efforts of İdris Bitlisi, the Kurdish Ottoman 
diplomat, in forming alliances between almost twenty Kurdish tribes and Ottomans against the Safavids. 
Jwaideh, 291. However there is no proof that Saladin politically emphasised his Kurdish identity and that 
İdris was flagging Kurdish national interests. İdris was an Ottoman official rather than a nationalist leader. 
Moreover, interestingly, many Kurdish nationalists believe that Saladin and İdris Bitlisi are traitors because 
they failed to serve, or even betrayed, the Kurdish cause, and hence cannot be considered Kurdish. 
Hassanpour, ‘Making of Kurdish identity’, 147. 
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to the south.’326 Another description of Kurdistan in the same period is by a famous 
non-Kurdish Ottoman intellectual Şemseddin Sami. In his Kamus-ul Alem he talks about 
Kurdistan: ‘Kurdistan is a large land in western Asia. Most of it remains in the Ottoman 
Empire, but some of it belongs to Iran. It is called Kurdistan, for the majority of its 
inhabitants are Kurds. However, this name does not have political or administrative 
connotations at the present time. In the past the name Kurdistan was given to a territory 
where currently the Ottoman Empire and Iran have established ‘the province of 
Kurdistan.’327 Koyi’s and Sami’s accounts are widely used in the Kurdish nationalist 
historiography.  
Kurdish nationalists and non-Kurdish scholars and writers interpret historical 
official and unofficial accounts and descriptions of the region via concepts loaded with 
modern meanings. Many scholars working on Kurds conceptualise and perceive the 
terms Kurd and Kurdistan in primordial and ethnic terms.328 Overall, most of the 
literature on the Kurds is convinced that a more or less unified, continuous and 
historical Kurdish identity can be demarcated on a clear territory, although there are 
disagreements, even among the Kurds, about who constitutes the Kurdish 
community.329 This scholarly perception is based on essentialist theories that place 
emphasis on revealing the origin of Kurdish identity, which is believed to lie in their 
language, culture and territory, and it provides a strong foundation for Kurdish 
                                                 
326 O’Shea, 170-71.  
327 Quotation in Özoğlu, 37. Şemseddin Sami, Kamus-ul Alem, 5: 3840.  
328 Examples of such assumptions can be found in Hassanpour, ‘Making of Kurdish identity’, 106-162, 
115; Larry Everest, Oil, Power and Empire: Iraq and the US Global Agenda, Canada: Common Courage, 2004, 
p. 46; Charaountaki, 32-33; Tahiri, 2; Edmonds, 87. Similar assumptions exist in most primary non-
Kurdish scholarly work on the Kurds, such as McDowall’s and Natali’s; and works of other Kurdish 
academics and writers, Jwaideh and Ghassemlou. 
329 Özoğlu, 21. Kurdish nationalists consider the Lurs, who live in the Lorestan (the land of the Lurs) 
province in Iran, as Kurds as indicated in the 1947 map (the first very detailed map of Kurdistan’s 
territorial extent), which includes Luristan and the area between Luristan and the Persian Gulf within the 
territory of Kurdistan. O’Shea, 45. Sharafnameh, written by Bitlisi in the sixteenth century and the first 
historical texts on the origins of the Kurds and Kurdish society, considers the Lurs a branch of the Kurds. 
But it is argued that Luri tribes in Iran cannot be considered as Kurds because Luris speak a language that 
is related to modern Luri, and that Luri and Bakhtiari (Bakhtiaris is another group considered as Kurds by 
Kurdish nationalists) are more ‘closely related to Persian than to Kurdish.’ See John Limbert, ‘The origins 
and appearance of the Kurds in pre-Islamic Iran,’ Iranian Studies, 1 (2): 41-51, 47. Alevis in Turkey are 
another significant group generally appropriated into Kurdish identity. Kurdish nationalist discourse and 
academic literature considers the Dersim rebellion in 1937 instigated by Zaza-speaking Alevis in Dersim 
(Tunceli is the official name given to this province in Turkey today) as a Kurdish independence revolt. 
However, today, there is a tendency among the Lurs, Alevis, Zazas and other groups such as Yezidis, 
Kaka’is and Guranis to consider themselves as distinct, and many scholars, social anthropologists and 
philologists seem to confirm these groups’ distinctiveness from Kurdish identity. 
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nationalists and their primordialist understandings of Kurdish origin.330 Another aspect 
of this view, labelled as ‘ethnicist’ by Vali, is that it associates ethnic origins with national 
origins. It treats a ‘uniform Kurdish identity’ as an expression of a nationalist claim, as 
presented in historical rebellions, awaiting realisation.331 
Some scholars, on the other hand do not presume a linear history for the 
nations in which an ethnic group develops its self-consciousness, becomes a nation and, 
then, logically deserves to have its own nation-state.332 They perceive nations, as well as 
their features such as territorial attachment, language, culture and ethnicity, as 
contingent, and as developed and changed as a result of historical factors and 
circumstances.333 According to this view, whether nations have common distinct 
features or not is not important in understanding and explaining nationalisms.334 These 
scholars emphasise the modern and constructed character of Kurdish identity and 
nationalism and mostly argue that tracing and finding some linguistic, cultural or ethnic 
origins for a group of people do not automatically explain their nationalist political 
activities and goals. This thesis agrees with this view on the modernity of nations and 
nationalism. Identity or consciousness are not the key defining factors in the formation 
of nationalist movements and the existence of distinct cultural, linguistic, religious or 
historical features in the past is not the main driver for the emergence of nationalisms 
and nations. 
Kurdish identity is a modern phenomenon constructed with the political 
purpose of nation building and achieving sovereignty, but it is associated with several 
features emphasising a historic continuity, particularly that of a Kurdish homeland, 
Kurdistan.335 Kurdish nationalists argue for Kurdish habitation in the area since ancient 
times assuming that the history of the territory of Kurdistan reflects the history of the 
                                                 
330 O’Shea, 148; Vali, ‘Genealogies’, 59. Smith’s conceptualisation of the ethnie also provides a theoretical 
foundation for the essentialist arguments. According to Smith nations had pre-modern identities called 
ethnie based on linguistic, cultural, religious and territorial commonalities. Smith, Ethnic Origins, 191. 
331 Vali, ‘Genealogies’, 61-62. Ethnicist understandings of Kurdish identity involve claims to a direct 
ethnic link to ancient peoples of the region (Medes) and see Kurds as the indigenous people of this 
geographic area. For these arguments see Houston, 16. Some claim descent from groups existed before 
Median domination such as the Guti and the Lullbi. Edmonds, 88. 
332 Some of these scholars are Halliday, Özoğlu, Vali, Van Bruinessen, and Bozarslan, ‘Kurdish 
nationalism in Turkey: from tacit contract to rebellion (1919-1925)’, in Abbas Vali (ed.) Essays on the 
Origins of Kurdish Nationalism, California: Mazda Publishers, 2003, 163-190. Halliday provides an interesting 
direction for a modernist analysis of Kurdish nationalism by applying four broad processes of modernism 
– war and conflict, state building, ideology and socio-economic change and argues that modernist 
approach recognises the ideological force of political claims to issues such as territory, definitions of 
culture, independence. Halliday, ‘Can We Write’, 12-13. 
333 Halliday, Nation and Religion, 39.   
334 Gellner, 'Do nations have navels?’, 366-370, 367-368. 
335 Vali, “The Kurds and Their ‘Others’”, p. 49; Vali, ‘Genealogies’, 67-68; Charaountaki, 36; Jwaideh, 291. 
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Kurdish people.336 The historical and present existence of Persians, Arabs, Turks, 
Assyrians, Jews, Armenians and others in the region is an often-mentioned problem in 
relation to this identification. Typically, Kurdish nationalists label this territory as 
‘Kurdistan’ with today’s notions of ethnicity and nation and attribute national character 
to this region throughout history. Some scholars challenge this assumption and claim 
that, until the twentieth century, neither ‘Kurd’ nor ‘Kurdistan’ had political meanings.337 
But this doesn’t change the fact that the idea of Kurdistan has today become the most 
obvious and important aspect of Kurdish nationalism.  
The importance of the territorial element, Kurdistan, partly derives from a 
strong attachment to place of habitation and physical environment in the Kurdish 
culture. These features have played an important role for the creation and maintenance 
of a Kurdish national identity.338 Environmental, geographical, and rural features serve 
as strong expressions of identity not only for Kurds in the region, but also for Kurds in 
the cities or diaspora. Children are often named after names of rivers and mountains, or 
rural symbols. Many Kurdish proverbs say ‘the Kurds have no friends but the 
mountains’, ‘level the mountains and in a day the Kurds will be no more’.339 Jwaideh 
labels incorporation of geographic features into the social life of the Kurdish 
community as ‘mountain culture’ and he states that where Kurmanji and the Dimli 
(Kurdish dialects) accompany this mountain culture, the people are considered Kurds 
and the land is labelled as Kurdistan.340 Another important aspect of the territorial 
feature is, as explained above, the way concepts of Kurd and Kurdistan in the historical 
                                                 
336 Vali, ‘Genealogies’, 67; O’Shea, 74. 
337 O’Shea, 4; Özoğlu, 27. 
338 O’Shea, 4-5. Although language and religion are considered as important sources of Kurdish identity, 
this chapter does not discuss linguistic and religious aspects of Kurdish identity due to its focus on 
territorial features. G. R. Driver, ‘The Name Kurd and Its Philological Connexions’, Journal of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, 1923, 393-403 cited in Özoğlu, 23-25. Minorsky argues that various Kurdish dialects – 
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language spoken by a large people, the Medes (728-550 BCE). Vladimir Minorsky, ‘Les Origines des 
Kurdes’, Actes du XXe Congrès International des Oriantalistes, Louvain, 1940, 143-52 cited in Van Bruinessen, 
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even be considered as separate languages.). MacKenzie writes that Kurdish dialects have very few 
common traits. D. N. MacKenzie, ‘The Origins of Kurdish’, Transactions of the Philological Society, 1961, cited 
in Van Bruinessen, ‘Kurdish Paths’, 24. Some philologists have recently started to deny the Kurdishness 
of Dimili, Zaza and Luri. Hassanpour, ‘Making’, 117. Like language, religious culture is also quite varied 
among the Kurds. The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims. Shi’i Islam is widely practiced amongst the 
Kurds in Iraq and Iran. Some of the Kurds in Turkey are Alevi and some in Iraq practice Ahl-i Haqq. 
Tahiri, 5. Again, in very small areas in Iraq, Armenian Republic, Syria and Turkey there are Kurds who 
adhere to the Yezidi religion. Van Bruinessen, ‘Kurdish Paths to Nation’ 25-26. Linguistic and religious 
variety among Kurdish society is generally attributed to the very mountainous geography of the region, 
which made contact and communication very difficult. Also, the absence of a Kurdish political entity in 
the history hindered creation of a common literature. Edmonds, 88. 
339 O’Shea, 5. 
340 Jwaideh, 291. 
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texts are used by Kurdish nationalists today. Consequently, in the literature on Kurds 
there are three general assumptions: (1) that the population living in Kurdistan has been 
more or less homogenously Kurdish; (2) that the boundaries of Kurdistan are clear; (3) 
that the region called Kurdistan was once united in history (as the claim on its current 
division implies previous unity).  
 
Kurdish Tribal Structure within the Context of the Ottomans’ Local Administration System 
It is difficult to understand whether the presumed identity of the people has defined 
Kurdistan or the perceived territorial boundaries Kurdistan (which is continuously 
expanding) define who the Kurds are. Today the concept of ‘Kurd’ has mainly linguistic 
and territorial meanings and it is attributed to the speakers of Kurdish and people who 
live in the ‘Kurdish region’.341 Concepts such as ‘Kurdish region’, ‘Kurdistan’, ‘areas 
inhabited by Kurds’ are abundantly used in the literature despite the difficulty in 
identifying the relationship between people and their claimed territory in the Kurdish 
case. The primary tribal character of social structure makes it difficult to define who the 
Kurds are.  
Kurdish tribal structure is mostly based on culturally distinctive large families 
centred on kinship and common descent. A significant aspect of this structure is the 
hierarchical order of the society. Tribes, ashirets, in this area were typically composed of 
‘a leading lineage, a number of commoner clans/lineages, client lineages and subject 
non-tribal peasantry’.342 The Ottoman rulers considered the non-tribal peasantry as non-
Kurd, or as köylü (peasant) or reaya (Ottoman term for commoners). The non-tribal 
peasantry has been of a very heterogeneous background, including Kurdish, Turkish, 
Arabic, Armenian speaking and religiously diverse groups.343 In the Ottoman era they 
could not carry arms and worked as labourers in the land of their beys (owners of the 
land). It has been suggested that peasants often consisted of the old populations of 
these territories who were now subject to new lords.344 For instance, Claudius James 
Rich wrote in 1836:  
I had to-day confirmed by several of the best authorities, what I had long 
suspected, that the peasantry in Koordistan are a totally distinct race from the 
tribes, who seldom, if ever, cultivate the soil; while, on the other hand, the 
                                                 
341 O’Shea, 149. 
342 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Kurds, states and tribes and states’, online source, 
http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/Kurds,%20states,%20tribes.htm, 
last accessed 01 November 2011. 
343 Idem. 
344 O’Shea, 36-37. 
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peasants are never soldiers. The clannish Koords call themselves Sipah, or 
military Koords, in contradistinction to the peasant Koords; but the peasants 
have no other distinguishing name than Rayah or Keuylees, in this part of 
Koordistan.345 
In addition to the tribal and non-tribal division of Kurdish society, there has 
been a considerable degree of overlap between different levels of identity and this 
complicates the divisions within the society even today. For instance, ashiret leaders (bey 
or agha) could be Kurdish, Turkish, Ottoman, Sunni or Arab simultaneously. At a wider 
level, some tribes over time have become Kurdish, or have changed their religion, and 
therefore their identity. Armenians who converted to Islam have become either Turkish 
or Kurdish.346 Another type of division is between ‘townspeople’ and ‘rural’ folk. Like 
non-tribal peasants, the identity of the townspeople living in the region has been 
ambiguous. Van Bruinessen quotes from Ziya Gökalp who wrote at the beginning of 
the twentieth century ‘the urbanite has no ethnic identity’ and writes that ‘Those urban 
notables who were related to the tribes of the region understandably tended to identify 
themselves with the Kurds, but most of the townspeople long remained ambivalent.’347 
Today tribal social divisions are much weaker as a result of government centralisation 
and land reforms, urbanisation and immigration. Still, many Kurds dwelling in rural 
areas do not consider other Kurds living in the cities as ‘Kurds’. For Kurdish 
nationalists today both non-tribal peasantry and townspeople are Kurds (especially since 
the 1960s with the intensification of the mass mobilisation), but the division between 
‘dominant tribal group’ and ‘subject peasant group’ has prevailed throughout most parts 
of the region in the twentieth century.348  
Tribal structure has had two main influences on Kurdish identity and 
nationalism and their relation to territory. Firstly, tribal association reinforced territorial 
attachment at local and regional levels. Despite wide linguistic and cultural variations 
throughout history (and at present) it is remarkable that Kurds are said to have a sense 
of common identity among the tribes long before the age of nationalism.349 This 
                                                 
345 Jwaideh, 27 quote from Claudius James Rich, Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan, 2 vols., London: 
James Duncan, 1836, 1: 88-89. It is important to note here that, although regional historians did not 
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346 O’Shea, 42. 
347 Van Bruinessen, ‘Kurdish paths’, 31-32. 
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349 Van Bruinessen, ‘Kurdish paths’, 25. 
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common identity has been preserved through several processes. The geographical 
inaccessibility of the region is believed to have enabled Kurds to maintain their culture 
and language in spite of the fact that they have been ruled by several different dynasties, 
empires and states. Traditionally Kurds have been defined as the ‘… tribesmen of 
eastern Asia Minor and the Zagros, settled as well as nomadic, who were not Turkish, 
Arabic or Persian-speaking’350 but, as Van Bruinessen reminds, it is impossible to define 
Kurdish ethnicity with a number of common cultural features. Indeed Kurdish society is 
very heterogeneous, and its culture changes drastically from region to region. Even 
within one single region there are more than a few religions, languages and cultures. 
This could also be partly explained by geographical inaccessibility which limited 
interaction between the peoples of the region, and hence led to the extensive variation 
in Kurdish culture, language and identity. In addition, some of the tribes were able to 
preserve their way of life thanks to their peripheral location where Ottoman and Safavid 
territories met. Most of these tribes were not fully integrated in the social and political 
cultures of the two empires and often changed alliances between the two empires.  
The second implication of tribal structure on the way Kurdish identity and 
culture is understood is that, on the one hand, tribal structure is believed to have 
allowed preservation of Kurdish tribal identity, and on the other hand, tribal structure 
has resulted in the perpetuation of an extensive number of different Kurdish cultures 
even in one single area, and therefore inhibited the formation of a uniform Kurdish 
identity and a united Kurdish nationalism. Indeed, territorial rivalry amongst tribes has 
been a prevalent feature of social and political life in the region. 
Tribal structure of Kurdish society, together with other factors, also led 
Ottoman rulers to create a slightly different administrative arrangement in this region 
compared to other areas of the Ottoman Empire. During the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry 
over the control of the region in the sixteenth century, most of the Kurdish tribes sided 
with the Ottomans not the Safavids because the latter offered them chief fiefdoms and 
principalities. A crucial factor in the Ottomans ability to win the allegiance of Kurdish 
tribal leaders was that the latter saw Ottoman control over the region as preferable to 
Safavid control as the Ottomans offered them greater power and autonomy. The 
Safavid Shah’s intention was to govern the area inhabited by Kurdish tribes through 
Turkoman and Persian administrators, whereas the Ottomans relied on local chiefs, 
                                                 
350 Ibid., 23. 
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which appealed more to the Kurdish chieftains.351 Moreover, Kurds were impressed by 
the demonstration of Ottoman military strength. The mutual religious suspicion 
between the mainly Sunni Kurdish tribes and new rulers of Iran (Safavids who made 
Shi’i Islam the official religion of the empire at the beginning of the sixteenth century) 
was another reason for the Kurdish tribes to side with the Ottomans. 
After the establishment of Ottoman rule in these areas, the Ottoman Porte 
engaged in a restructuring of the newly annexed territories. The Imperial Law Code 
prepared during the reign of Süleyman (1520-66) and a 1533 imperial decree (ferman) 
indicates that as part of the Diyarbakır province, autonomous nine Kurdish 
principalities were created.352 They were administered and ruled by their holders, 
Kurdish beys or emirs, who would remain obedient to the orders of the Sultan but would 
be exempt from paying revenue tax to the Porte.353 Three centuries later, in 1847, a 
province with the name ‘Kürdistan Eyaleti’ was created by the Ottoman state but it was 
dissolved in 1867. Although there was no continuous administrative province or district 
with the name ‘Kurdistan’, the Ottoman policy of sustaining principalities headed by 
local leaders in certain parts of this region remained more or less unchanged in this 
period. Main principalities in the Ottoman ruled areas in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries were Botan, Hakkari, Badinan, Soran, and Baban.354 
The creation of Kurdish principalities was result of the Ottoman administrative 
system which was managed in a way that was flexible enough to accommodate local 
circumstances and previous or existing practices in general. It could also be argued that 
the remoteness of this area and its harsh topography and deeply embedded tribal 
structure required intermediary figures in its governance. Therefore, even though the 
general administrative principle was direct rule by Ottoman officials who held non-
hereditary positions, the Kurdish emirs who controlled principalities and confederations, 
and the aghas and beys who controlled the more remote areas (sancaks), had some degree 
of autonomy within the territory under their authority such as exemption from tax-
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disappeared. 
353 According to the Ottoman administration system, the territories outside the capital were divided into 
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Houston, 38. Sancak means region or district. The head of a province was called beylerbeyi, and the head of 
a sancak was called sancakbeyi, who were both appointed by the Sultan and their positions were not 
hereditary. Their main duty was to raise and command troops in their provinces and sancaks and maintain 
order, Houston, 38. In 1527 the empire was constituted by eight provinces: Rumelia (capital Edirne), 
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paying duties and hereditary succession.355 Historical accounts also indicate that the 
Ottomans united tribes in order to create confederations that did not exist before and 
appointed tribal leaders to these new establishments.356 Even though they were directly 
bound by the Ottoman authority in terms of military responsibilities, this period led to 
the reinforcement of the authority of Kurdish tribes and their leaders.357 
 
Kurdish Tribal Revolts 
The timing of the emergence of Kurdish nationalism is one of the most contested topics 
in the literature on Kurds. Different perceptions in the literature on the emergence of 
Kurdish nationalism derive from various definitions of nationalism. If nationalism is 
seen as ethnic self-identification or consciousness, the emergence of Kurdish 
nationalism can be traced back to the earlier centuries.358 However, as mentioned earlier, 
this thesis adopts a narrow definition of ‘nationalism’. It takes nationalism as a recent 
and modern phenomenon directly associated with the notion of popular sovereignty and 
nation-state, and disagrees with the arguments that Kurdish nationalism emerged before 
the nineteenth century. It is instructive to examine the Kurdish tribal revolts in the 
nineteenth century in order to justify this choice. 
Many scholars consider the revolts of Kör Muhammed Pasha (1833-1837), 
Bedirhan Pasha (1843-1847) and Sheikh Ubeydullah (1880-1882) in the nineteenth 
century as the first Kurdish nationalist rebellions that took shape in reaction to the 
destruction of emirates and principalities by the Ottomans and see these revolts as 
indicators of Kurdish ethnic consciousness.359 Needless to say, this argument is strongly 
supported by Kurdish nationalists. This chapter adopts the view that tribal groups and 
their leaders with their strong desire to maintain their territorial control and self-
interested ambitions used nationalism as a ‘cover’ in competing with each other in the 
eastern parts of the Ottoman Empire. Kurdish revolts in the nineteenth century are 
                                                 
355 Tahiri, 35. Tahiri states that the Safavids also allowed its Kurds to have an autonomous status. 
356 Houston, 45. 
357 McDowall, Kurds, 14. McDowall argues that the areas ruled by Kurdish principalities could be 
considered as a buffer zone between the Ottoman and Safavid jurisdictions. According to the Kurdish 
nationalist historiography this era was a period of Kurdish semi-independence and autonomy. The 
creation of provinces headed by local Kurdish tribal leaders is seen as an indicator of the distinct Kurdish 
identity of the territory in question. For instance, the Kurdish scholar Entessar considers the principalities 
as semi-independent principalities. 
358 Hassanpour, ‘Making of Kurdish identity’, 148. Charaountaki, 35; Edmonds, 88. 
359 Scholars who trace the emergence of Kurdish nationalism earlier than the twentieth century generally 
perceive the Kurdish consciousness of a kind that existed among educated Kurds as a form of 
nationalism, Özoğlu, 21-22. Said Bashar Eskander, Britain’s Policy Towards the Kurdish Question, 1915-1923, 
PhD Diss., The London School of Economics and Political Science, 1999. Most prominent studies 
undertaken on Kurdish nationalism, such as McDowall and Jwaideh, also adopt the same argument. 
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useful in showing the tribal and territorial character of the political motivations of 
Kurdish leaders in this period. They also help to illustrate why territorial associations 
(understood in tribal terms) have been very significant in the emergence of Kurdish 
nationalism in the twentieth century. Therefore, providing a historical background and 
context is important for understanding the character of these revolts. However, the aim 
here is not to offer a historical analysis but to contextualise the revolts within the wider 
framework of Ottoman politics. 
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the rise of awareness of the decline 
of the Ottoman Empire, both in terms of foreign influence and domestic control. By 
the late eighteenth century, Ottomans had initiated centralisation policies throughout 
the empire. Most important of these were a series of administrative and military reforms 
initiated by Sultan Mahmud II (reigned 1808-1839) in the 1830s with the aim to revive 
the power and strength of the Empire. Later Abdulmecid (reigned 1839-1861) 
continued these reforms. Key aspects of these reforms were centralisation (which aimed 
to eliminate the authority of the ayans (local lords) who had become very powerful in 
their local areas), military conscription, tax reforms and others. The imposition of 
centralisation policies led to many rebellious movements in many parts of the Empire as 
well as among the Kurdish emirates. Kurdish emirs did not welcome increased state 
control and loss of authority. The Kurdish nationalist discourse claims that leaders of 
the Kör Muhammed, Bedirhan and Ubeydullah revolts were conscious of their people’s 
Kurdish national identity and their overarching aim was to protect this identity and 
establish a state for the Kurdish nation. Here it will be argued that these rebellions could 
also be the result of the attempt of tribal leaders to protect their power or to force the 
Sultan to maintain their status within new administrative arrangements.360  
These revolts can be understood within the context of the centralisation process 
in the Ottoman Empire in two ways. Firstly, ethnicist point of view would emphasise 
common territorial, linguistic, cultural bonds to show the existence of an ethnie.361 This 
would indicate that Kurdish tribal groups before the beginning of centralisation policies 
in the Ottoman Empire had a relatively autonomous status. The idea of Kurdish 
autonomy derives from the fact that after the establishment of the Ottoman rule in the 
region, within the context of continuing rivalry between Ottoman and Persian empires 
and institutionalising the administrative system in that territory, Ottoman rulers granted 
                                                 
360 In this context it would be interesting to compare these rebellions with other local uprisings occurred 
in other parts of the empire but this is beyond the purpose of this chapter. 
361 Houston, 32. 
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certain privileges to some of the Kurdish tribal aghas (tribal chief) to attain their loyalty 
to the centre.362 Kurdish nationalist historiography adopts an ethnicist perspective and 
sees this process as semi-autonomous Kurdish rule in the region and associates this 
autonomy with nationalist ideology. Centralisation policies that terminated or limited 
their autonomous status led to Kurdish nationalist reactions led by tribal leaders.363 As a 
result, a nationalist reaction emerged from Kurdish nationalist sentiments and Kurdish 
tribal leaders’ vision of a different future for their people. 
A second way of understanding Kurdish revolts is to look at the reasons behind 
changes in the alliances between the centre and the tribal leadership in the region. 
Within the context of the weakening of the Ottoman rule in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, leaders of the emirates and tribes attempted to increase their 
territorial control and appropriated the revenues instead of handing to the central 
authority.364 Centralisation policies were partly in response to these attempts and 
Ottoman loss of control in the region. The revolts led by Kör Muhammed Pasha of 
Rewanduz, Bedirhan Pasha of Botan, and Shaikh Ubeydullah can be understood as 
reactions to the centralisation policies of the Ottomans as a result of which the authority 
of tribal leaders was reduced, privileges granted by the Ottoman Porte changed hands 
and the leaders of the emirates (emirs) were replaced by centrally appointed governors 
(valis).365 They can be understood as examples of resistance to a loss of authority, rather 
than nationalist revolts for statehood. Şerif Mardin’s theory of ‘tacit contract’ is useful in 
explaining the motivation for these revolts. According to Mardin, the traditional centre-
periphery relation between the local rulers and the Ottoman state relied on the 
assumption that the Ottoman state tradition and the rebels perceived resistance as a 
means of bargaining and negotiation between the centre and periphery.366 Therefore, it 
can be argued that Kurdish leaders aimed to force the state for a new and more 
beneficial deal in order to regain their loss of status and authority. Bozarslan, using 
Mardin’s notion of ‘tacit contract’, argues that revolts were means to renew the type of 
relations between the state and the tribal leaders.367  
                                                 
362 Charaountaki, 37-38. 
363 Similar arguments, that Kurdish nationalism began to take shape in reaction to the destruction of the 
autonomous emirates by the Ottomans and Persians in the nineteenth century, are also widely adopted in 
the research projects on Kurds. Eskander, 17. 
364 Van Bruinessen, ‘Kurds, tribes and states’. 
365 Jwaideh provides a detailed account of these revolts. Jwaideh, 54-67.  
366 Şerif Mardin, Türk Modernleşmesi Hakkında Makaleler 4 (Articles on Turkish Modernisation 4), Ankara: 
İletişim Yayınları, 2008, 108. 
367 Bozarslan, 186. 
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Another important factor that led to reactions by Kurdish tribal leaders was the 
increasing recognition of the non-Muslim communities as a result of Mahmut II’s 
Tanzimat reforms initiated in 1839. Tanzimat reforms aimed to re-organise the 
administrative, military, fiscal and legal system of the state, to centralise the state rule 
and to promote the ideas of Ottomanism and equality among the ‘millets’ of Ottoman 
population.368 Ottomanism aimed to respond to nationalist movements in the Ottoman 
territories in the Balkans and dissident revolts in other parts of the empire.369 The 
strengthened and improved status of the non-Muslim population of the Empire 
disturbed Kurdish leaders, especially after they became aware of the terms agreed in the 
1878 Berlin Treaty. For instance, Sheikh Ubeydullah was concerned about possible 
Armenian control in Kurdistan, especially because of Article 71 of the 1878 Treaty of 
Berlin, which promised Armenians certain ‘improvements and reforms’ and guaranteed 
their ‘security against Circassians and Kurds.’370 All these developments, together with 
increased Christian missionary activity, led Kurdish tribal leaders to feel threatened and 
led to fears of the increased power of Christians (Nestorians) and of the establishment 
of an Armenian or a Christian state in the region.371 
The revolt of Kör Muhammad Pasha was amongst the most significant regional 
revolts in the early nineteenth century. The ruler of Rawanduz, Muhammad Pasha 
succeeded his father in 1814 and quickly expanded his domain of control in the region. 
He revolted with the aim to acquire all Kurdish provinces of the Ottoman Empire.372 
Ottoman forces appeared in large numbers, but the revolt was suppressed through 
diplomacy. Interestingly, after his defeat Muhammad Pasha was brought to İstanbul and 
upon his arrival he was ‘acknowledged to be … one of the pillars that sustained the 
throne of the Sultan’ and was appointed as the governor-general of a wide area in east 
Anatolia.373 The way Muhammad Pasha revolt emerged and finalised seems to fit in 
Mardin’s theory of ‘tacit contract’.  
                                                 
368 Ottomanism is a formula created by the Ottoman Porte, elite and intellectual circles in İstanbul in 
order to stop the Ottoman dissolution. 
369 İlber Ortaylı, Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı Mahalli Idareleri (1840-1880) [Ottoman Local Administrations 
during the Tanzimat Period (1840-18800], Ankara, Cedit Yayınları, 2007, 15-17. 
370 Jwaideh, 80-83. 
371 Martin Strohmeier, Crucial Images in the Presentation of a Kurdish National identity: Heroes and Patriots, Traitors 
and Foes, Leiden: Brill, 2003, 11. The engagement of both Bedirhan and Ubeydullah in violent actions 
towards Christian population of the region illustrates such concerns. Houston, 56.  
372 Jwaideh, 55, 291-92. According to Jwaideh, underlying Muhammad Pasha’s rebellion was the idea of 
Kurdish nationality. 
373 Jwaideh, 61. Jwaideh quotes from Frederick Millingen, Wild Life among the Koords. London: Hurst and 
Blackett, 1870, 186. 
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Bedirhan Pasha’s revolt, another significant Kurdish tribal revolt, followed a 
similar route to Muhammed Pasha’s. Bedirhan Pasha, the emir of the Botan emirate 
(appointed by the Ottoman Porte) and controlled this strong emirate in the first half of 
the century. Although he was a loyal emir, he opposed the centralisation policies of the 
Ottoman state and rebelled in 1847.374 After the revolt was suppressed, Bedirhan Pasha 
was appointed to another post by the state and sent to Crete to suppress the Greek 
uprising in 1856 and was allowed to return to İstanbul.375 It is widely accepted that 
Bedirhan Pasha revolted against the Ottoman’s new administrative arrangements in the 
region within the context of centralisation policies, as the new arrangements divided the 
land under Bedirhan’s authority and reduced his power.376 Tahiri argues that although 
tribal leaders, who rebelled against the state in the nineteenth century, including 
Bedirhan Pasha, claimed that their aim was to ‘liberate Kurdistan’, these revolts were 
aimed at regaining the status they lost as a result of centralisation policies.377 This 
assumption again is in line with Mardin’s theory of ‘tacit contract’.  
After the suppression of the last powerful Kurdish leader, Bedirhan Pasha, no 
Kurdish leader gained that much power in the region until Sheikh Ubeydullah. 
Destroyed Kurdish principalities were not replaced with effective political and 
administrative structures. Appointed governors did not have the traditional legitimacy 
emirs and tribal leaders had. This change, according to Van Bruinessen, led to division of 
emirates into separate confederacies and smaller tribal units and increased rivalry among 
tribal leaders.378 Another source of the increased authority of this new type of leaders 
was the threat of possible Armenian control in the region. Within this context, the gap 
created by the disappearance of the autonomous emirates was filled by leaders with 
religious authority, the sheikhs who, from then on, were to be found at the head of all 
the important rebellions.379 Sheikhs were able to exert such authority because their 
followers saw them as saviours (Mehdi), who would end the chaos and bring justice, 
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particularly during the periods of war, economic hardship, social chaos and famine.380 
Sheikh Ubeydullah’s increased authority coincided with the huge social, political and 
economic chaos in the region caused by the 1877-78 War between the Russians and 
Ottomans. 
Although some of the features of the Sheikh Ubeydullah revolt indicate that his 
resistance was a nationalist movement, his revolt was still mainly a resistance to the loss 
of territorial control and to the centralisation policies of the Ottoman rule.381 There are 
some reasons to consider Ubeydullah’s revolt as nationalist. Olson points to the 
continuities between Ubeydullah’s revolt and preceding Kurdish revolts, such as 
Bedirhan, but argues that Bedirhan aimed at greater autonomy under Ottoman 
administration, whereas Ubeydullah expressed his desire to create an independent 
Kurdish state.382 For example, in one of the pieces of mail correspondence between the 
British consuls and Shaikh Ubeydullah, vice-consul Clayton wrote‘. . . [The Sheikh] has a 
comprehensive plan for uniting all the Kurds in an independent state under himself.’ 
Jwaideh also quotes from a letter written by Sheikh Ubeyduallah to Dr. Cochran, an 
American missionary in the Hakkari region: ‘The Kurdish nation, consisting of more 
than 500,000 families, is a people apart. Their religion is different, and their laws and 
customs are distinct.’383 However, the nationalist nature of Ubeydullah’s plans and the 
intended meaning of the phrase ‘Kurdish nation’ in Ubeydullah’s letter are questionable 
especially if we assume that the Sheikh used the concept of umma (a term that means 
literally ‘community’ and was used to denote all Muslims, or Arabs, but also specific 
identifiable parts, such as Egypt, or Hijaz).384 In addition, although Ubeydullah aimed 
for an independent principality, he was also ready to accept a deal that recognised his 
authority in the region under Ottoman rule.385 This shows the priority given by tribal 
leaders to their own personal and tribal interests and is again in line with the theory of 
                                                 
380 Olson, ‘Five stages’, 393. 
381 Many scholars in the literature on Kurdish nationalism argue that Ubeydullah’s uprising was nationalist 
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‘tacit contract’. What followed Sheikh’s capture seems to support this theory because 
the fate of Sheikh Ubeydullah was not different from Muhammed Pasha’s or Bedirhan 
Pasha’s. After the suppression of the rebellion, the Sheikh was brought to Istanbul and 
was granted honours by the Sultan and awarded a new position within the Ottoman 
state. 
In this period the Kurdish elite followed varied political ideas and tied 
themselves with different political and military loyalties and attachments. Some of the 
provincial tribes joined the Hamidiye Cavalry, which was established by Sultan 
Abdulhamid II (reigned 1876-1909) in 1891 in order to organise the Sunni population 
(some of the Kurdish tribes, Turks and Turkmens) against the Armenians and their 
supporters, particularly the British and to secure the loyalty of the Sunni Kurdish 
tribes386 Joining the Hamidiye armed forces nourished and reinforced Kurdish hostility 
toward non-Muslim populations in the region. It is said that these cavalries were 
involved in the Armenian massacres in the 1890s and were involved in the worst kind of 
abuses.387 Olson argues that the Hamidiye cavalry served as a pivotal stage in the 
development of Kurdish nationalism because some of the Kurdish tribes gained 
immense power and authority by joining to these forces.388 However, it is important to 
be aware of the fact that the key influence of joining the Hamidiye Cavalry on the 
Kurdish tribal elite was increased reactions against non-Muslim communities in eastern 
Anatolia and a possible Armenian state in the region, and further divisions among the 
Kurdish tribes. 
 Based on the above analysis, the notion of Kurdistan or the territorial goals in 
the nineteenth century can best be understood as a pre-national politico-territorial 
notion or aim that emerged gradually within the processes of bargaining between local 
tribal elites and the central state during the implementation of centralisation policies by 
the Ottoman Porte. This finding supports the argument that Kurdistan, as a politico-
territorial concept, existed before Kurdish nationalism emerged and the emphasis on 
territoriality and ownership of land exacerbated the divisions between Kurdish groups 
(due to continuing tribal structure among Kurdish society). This links back to the earlier 
point – although territory is generally seen as a given feature of national identities, 
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actually it is as constructed as the national identity itself. This also supports one of the 
key arguments of this chapter that territorial identity and the idea of a homeland are the 
most crucial aspects of Kurdish nationalism both in terms of self-identification and of 
projection of this identity to the outside world.  
The pages below turn to the Kurdish activities in the early twentieth century and 
explain these activities as attempts of urban and provincial tribal elites to increase their 
power and dominion during the weakening and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire 
until WWI ended. Kurdish tribal revolts in the nineteenth century and the formation of 
Kurdish associations (as will be explained in the pages below) can be interpreted, within 
a ‘top-down’ framework, as reactions to the Ottoman rulers’ attempt to increase their 
control in the region and to reorganise the administrative, military and economic (tax 
system) structure, as well as response to the regional wars and later the weakening of the 
Empire. The period of revolts therefore set a precedent to the later development of the 
Kurdish nationalism. From a ‘bottom-up’ perspective, the changes that happened in the 
society after the introduction of new civil laws, administrative and military changes, 
increased rights of non-Muslim populations of the Empire, emergence of Kurdish 
organisations made it necessary for the Kurdish elite to think of themselves and their 
dependants within a changing society. Other significant factors that led to the re-
organisation of the Kurdish elite, and later to the emergence of Kurdish natioanlism as a 
political movement were the plans for the creation of Armenia and Wilson’s principle of 
self-determination. 
 
Kurdish Activities until the World War I 
It is interesting that the nationalist wave that swept through the Ottoman Balkan 
territories in the nineteenth century was less influential than Wilson’s self-determination 
principle in instigating nationalist motivations among the Kurdish urban and provincial 
tribal elite. This was due to the tribal mentality of the dominant Kurdish elites and their 
strategic as well as Islamic affiliation with the Ottoman Porte. The principle of self-
determination had a significant influence on the strategic calculations of the Kurdish 
tribal elite and the way Kurdish nationalism evolved after WWI. The Kurdish elite’s aim 
to regain, maintain or increase their tribal dominions in the nineteenth century and in 
the period before WWI reinforced the existing divisions among tribal leaders and led to 
further divisions. This limited the possibilities for the emergence of a united or a 
stronger Kurdish nationalism in the early twentieth century. Moreover, the tribal 
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territorial mentality prevalent among the Kurdish leadership led territorial identity to 
become the most important common feature of Kurdish nationalism.  
After the revolts in the nineteenth century many Kurdish tribal leaders and their 
families were exiled to other parts of the Ottoman Empire, especially to Istanbul. In 
Istanbul, these tribal elites found the opportunity to interact more easily, became more 
aware of the intellectual and political views of their time, published journals and 
established societies. Most of them were the descendants of large tribal families and 
were educated in Europe or in Istanbul. A number of these individuals were part of the 
Ottoman administration as members of parliament, governors and military officials. In 
this historical period the wave of nationalism was sweeping through the Balkan 
territories of the Empire and the state was in internal turmoil and under external 
pressure. Ottoman millets were attaining their independence one after another.  
There were different fractions among the urban Kurdish elite in Istanbul (but of 
course they were still connected to their territorial dominions back in Anatolia). One of 
these fractions was critical of Abdulhamid’s reign but still considered Kurds as part of 
the Ottoman society. The key figure in this group was Abdurrahman Bedirhan from the 
Bedinan clan. He and his brothers published Kürdistan between 1898-1902 in 
Switzerland, then in Cairo and some of the other European capitals. The journal 
included writings on Kurdish sufferings in the Ottoman hands.389 This critical attitude 
was probably because of Bedirhan family’s strong opposition to Abdulhamid’s reign as 
well as because of their loss of territory and authority back in 1847.390 Although 
Kürdistan is claimed to be a nationalist journal due to its emphasis on the distinctiveness 
of Kurdish identity and its effort to create Kurdish consciousness, it saw this identity as 
part of the Ottoman society. Its main goal was to educate and enlighten the uneducated 
and mostly illiterate Kurds and to explore and promote Kurdish language, literature, 
history, and culture.391  
Some of the Kurdish elite in Istanbul joined the Young Turk movement. Young 
Turks had been working against Abdulhamid’s suppressive rule in exile and established 
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İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (the Committee for Unity and Progress). Two of the founders 
of the Committee were Kurdish and many others joined later.392 Committee’s activities 
resulted in the 1908 Young Turk Revolution and establishment of constitutional 
monarchy. An era of cultural, intellectual and political freedom followed the revolution. 
In this environment Kurdish elite formed a number of associations and societies in 
Istanbul. The most significant organisation established by the Kurdish elite in 1908 in 
Istanbul was Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti (The Society for the Mutual Aid and 
Progress of the Kurds). Its founders, Muhammad Sharif Pasha, Emin Ali Bedirhan and 
Sheikh Said Abdulkadir (son of Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri) were members of key 
Kurdish tribal families. According to its constitution, the Society was established with 
the purpose: 
to consolidate Kurdish ties with [the Ottoman state] while protecting the 
Constitution as the only way for progress and explaining to those Kurds who are 
not aware of the virtues of the Constitution that is responsible for the happiness 
of the people and also compatible with the great rules of Islam. [It shall] protect 
the high esteem of being an Ottoman and strengthen the relations with the 
Armenian, Nasturi and other citizens of the Ottoman Empire. . . .393  
 Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti, together with the other Kurdish groups, could be 
considered as a Kurdish political organisation within an Ottoman framework that aimed 
at education, modernisation and protection of Kurdish people ‘for the good of the 
empire overall’ rather than a nationalist organisation.394 Klein argues that this society and 
other Kurdish clubs formed in this period by the Kurdish elites living in Istanbul cannot 
be considered as nationalist in the contemporary sense. Kurdish activities in this period 
were fragmented and divided, and each Kurdish group had differing political visions 
based on their interests and goals, and their motivation was to regain their power and 
territorial authority which they lost as a result of the centralisation policies in the 
nineteenth century.395 Similar to the nineteenth-century Kurdish tribal revolts discussed 
in the pages above, fractions and divisions within and between the Kurdish urban elite 
in Istanbul and tribal elite in eastern Anatolia can be explained by Kurdish groups’ 
desire to prioritise their interests, authority and power representing the family or tribe 
they belong to. Klein describes this as a project ‘to reclaim traditional political 
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arrangements for one family through nationalism.’396 Instability caused by weakening 
and collapsing of state power in the region before and during WWI led the elite of 
Kurdish tribes, clans and families to attempt to increase their political power. In this 
process, although the desire to control tribal dominions began to be increasingly 
legitimated in nationalist terms, none of the tribal leaders would be willing to give up 
their own control for a wider project. 
Another indicator of the Kurdish elites’ desire to maintain their territorial 
control was strategies some of the Kurdish leaders used in attaining support of outside 
powers. Similar to previous centuries, they lobbied their case in the international arena 
and sought the support of powers like Britain and Russia.397 They offered allegiance to 
the power supporting them, even though that alliance required not having their 
independent rule. For example, Muhammad Şerif Pasha offered to work for the British 
Expeditionary forces in Mesopotamia but his offer was declined. Some of the members 
of the Bedirhan family allied themselves with the Russians while another member of the 
same family was an Ottoman governor for the province of Malatya.398 It is also often 
observed that these Kurdish elite did not perceive the common Kurdish people as 
members of a nation. Their approach to the common people was defined by 
paternalistic and tribal characteristics. In the same way, what defined the source of the 
attachment of the inhabitants of their tribal dominions towards their chief was loyalty to 
the family/tribal leader, rather than loyalty to a nationalist leader. Even after the 1920s, 
as Van Bruinessen writes, ‘nationalism has become a very significant motivating force, 
but nevertheless, loyalty to one of the … leaders often overrides the ulterior interests of 
the nation.’399 
The concept of Kurdistan began to attain its meaning as a national concept in 
this period through the activities of the Kurdish elite. Since the concept of Kurdistan, in 
the early twentieth century reflects a level territorial attachment but not by all Kurds, not 
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in all parts of the region and not in the nationalist sense. Although nationalism had 
become the dominant ideology in the region and national aspirations of Kurdish leaders 
were being nurtured and supported by the Russian, German and British army agents, 
construction of a coherent Kurdish national movement proved to be too difficult, even 
impossible. This was because of the fact that tribal territorial aspirations could not be 
substituted entirely by national aspirations.400 There was more than one leading family in 
the region and none of them wanted to be dependent on the other. Therefore, they 
could not mobilise as part of one united movement. Moreover, the educated Kurdish 
urban elite aimed at strengthening the Ottoman Empire through modernisation and 
education of the illiterate populations, including the Kurds. Kurdish provincial elite in 
eastern Anatolia and their family members residing in Istanbul aimed to redeem the 
privileges they enjoyed in the nineteenth century and partly under Abdulhamid’s reign, 
rather than representing a minority group requesting autonomy or independence.401 
Most of these Kurdish chiefs did not have nationalist feelings toward common Kurdish 
people. Thus, it could be argued that before the 1920s, Kurdish leaders were not 
necessarily seeking an independent nation-state of Kurdistan, and the idea of Kurdistan 
was not yet fully envisaged as a national territory.  
For the Kurdish tribal elite, Islam was a more decisive component of their 
visions of the future than Kurdish identity. Indeed, for the vast majority of the Kurds, 
being a Kurd represented being Muslim both in the Ottoman and Qajar empires.402 For 
instance, the millet system in the Ottoman system did not denote ‘nations’; it reflected a 
form of compartmentalisation based on religious and sectarian divisions, though in the 
era of nationalism millet system helped to define the identity of emerging nations.403 
Neither the Ottoman state nor the peasants had an ethnic appellation. Turks, Kurds, 
Albanians identified themselves as ‘Muslim and Ottoman’.404 Therefore the aim of the 
Kurdish elite active in Istanbul was to regain authority in the areas where once their 
families had power or to continue to be members of Ottoman administration in 
Istanbul or elsewhere. In Özoğlu’s words, ‘The possibility exists that had the empire 
survived and recovered, Kurdish nationalism might never have emerged.’405  
                                                 
400 O’Shea, 105; Natali, Kurds and the State, 11. 
401 The latter is the widely accepted argument in the literature. Klein, 137. Klein bases her argument on a 
detailed archival research on the publications done in İstanbul and in the provincial towns by Kurdish 
groups in that historical period. 
402 Natali, Kurds and the State, 1. 
403 İlber Ortaylı, Osmanlı Barışı [Pax Ottomana], Istanbul: Ufuk Kitapları, 2003, 29-31. 
404 Ibid., 20. 
405 Özoğlu, 70. 
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After the War ended in 1918 the south-eastern territories of the Empire were 
divided, and Iraq and Syria were created under the British and French mandate and 
when the Treaty of Sevrès showed that the Great Powers had no intention to create a 
unified Kurdistan and preferred not to directly influence the areas above Iraq and Syria, 
some of the Kurdish elite and most of the tribal leaders and sheikhs in the rural areas 
joined in Mustafa Kemal’s Kuvayi Milliye Hareketi (National Forces Movement). This 
movement denied the legitimacy of the government in Istanbul, and declared the 
establishment of the government in Ankara and aimed to fight against the Allied 
occupation in Anatolia. The Kurdish tribal elite’s support mostly derived from the 
movement’s aim, at least at the beginning, to defend Islam as part of the ‘Turkish-
Kurdish Muslim fraternity’.406 Another reason for these tribal groups to join in Kuvayi 
Milliye was the European support for an Armenian state, in an area which they saw as 
their own, for which the newly declared Wilsonian principle of self-determination for 
ethnic minorities provided a suitable framework. As a result, the presentation of the 
‘War of Independence’ as a Muslim war against non-Muslims, the implicit recognition of 
Kurdishness by Mustafa Kemal’s movement, and the open European support to the 
Armenians led some Kurdish elite in Istanbul and most of the provincial tribal 
chieftains to support the Kuvayi Milliye. When it was understood that the break-up of the 
empire was inevitable it became clear that Ottomanism was no longer feasible. This is 
when Kurdish nationalism began to emerge as a distinct movement from other 
movements such as Ottomanism, pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism.407  
It is interesting that Kurdish leaders in this period used the definition and map 
of Kurdistan created by the European agents, travellers and army officers in the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century.408 The map Şerif Pasha presented to the 
British representatives at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference was also similar to the maps 
created by the Europeans in the earlies decades of the twentieth century. Another map 
similar to the maps created by Europeans was Muhammad Amin Zaki’s map in 1936. 
Muhammad Amin Zaki was also one of the ex-Ottomanists who became Kurdish 
nationalist after the realisation of the fact that Ottoman Empire would dissolve.409  
In this context, some members of the Kurdish elite opted for open Kurdish 
nationalism. These leaders, most importantly Emin Ali Bedirhan and Sayyid Abdul 
                                                 
406 Bozarslan, 169, 172. 
407 Klein, 146. 
408 O’Shea provides a detailed account of the travellers and their maps. O’Shea, 107-115. 
409 Houston, 22. 
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Kadir (from Ubeydullah family), founded the Kürt Teali Cemiyeti (Society for the 
Advancement of the Kurds) on 17 December 1918.410 There were strong disagreements 
between Emin Ali Bedirhan and Abdul Kadir. Abdul Kadir, the president of the Society, 
supported Şerif Pasha’s efforts in Versailles and favoured autonomy of a unified 
Kurdistan within the Ottoman Empire. Whereas Emin Ali Bedirhan advocated the 
implementation of Wilson’s self-determination principle for Kurds and supported 
independence of a smaller (excluding the parts in Iran and Iraq) Kurdistan and was 
severely opposed to General Şerif Pasha’s pre-arrangement in Paris Peace Conference 
with the Armenian delegation for the formation of both Armenia and Kurdistan.411 The 
disagreement between Bedirhan and Abdul Kadir indicates to the emergence of two 
different political and territorial projects of Kurdistan: a larger autonomous Kurdistan 
under the Ottoman rule and a smaller Kurdistan separated from the Ottomans (and the 
future Turkish state) under colonial rule. Each leader promoted his plans for the future, 
based on the rivalry between the two families going back to the nineteenth century. 
Indeed, it is believed that the division between Bedirhan and Abdul Kadir was rather the 
result of the rivalry between the two tribal elite leaders for authority in a possible future 
Kurdish formation of any kind.412 Therefore, in conclusion, it could be said that by this 
stage a unified movement with the aim to form a Kurdish state had not yet developed. 
Kurdish elites had begun to embrace the notion of Kurdistan as a ‘national homeland’ 
but still saw it in terms of their territorial dominion.  
Overall, in conclusion, the revolts of Kurdish leaders and their formation of 
Kurdish societies in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century were not 
motivated by nationalist goals but by the desire to maintain or increase territorial control 
and power. The territorial political notion of Kurdistan developed before Kurdish 
nationalism emerged and began to be considered as the name of a ‘national homeland’, 
gradually, only after the end of WWI. Therefore, the tribal leaders’ desire to maintain 
                                                 
410 Özoğlu, 81. 
411 Bozarslan, 169; Olson, ‘Five stages’, 399; Jwaideh, 134. Şerif Pasha’s efforts in Versailles and his map 
of Kurdistan are discussed in detail in the next chapter. Bedirhan’s telegraph to the Conference indicating 
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412 Özoğlu, 77: ‘[t]he fact that Emin Ali Bedirhan wanted himself or perhaps his son, Celadet to be the 
ruler of Kurdistan, it is very probable that Emin Ali Bedirhan was bitter about Abdulkadir’s leadership in 
Istanbul and about Semdinan power in Kurdistan.’ Ibid., 118-119. This rivalry between the two families 
goes back to the nineteenth century. Bedirhan family lost its authority in the Baban territories after the 
defeat of the Bedirhan Revolt; by the second half of that century, sheikhly Şemdinan family emerged as 
the strongest power in the region and included some of the old Baban areas under its dominion. This 
caused bitterness between the two families. 
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and increase territorial control and their loyalty to the Sultan (with the condition that 
they continue control their territorial domain) impeded early formation of Kurdish 
nationalism. This also led Kurdish nationalism to have a strong focus on territorial 
features. During and after WWI, the international political circumstances changed, 
Wilson’s vision of a new international order began to spread across the world, the 
Ottoman Empire’s dissolution became inevitable and the plans for an Armenia were 
being seriously discussed. It is in this period that the activities of the Kurdish leadership 
transformed into a Kurdish political movement.  
 
Conclusion 
There is a significant relation between territory and nationalism in the Kurdish case and 
Kurdish nationalism is shaped by the problematic character of the concept of 
Kurdistan. This chapter provided the historical background in order to show the 
prominence of territorial features (linked to tribal structure) in the history of the 
Kurdish society before the emergence of Kurdish nationalism as a political movement. 
Scholarship on Kurdish nationalism often mentions the concept of Kurdistan but does 
not consider it as something to be theorised and explained. However, the study of the 
territorial concept of Kurdistan provides useful insights to Kurdish nationalism. This 
chapter took the notion of Kurdistan as constructed through a combination of 
contingent material, historical and ideational factors, not as a primordial and given 
feature of Kurdish nationalism as is traditionally understood in the literature. The 
chapter argued that the notion of Kurdistan gradually developed out of the processes of 
bargaining between local tribal elite and the Ottoman state, the attempts of urban and 
provincial tribal elites to increase their power and dominion during the weakening and 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and the division of the Ottoman territories during 
WWI based on the interests of the victorious states. 
This chapter showed that the development of Kurdish nationalism has been 
delayed most importantly because of the excessive ‘territorial obsession’ of the tribal 
elite. This territorial obsession has been directed to ‘an idea of Kurdistan’ which has had 
multiple forms and meanings. The projected Kurdistans have been numerous and varied 
in accordance with the interests of tribal confederations. The competition between the 
Kurdish tribal elites was also one of the reasons to why Kurdish nationalism emerged 
later than other nationalist movements in the Ottoman Empire and why it did not 
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develop into a unified nationalism.413 The territorial obsession with the aim to keep or 
gain power and authority led to rivalry among Kurdish groups. Thus rival Kurdistan 
plans emerged, foretelling the divided nature of Kurdish nationalism. 
Overall, theoretically, the thesis challenges two general assumptions in relation 
to existing understandings of Kurdish nationalism. Firstly, in the literature, territory is 
generally seen as a given feature of Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish identity. This 
chapter showed that the territory, Kurdistan, was not perceived as a national homeland 
until the end of the WWI. It gradually emerged as a politico-tribal project and 
bargaining tool of Kurdish leadership in the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century. It transformed into the idea of 
Kurdistan as a national homeland after WWI. Modernist nationalist theories would 
argue that territorial projects are created with the aim of autonomy, separation or local 
administrative rights, and are constructed and created by the nationalist leadership. 
However, in the Kurdish case, the territorial notion of Kurdistan as a political unit 
emerged before Kurdish nationalism emerged, and the emergence and development of 
Kurdish nationalism have been directly connected to the concept of Kurdistan. 
                                                 
413 Disunity among Kurdish elite, establishment of new states in the first half of the twentieth century 
which created multiple numbers of Kurdish societies existing in different political and cultural contexts, 
low levels of literacy and education, highly mountainous geography, underdevelopment due to 
frontier/peripheral location are among some of the reasons suggested in the literature. 
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Chapter 5: Kurdistan and Kurdish Nationalism Since 
World War I 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will argue that the formation of Kurdish nationalism as a political 
movement and the definition of Kurdistan as a national territory can be understood 
within the context of the re-organisation of the Ottoman territories based on territorial 
nation-states and through the direct involvement of Western powers and the wide 
acceptance and application of the Wilsonian self-determination principle. After the 
1950s, the spread of territorial nation-states to other parts of the world through 
decolonisation and the dissolution of the communist regimes reinforced the territorial 
nation-state ideal and provided further political and ideological impetus for the 
promotion of Kurdistan as the Kurdish national homeland. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, this thesis adopts Breuilly’s definition of nationalism as a form of politics, 
which assumes that nationalist movements relate nationalism to the aims of attaining or 
using state power.414 In the Kurdish case, elites linked their nationalism to the aim of 
attaining state power, initially within the context of the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire and later in the form of separatist nationalism in the new states formed in the 
ex-Ottoman territories.415  
This chapter aims to explain the development and proliferation of Kurdish 
nationalism, and the reasons for the way Kurdish nationalists, scholars and sections in 
international society perceive the notion of Kurdistan and its maps. It proposes two 
reasons for such perceptions. Firstly, as explained in the previous chapter, Kurdish 
nationalist discourse and some of the non-Kurdish academic historiography on the 
Kurds deploy contemporary conceptions of national territory on historical uses of 
Kurdistan. One of the key characteristics of Kurdish nationalism is its assumption that 
the history of the region is identical to the history of the Kurdish nation. This facilitates 
the perception that Kurdistan is an ethnic territory. The ethnicist understanding of 
nations in some of the academic and non-academic literature implies that territory is 
more or less a given feature of groups and this strengthens and gives credibility to such 
perceptions of a Kurdish homeland. The ethnicist assumption is at its most prominent 
                                                 
414 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 1.  
415 Breuilly looks at separatist nationalisms in three different contexts: Separatist nationalism in the 
nineteenth century Europe Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, separatist nationalism in the new nation-
states (particularly the cases from Africa and Pakistan) and separatist nationalism in the developed nation-
states, particularly the Scottish case.  
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in the use of the idea of Kurdistan and the use of the map of Kurdistan by Kurdish 
nationalists in relation to their self-determination claims. 
The second reason for the way some actors in international society approach 
Kurdish nationalists’ claims to an ethnically-defined territory is the resonance of the 
notion of territoriality in the contemporary international system based on territorial 
nation-states, which provides the legitimate context for the promotion of national 
homelands. Additionally, understanding territories in ethnic terms can be linked to the 
popularity of understandings of the nation as an ethnically-defined entity. All this serves 
as a suitable intellectual justification for Kurdish nationalists and gives strength to their 
attempt to draw support and sympathy from among would-be nationals and in 
international society. In this framework, maps can be seen as propaganda tools in 
promoting the idea of a ‘natural’ or ‘given’ border and are particularly effective tools for 
sub-state nationalist groups. 
In order to explain and illustrate the arguments above, this chapter firstly looks 
at Kurdish politics at end of WWI and the emergence of Kurdish nationalism in line 
with the idea of a national Kurdish homeland. Next, the chapter explores the ways in 
which Kurdish nationalist movements, as well as outsiders, have used the notion of 
Kurdistan and its maps throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Lastly, the 
chapter offers a discussion of the possible reasons for the perceptions of scholars, 
Kurdish sympathisers, certain state departments and some of the international media in 
international society on Kurdistan. As explained in the Introduction, in relation to the 
historiography of the maps of Kurdistan and their use by Kurdish nationalists as 
propaganda tools, this thesis has hugely benefited from Maria T. O’Shea’s insights. 
O’Shea discusses how the map of Greater Kurdistan has become widely used and 
considers this an example of ‘propaganda cartography’. As a social geographer she 
argues that the Greater Map of Kurdistan does not reflect the real demographic 
circumstances of the region but rather it is the ‘most visible form of discourse about 
Kurdistan.’416 
 
Kurdistan and Kurdish Nationalism at the End of WWI 
As already established, Kurdish tribal leaders’ desire to maintain and increase their 
territorial control and their loyalty to the Sultan, with the condition that they continue to 
control their territorial domains, impeded the early formation of Kurdish nationalism. 
                                                 
416 O’Shea, 2-3. For a discussion on the implications of the existence of the elusive territory of Kurdistan 
on the geopolitical realities in the region and the status of the Kurds see Culcasi, 117-119. 
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Disagreements between Kurdish leaders, especially among the members of the Kürdistan 
Teali Cemiyeti (Society for the Rise of Kurdistan), continued even after it became clear 
that the Ottoman Empire was going to dissolve. Kurdish nationalist historiography 
considers the WWI period as a key defining moment in Kurdistan’s history of missed 
opportunities. This is because of the fact that the creation of a Kurdish state was one of 
the issues discussed by the Great Powers before, during and after the War within the 
wider context of the re-division of the ex-Ottoman territories. It is known that during 
the War the British sent political officers to Mosul to encourage a Kurdish uprising 
against the Ottoman Empire with the intention of forming an independent Kurdish 
state in Mosul and Sulaymaniyah. However, they soon realised that an Iraqi state would 
not be feasible without those regions.417  
By the time the war ended and the Paris Peace Conference began on 18 January 
1919, there was still no agreement on the location and extent of a possible Kurdish 
political entity. The proceedings of this conference lasted more than a year, but 
throughout this time the situation of Kurdistan and the Kurdish people was dealt with 
only in very general terms and mostly within the framework of its relation to the destiny 
of the Ottoman controlled areas.418 The Paris Peace Conference hosted representatives 
of many peoples and groups, however not all these delegations were given official 
hearings, including the Kurdish delegation. The Kurdish delegation was led by General 
Şerif Pasha. The Pasha had prepared a Memorandum on the Claims of the Kurd People, which 
was accompanied by a map of Kurdistan. The Memorandum claimed a free Kurdish 
state for the Kurdish people and attempted to demonstrate the soundness of the 
Kurdish demands against the Armenian claims. It argued that the districts claimed by 
the Armenians were actually the boundaries of Turkish Kurdistan. The request of the 
Kurdish delegation was as follows: ‘In virtue of the Wilsonian principle everything 
pleads in favour of the Kurds for the creation of a Kurd state, entirely free and 
independent … Since the Ottoman Government has accepted Mr Wilson’s fourteen 
points without reservation, the Kurds believe that they have every right to demand their 
independence, and that without any way failing in loyalty towards the Empire under 
whose sovereignty they have lived for many centuries, keeping intact their customs and 
tradition…’.419 Şerif Pasha went on to argue that if the contested districts were to be 
included in the New Armenia, disorder and guerrilla warfare were inevitable. The 
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Memorandum also indicated the ethnographic frontiers of Turkish Kurdistan as follows: 
‘in the North at Ziven, on the Caucasian frontier, and continue westwards to Erzéroum, 
Erzindjan, Kémah, Arabkir, Benismi, and Divick; in the South they follow the line from 
Haran, the Sindjihar Hills, Tel Asfar, Erbil. Kerkuk, Suléimanié, Akk-el-man, Sinna; in 
the East, Ravandiz, Bash-Kalé, Vizir-Kalé, that is to say the frontier of Persia as far as 
Mount Ararat.’420 
 
Figure 5.1: Serif Pasha’s Map of Kurdistan, 1919421 
[This content has been removed for reasons of copyright.] 
 
 
The definition of Kurdistan and its map provided in the Memorandum were 
constructed on the basis of early definitions of Kurdistan and maps produced by 
Western travellers, British and German armies and entrepreneurs in the region. From 
the nineteenth century onwards numerous definitions and cartographic depictions of 
Kurdistan were created by European travellers and writers who visited the region as 
state agents, army officers, scientists, researchers or journalists. Their maps derived from 
their findings during their travels as well as from definitions of Kurdistan by Şerefhan, 
Evliya Çelebi and Koyi. Among these early Western produced maps, a map produced by 
the Germans in 1854 is significant because it is the first ethnographic map of part of 
Kurdistan. The British military officer Major Maunsell produced another important map 
after his travels in the region in 1892. This map is important as it is the first map of 
Kurdistan and it provided detailed information on the geography of Kurdistan and 
Kurdish habitation.422 The British Government used Maunsell’s projections of 
Kurdistan in the period before WWI when plans about the region were being made. 
Maunsell’s map and other travellers’ maps became widely accepted and used by Kurdish 
nationalists after WWI.  
The Kurdish Delegation was not considered representative of the Kurds and, 
despite the efforts of Şerif Pasha, it was not taken seriously by the British.423 Eventually 
                                                 
420 Kurd Delegation to the Peace Conference, Memorandum on the Claims of the Kurd People, Paris, 1919, 3, 12. 
421 O’Shea, 167. 
422 O’Shea, 14-15, 110, 125. It is important to remember that these accounts reflect the values and 
perceptions of the travellers who were representatives of the states that ultimately decided the political 
future of the region. Their accounts were shaped by their states’ official political policy towards the region 
and contributed to the restructuring of the region in the first decades of the twentieth century. 
423 McDowall, Modern History, 122. For a discussion on how maps are used by the delegations as tools to 
convince others at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference see Edward Mandell House and Charles Seymour 
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the Pasha resigned from his role as the President of the Kurdish Delegation before the 
Conference ended. Before his resignation the Conference received a series of telegrams 
from Kurdish chieftains in the region stating that they did not recognise Şerif Pasha as a 
legitimate representative of the Kurdish people and protested against his map of 
Kurdistan. For instance, Emin Ali Bedirhan, the vice president of Kürdistan Teali 
Cemiyeti, rejected the proposed map and, in a letter to the president of the Conference, 
he claimed ‘Kurdish lands consist of the Ottoman vilayets of Diyarbakır, Harput, Bitlis, 
Van, Mosul and the sancak of Urfa’.424 There were also telegrams from other Kurdish 
chieftains claiming that they did not want separation from the Turks.425 In the Ottoman 
ruled areas, many Kurdish chieftains supported Mustafa Kemal’s movement since they 
perceived him as the most likely person to protect Kurdish lands from Armenian claims, 
and believed that they needed him to consolidate and increase their own power.426 
Additionally, Olson states that, some Kurdish groups supported the Turks not only for 
opportunistic reasons, but also because of their belief that Kurdish nationalists’ 
demands for autonomy or independence were treacherous especially when Turks were 
stuck in a war with the Greeks.427 
The general international political and ideological circumstances of the era led 
Kurdish leaders to raise their hopes since self-determination was the rule of the day, at 
least in the process immediately after WWI. Not long after the proceedings of the Paris 
Peace Conference ended, the Treaty of Sèvres was signed in August 1920.428 Despite its 
limited provisions, modern Kurdish nationalist historiography perceives the Treaty of 
Sèvres as having legally provided for the establishment of a Kurdish state and therefore 
as a milestone in Kurdish history. According to this view, if it was not for the 1923 
                                                                                                                                          
(eds.), What Really Happened at Paris, the Story of the Peace Conference 1918-19, by American delegates, London, 
1921, 142. 
424 Özoğlu, 39-40. 
425 Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, 279.  
426 Ibid., 278-279. Olson, ‘Five stages’, 401.  
427 Olson, ‘Five stages’, 401-402. 
428 Articles 62-64 of the Treaty dealt with the issue of Kurdistan. The Treaty set the terms for the partition 
of the Ottoman territories and Articles 62-64 dealt with the status of the Kurds. Article 62 provided that: 
‘…a Commission sitting at Constantinople … shall draft … a scheme of local autonomy for the 
predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it 
may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia…’. Article 
64 explained when and how Kurds could apply to the League of Nations to show their desire for 
independence: ‘If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish people 
within areas defined in article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such 
a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, 
and if the council then considers that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends 
that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to 
renounce all rights and title over these areas.’ As quoted in Jwaideh, 131-132.  
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Lausanne Treaty, the Kurdish state would have been established.429 For them the WWI 
period was a missed opportunity for accomplishing their desire to become independent. 
But later Wilson became aware of the destabilising influence of his ideas. Cautious 
measures were implemented, such as the removal of the concept of self-determination 
from the conference covenant. Wilson announced that the Conference would only deal 
with territories and peoples related to Europe, with the Turkish possessions in Anatolia 
and the Middle East and the German and Italian colonial possessions, and he suggested 
the formation of an international mechanism to deal with future claims.430 Most of the 
Ottoman territories were divided between the British, French, Italians and the Greeks 
and, eventually, only two new states were formed: Turkey and Armenia in the immediate 
period after the end of the WWI. 
The future status of the Kurds remained uncertain throughout the post-War 
process for reasons also other than the Lausanne Treaty. The case of Kurdistan during 
the WWI period indicates that when the idea to create Kurdistan did not correspond 
with political, economic and geostrategic circumstances and aims, it was disregarded. 
One of the reasons for this disregard was that the implementation of the principle after 
1918 proved very difficult beyond the European territories. In the Ottoman territories 
the Great Powers’ policy was mainly to draw viable boundaries for the new entities 
rather than fully implement the principle of self-determination. In theory self-
determination seemed reasonable as it implied a people’s right to govern. In an existing 
political jurisdictional entity, the population of that entity constitutes the people or ‘the 
self’, but if a new political jurisdictional entity is to be created it is very difficult to define 
the people (or ‘the self’) that has the right to self-determination. In many parts of the 
post-imperial Habsburg and Ottoman territories the ‘self’ needed to be created. In this 
context, the victorious powers saw Kurds as a potential ‘self’ and Kurdistan as the 
possible territory of that potential ‘self’. However, British policies in relation to the 
Kurds indicate that they did not perceive Kurdistan as an end in itself, but as a potential 
means to reach the most suitable and favourable political, economic and geostrategic 
conditions in the region. An example that indicates the greater role played by political 
considerations is that the victorious powers, in order to avoid antagonising Iran, never 
brought the Kurdish inhabited areas in Iran to the agenda during the discussions on a 
                                                 
429 O’Shea, 11, 144. Even the non-Kurdish academic literature adopts the ‘division’ argument and sees this 
at the core of contemporary problems facing Kurdish society such as deprivation of political unity and 
threats to cultural cohesion. See Charountaki, 42.  
430 Manela, 60-61. 
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possible Kurdish state.431 This shows the tension between the idea of self-determination 
and politico-economic circumstances. 
Another reason for the disregard of the idea of a Kurdish state is that the British 
gradually became less interested in the idea. The key aim of the British in relation to the 
Kurds was to create a buffer zone (in the north of Mesopotamia and Mosul) between 
the territory under their domination in Mesopotamia and the future Turkish state. The 
British soon realised that the control of that zone would be a big undertaking for them 
and decided to leave this area to its own fate.432 This disregard was also the result of the 
fragmented status and inconsistent attitude of the Kurdish leadership, which the British 
perceived as a drawback in any movement towards a possible Kurdish state. The much 
more coherent, strong and unified Armenian movement supported by an influential and 
well-organised Armenian diaspora posed a significant contrast to the fragmented Kurds 
in the region and their ineffective representation in Europe.433 Another possible reason 
for British disinterest was the lack of oil resources in those areas.  
The only area where self-determination was implemented, albeit in a quite 
procedural form, was north Mesopotamia (today Northern Iraq) where a regional 
administration was headed by Kurdish tribal leaders. This was done with the aim of 
complying with the League of Nations’ expectations but it was made clear that this area 
was Iraqi territory. Moreover, the British were concerned about the overlapping 
territorial claims of the Kurds and the Armenians.434 It soon became clear that the 
Assyrians also had territorial claims in the same area. They sent delegates to the Paris 
Peace Conference presenting a large map that projected the location and boundaries of 
the Assyrian state they envisaged.435 Turkish political aspirations, on the other hand, 
opposed the Armenian, Kurdish and Assyrian aspirations.436 Therefore, the multi-
cultural and multi-religious composition of the population in eastern Anatolia made the 
                                                 
431 O’Shea, 12. 
432 Kurdish nationalist discourse often criticizes the British state for its inconsistent policy towards the 
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434 McDowall, Modern History, 120. 
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implementation of self-determination very problematic due to the difficulty of drawing 
boundaries for viable and culturally homogenous political entities. 
In the end, post-war negotiations did not result in the creation of a Kurdish state 
but did lead to an abstract Kurdistan with extensive boundaries, which became the 
foundational aspect of Kurdish nationalism. The internationalisation of self-
determination in this era led to the emergence of an understanding that the 
ethnographic structure of the region was crucial in creating new political entities. 
Together with the internationalisation of the principle of self-determination, the idea of 
Kurdistan provided an excellent framework for the Kurdish identity. After this stage, 
the Kurdish national homeland and its cartographic depiction, the map of Kurdistan, 
began to imply that the territory lying within those borders was Kurdish.  
 
Kurdish Nationalism and Kurdistan after the WWI 
Kurdish nationalists have operated within a context of new international boundaries 
that emerged after WWI and remained more or less unchanged except for some 
relatively minor changes. The map of Kurdistan that emerged in the early twentieth 
century persisted over successive decades until today and constituted the basis for 
Kurdish nationalist aspirations despite the fragmented status of Kurdish nationalism and 
different territorial and political aims of each Kurdish political movement. This section 
will offer a historical and chronological narrative of the significant Kurdish movements 
and the fragmented status of Kurdish nationalism. 
After the British abandoned the idea of creating a Kurdish state, firstly within 
Anatolia and then in Iraq, Kurdish movements led by the Kurdish elite and intellectuals 
continued to emerge and proliferate. However, they never attained the status of a 
unified Kurdish nationalist movement detached from localised tribal desire for territorial 
control. The territory became the most important and defining feature of Kurdish 
nationalism despite the continuing fragmentation of Kurdish nationalism and the 
proliferation of politico-territorial goals. Kurdish nationalists in each state have limited 
their territorial goals within the boundaries of the states they reside.  
The level of popular support has been different in each state and none of the 
Kurdish movements have gained the full support of their Kurdish societies, and each 
Kurdish movement in each state is organised in different styles. In Turkey, as a result of 
Turkey’s centralised administration that aimed to eliminate the local tribal and religious 
authorities of the aghas and sheikhs, and its national education and Westernisation 
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policies, Turkey’s Kurds were gradually detribalised and urbanised. In Iraq, the British 
maintained the Kurdish tribal structure and local authority figures. In Iran, the Kurds 
have mostly been clearly divided between ‘nomadic, tribal, semi-tribal, urbanised and 
pastoral’ stratas.437 
Kurdish activities continued after the war in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. In Iraq, 
Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji, who had been appointed as the governor of Sulaymaniyah, the 
Kurdish region in Iraq, rebelled against the British in 1920 and again between 1924-32. 
Sulaymaniyah was created by the British in 1918 as a semi-autonomous Kurdish region, 
in accordance with the ideals of President Wilson’s Point 12.438 Sheikh Mahmud 
resented the fact that some of the districts did not accept his leadership and that his 
freedom was restrained by British advisers. He declared himself the king of Kurdistan 
and believed that the Kurds of the Sulaymaniyah region were entitled to a state of their 
own.439 Nevertheless, Sheikh Mahmud’s quest was almost impossible, because the Kurds 
in the Sulaymaniyah province were divided due to tribal rivalry, and two powerful tribal 
confederations, the Jaf and the Pizhdar, opposed him.440 Moreover, the British had 
different plans for the region. After a short military operation Sheikh Mahmud was 
defeated, captured, and deported, and these areas were incorporated into the Iraqi 
administrative organisation. Sheikh Mahmud rebelled again in 1924, and his revolt was 
suppressed in 1932. After this the British sent a memorandum to the Council of the 
League of Nations to legitimise their denial of Kurdish right to self-determination.441 
Another attempt at achieving Kurdish independence in this same era with strong 
nationalist undertones emerged in Iran in the early 1920s.442 At the end of WWI, Iran, 
led by the Pahlavi regime, was in a state of turmoil and Simko Agha emerged as the 
most powerful Kurdish figure in the Kurdish inhabited areas from 1919 to 1922. Simko 
was reported to have worked on a plan to include the Persian Kurds in an independent 
Kurdistan.443 He tried to ally himself with Turkey, Britain, Russia, the United States and 
France and declared an open rebellion against Iran in 1922. The tribes that had joined 
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his forces deserted him and his expectations of a British support for his revolt against 
the government ended in disappointment. In the end, he was defeated and escaped to 
Iraq.  
In post-war Turkey, the first large scale Kurdish revolt was the 1925 Sheikh Said 
Revolt. The organisation behind the revolt was the Azadi (meaning ‘freedom’), which 
was founded as a secret organisation in Erzurum (eastern Turkey) in 1923. Its members 
were Kurdish officers and tribal leaders.444 Azadi planned to instigate a general revolt 
and to form an independent Kurdistan. Sheikh Said, who was a well-known Sunni 
sheikh, was selected as the leader of the revolt. A religious leader was chosen because it 
was thought that a revolt with a religious character would make mobilisation easier at a 
time when Kurdish nationalism was weak among the masses.445 Sheikh Said revolted in 
1925. His main support base was the Zaza-speaking Sunni Kurds. Alevi Kurds of 
Dersim did not support him. Moreover, some Sunni Kurds and tribes in Van and some 
of the tribes and the townspeople of Diyarbakır and Elazığ joined in the suppression of 
the revolt.446 According to Tahiri, the attempt of Sheikh Said was unsuccessful, similar 
to Sheikh Mahmud and Simko revolts, because all these leaders undertook actions ‘for a 
society in which its people were at odds with each other’.447 Sheikh Said’s revolt was 
easily defeated and he and other Kurdish leaders who joined the revolt were executed 
for the crime of attempting to establish an independent Kurdish state. 
 Sheikh Said’s revolt is the most debated Kurdish rebellion in the literature and 
there are different arguments about its character. According to Jwaideh, there was a 
strong nationalist sentiment underlying the revolt and religion was simply manipulated 
for a nationalist cause.448 Van Bruinessen describes the revolt as a large scale ‘traditional 
tribal rebellion.’449 It is also argued that the religious component in the revolt was far 
more significant than many assumed. The abandonment of the Ottoman legacy and the 
religious authority of the Caliphate led the traditional and conservative Kurdish elite to 
realise that the dominant doctrine of the Turkish Republic was Turkish nationalism, not 
Muslim fraternity, and this led to the Kurdish resistance.450 Another reason proposed for 
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the cause of the revolt is that the Kurdish elite believed that Turkey abandoned the 
Kurds by accepting the division of the Kurds among Turkey and Iraq in the Lausanne 
Treaty. Therefore, they saw the British dominance over Mosul as a betrayal by the 
Turkish state.451  
 Another significant Kurdish revolt is the Ağrı Dağı (Ararat Mountain) revolt 
(1930-31), also known as the Ararat revolt, which was organized by Khoybun (meaning 
‘independence’ or ‘being one-self’). Khoybun was established in Syria in 1927 by 
Kurdish activists who escaped or migrated to Syria after the foundation of the Turkish 
Republic. Kurds in Syria were less numerous than the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq and Iran 
and they lacked a focal centre. Therefore the Kurds who migrated from Turkey, 
especially the Bedirhan brothers, were able to act as significant figures. Also, French 
patronage in Syria enabled them to engage in nationalist activities. Khoybun’s aim was 
to promote the Kurdish national cause and to form a Kurdish state on the territories of 
Turkey. Khoybun also opened Kurdish centres outside Syria, in Cairo, Paris, Detroit, 
and Philadelphia and was particularly active in Paris.452 It distributed manifestos in 
Turkey, Iraq and Syria and sent them to the League of Nations, to Beirut and to Paris. 
However, Khoybun was unable to unify and organise the Kurdish masses, mainly 
because, according to Tahiri, the Kurdish tribal leaders were only seeking their own 
interests and the intellectuals engaged in these activities had no real power over the 
tribal leaders. Moreover, most of the Kurds in Iran and Iraq did not support Khoybun, 
and the Kurds in Turkey were divided. The level of disunity amongst the Kurds became 
particularly clear during the course of the Ağrı Dağı revolt. Most Kurds in Turkey did 
not take sides during the revolt whereas a small number of Kurdish groups supported 
either the revolt or the government.453 Meanwhile, most of the Kurds outside Turkey 
saw the revolt as a Kurdish revolt in Turkey.  
 Still, the Ağrı Dağı revolt is one of the most significant revolts where Kurds 
from Iran, Iraq and Turkey, although limited in number, all took part. Most Kurdish 
nationalist activities after 1925 were confined within the individual states.454 The revolt 
took place near the town Ağrı in northeast Turkey and İhsan Nuri and former Ottoman 
officers led the revolt. Although the leaders of the revolt made appeals to the League of 
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Nations and the Great Powers for support, and called for the support of the Kurds in 
Iran and Iraq, they did not manage to gain support. This was because of the signed 
treaties and protocols between Iran, Turkey and Great Britain and the Soviet Union, 
and also because of the security agreements between Turkey, Iran and Iraq to stop 
cross-border Kurdish activity.455 The Turkish army suppressed the revolt in 1930 and 
İhsan Nuri escaped to Iran.  
The last Kurdish revolt in Turkey in this period was the 1937 Dersim Revolt. 
This revolt also formed for similar reasons to the Sheikh Said and Ağrı Dağı revolts. 
Turkish government policy displeased the Kurdish tribal leaders and sheikhs, especially 
due to the government’s continuing confiscations and deportations. A religious leader, 
Sayyid Reza, led the revolt and the revolt is generally characterised as religious and 
tribal.456 There are also arguments in the literature that it was mainly the result of 
nationalist sentiments and aims.457 The revolt started in 1937 in the mountains of 
Dersim and continued until the end of 1938 but the insurgents could not receive outside 
help. Even the Kurds outside Dersim and some Alevi Kurds did not support the 
revolt.458 The revolt was defeated and no Kurdish revolt arose again in Turkey until the 
1980s.   
During these revolts, Kurdish activists did not produce any maps of Kurdistan. 
This could be due to the fact that Kurdish tribal leaders were more concerned with the 
extent of their tribal lands rather than claiming a national territorial Kurdistan and they 
had no real idea about the extent of Kurdistan.459 The maps of Kurdistan produced by 
Kurdish nationalists and Kurdish historical geographers after the 1930s mostly relied on 
the earlier European maps and atlases produced to study Kurdistan’s political geography 
in the second half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. A good 
example of such maps is Muhammed Emin Zeki Bey’s map of Kurdistan, published in 
his History of the Kurds and of Kurdistan in 1936. Zeki Bey was a Kurdish historian and 
politician and Transport Minister in the Iraqi government. The sources he used in 
producing his Kurdistan map were Sykes’ 1908 Map of Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman 
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Empire,460 a map drawn by the Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations of Iraq 
and a secret Indian Army map from 1912.461  
 
Figure 5.2: Ethnographic Map of Kurdistan, Muhammed Emin Zeki462 
[This content has been removed for reasons of copyright.] 
 
 
Until the mid-1940s there were no significant Kurdish military or political 
activities apart from the 1937 Dersim rebellion in Turkey and some small groups and 
meetings taking place in other regional countries. In Turkey the WWII period witnessed 
increased pressure on minority groups and strong one-party rule continued. Following 
the severe suppression of the Dersim rebellion, the Kurds of Turkey remained relatively 
inactive. In Iraq, after the suppression of his defeat in 1932, Sheikh Mahmud was exiled 
to southern Kurdistan and only was allowed to return to his family in 1941. However, 
other members of his family, particularly Mustafa and Ahmed Barzani continued their 
activities in northern Iraq. They led several insurrections in between 1930-33. Mustafa 
Barzani surrendered to the Iraqi forces in 1933 and was kept under control in 
Sulaymaniyah until 1943. However, when Iraq joined the Axis powers in 1941 and 
fought with the British forces, albeit briefly, Mustafa Barzani used this opportunity to 
escape to Iran and organise a rebellion against Iraq with the help of the Hiva Party in 
Iran. During the 1940s, Kurdish activities were particularly centred in Iran and the Iraqi 
and Iranian Kurds formed an alliance, as will be explained in relation to the 
establishment of the Mahabad Republic. 
The most significant group established in Iran was the Hiva (meaning ‘hope’), 
which was established in 1935 by both Iraqi and Iranian Kurdish activists. Hiva 
remained active only for two years, then revitalised a decade later and played an 
important role in the preparation of Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s rebellion in Iraq in 1945. 
In its first meeting in Barzan (a village in Lurestan Province in Iran) before the rebellion, 
the party decided to declare the autonomy of Kurdistan and prepared a programme with 
the goal of unifying the tribes, and publishing and distributing propaganda to form a 
Kurdish army.463 Barzani was defeated in 1945 and escaped to Iran. He was part of the 
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political and military movements in Iran and he instigated guerrilla warfare against Iraq 
in the 1960s. After Barzani’s defeat in 1945 the Hiva split into small groups. One of 
those groups later formed the Rezgari Kurd Party (Kurdish Deliverance Party) that 
aimed to unify and liberate greater Kurdistan and secure administrative independence 
for Iraqi Kurdistan, and to explain the Kurdish cause to all nations, particularly the 
nations of the Middle East.464 In January 1946 the Rezgari Kurds submitted a formal 
appeal for Kurdish self-determination and sovereignty to the American Legation in 
Baghdad. Accompanying this submission was a map of Kurdistan, which they requested 
be shown to the UN.465  
 
Figure 5.3: Rizgari Kurd Map, 1946466 
[This content has been removed for reasons of copyright.] 
 
 
In the same period, on 22 March 1945 a young Kurdish officer in the Iraqi 
Army submitted a Memorandum on the Kurdish Question to the American Legation in 
Baghdad. This memorandum mainly claimed Kurdish independence and requested that 
the Kurds be given ‘their place among free nations’.467 The Memorandum did not 
involve a map but provided a description of the ethnographic boundaries of Kurdistan, 
which more or less replicated the boundaries produced on other Kurdish maps.468  
The Kurdish League, established in Syria, is another Kurdish group that 
produced a map with similar boundaries in 1945. The Kurdish League was Khoybun’s 
successor and was mainly led by Kurdish leaders who were originally from Turkey. 
Their map, called Carte du Kurdistan, was produced a year before the Rezgari Party’s 
map and was presented by the Kurdish League Delegation at the first session of the UN 
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San Francisco Conference on the 30 March 1945. The Kurdish League also sent a letter 
with the delegates to this conference and demanded Kurdish autonomy.469 This demand 
was limited to Kurdish autonomy in Turkey and excluded the Kurdish enclaves in Syria 
in order to not to antagonise the authorities in Damascus.470 
 
Figure 5.4: Carte du Kurdistan, 1945 
[This content has been removed for reasons of copyright.] 
Map available at http://www.kurdistanica.com/gallery/main.php?g2_itemId=97 
 
 
An unknown Kurdish group in Cairo produced another similar map in 1947.471 
The territories this map depicted were slightly more expansive than the Carte du 
Kurdistan and the Rezgari Kurd maps. The memorandum accompanying this map said 
‘the presence of Kurds in any given area is only indicated where it is expressly stated by 
a trustworthy authority’.472 
 
Figure 5.5: Map of Kurdistan, Cairo 1947473 
[This content has been removed for reasons of copyright.] 
 
 
The Cairo Map is important because it has been influential particularly due to its 
clarity and decisiveness.474 The territories shown on this map have become widely 
accepted by Kurdish nationalists and outsiders as ‘Kurdistan’. Almost all Kurdish 
organisations in the diaspora publish this map in their programmes and leaflets and use 
it is as the symbol of Kurdish identity and future aspirations.475 Overall, the maps 
produced in the 1940s have become the most influential propaganda tools of Kurdish 
nationalist discourse. Despite their production with political aims related to specific 
claims on the demographic and ethnographic structure of the region, and their 
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questionable methodologies, they have become ‘Kurdistan in the minds of Kurds’ and 
the boundaries they indicate have been readily accepted.476 
Two important political developments in the 1940s were the establishment of 
the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) in 1945 and, with Soviet support, the 
establishment of the Kurdish Mahabad Republic in 1946.477 After their invasion of Iran 
in 1941, the British and Soviet forces divided Iranian Kurdistan into three zones: the 
Soviet zone, the British zone and a buffer Kurdish zone between the two other zones.478 
The KDPI created the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in Iran in the buffer Kurdish 
zone. The Republic was ruled by the key religious figure in the region, Qazi 
Muhammad, while Barzani was the foreign minister. The level of Soviet support for the 
republic was quite limited and it is argued that the establishment of the Mahabad 
Republic would not have been possible without the support of Mustafa Barzani and his 
fighters.479  
The Mahabad Republic collapsed eleven months after its foundation for several 
interrelated reasons. The most important reason was the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
from Iran in 1946 under the terms of the treaty signed between the Iranians, the British 
and the Soviets. Following the Soviet withdrawal the Iranian forces occupied the 
republic. Another reason was the differences and disagreements between the Iraqi 
Kurds and the Iranian Kurds. The Iranian Kurds were disturbed by the intrusion of 
Iraqi Kurds in their affairs and disliked the latter’s traditional tribal policies.480 
Additionally, Qazi and Barzani had different political views. Moreover, there were 
linguistic and cultural differences among the tribes of Iran. Their rivalries with each 
other and with the Azeri landowners increased as a result of the policies of the 
leadership of Mahabad Republic and the involvement of Iraqi Kurds in the 
government.481 After the collapse, Barzani and his fighters escaped and Barzani found 
refuge in the USSR.  
Throughout the 1960s and until the 1980s, Kurdish activities continued in the 
form of small military insurrections and political organisations in Iraq and Iran.482 In this 
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period, Kurdish organisations do not appear to have made requests to international 
organisations or to powerful states in order to gain support for the establishment of a 
Kurdish state. Until the 1990s, the map of greater Kurdistan was not widely used for the 
promotion of Kurdish nationalist demands. This was probably because in Iran the 
Kurds remained fairly quiet after the collapse of the Mahabad Republic; in Iraq the 
suppression of the Baas regime and later intra-Kurdish rivalry led Kurdish groups in 
Iran to have limited contact with the international actors. In Turkey the 1960 coup 
d’état, the 1971 intervention and the military regime between 1980-1982 prevented the 
formation of significant Kurdish organisations and movements. As will be explained in 
the next pages, Kurdish movements in 1980s and 1990s began to become more 
effectively organised and mobilised. Still, in this historical period and later the idea of 
Kurdistan and its maps continued to provide a significant basis for Kurdish nationalism.  
Barzani initiated his guerrilla war against the Iraqi state again in the 1960s.483 The 
Hashemite regime in Iraq collapsed in 1958 as a result of the military coup led by 
General Qasim. After this, Barzani was brought back to Iraq from exile. The Provisional 
Constitution was created and it referred to the Kurds as equal partners in the Iraqi state 
with the Arabs but later it became clear that the promises in the Constitution were not 
to be implemented.484 The Iraqi branch of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (DPK), 
which had begun to be openly active in the social and political arena after 1958, was 
declared illegal in 1960. Mulla Mustafa Barzani left for Barzan again and initiated his 
rebellion against the Iraqi government in 1961, which lasted until 1970.485 On the 11 
February 1970, the KDP and the Iraqi Government reached an agreement to create an 
administrative region with a majority Kurdish population who could ‘exercise their full 
national rights and autonomy.’486 The autonomy in northern Iraq was announced in 
1974, but only for some parts of the region. Kurdish revolts began again in 1974 but 
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were suppressed in 1975 because the Iranians stopped their support for the uprising.487 
In 1975 another Kurdish party emerged, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by 
Jalal Talabani, the current president of Iraq. The PUK was founded in Damascus and 
moved its headquarters to the Iraqi-Iranian border in 1976. The PUK has been at odds 
with Barzani’s KDP because it has a different tribal and intellectual basis and has 
supported progressive and agrarian reforms. The KDP, on the other hand, has a 
traditional and tribal support basis and opposes the non-tribal reforms. The rivalry 
between the two parties took the form of armed conflict in the 1990s. 
The autonomy of the Kurdish area continued after the defeat of the Barzani 
revolt and a regional parliament was established. However, border control and a military 
presence were implemented by the central government. The Iraqi government 
evacuated a broad zone near the border and destroyed many villages throughout the late 
1970s and 1980s. After the Iran-Iraq War began in 1980, Kurdish parties increased their 
control in Northern Iraq and brought people back to the villages that were destroyed by 
the Iraqi government.488 The 1988 Anfal campaign by the Iraqi government was carried 
out in order to take control of this region again, a campaign during which tens of 
thousands of people died.489 After the 1991 Kuwait War, Kurdish groups increased their 
control again, however, this led to another attack by the Iraqi government. A large 
number of Kurds were pushed to the borders of neighbouring countries, of which only 
Turkey allowed the refugees to enter, leading to a humanitarian disaster.490 Eventually, a 
‘safe haven’ was created by the US, with key centres of the safe haven lying in 
Sulaymaniyah and Erbil. After fighting with each other from 1994 to 1997, the KDP 
and PUK made peace and divided their control into two regional administrations with 
separate parliaments and this division remained unchanged until 2005.491 
Although the Kurds in Turkey were not very active in the 1940s, 1950s, and 
1960s, debates revolving around Kurdish rights began to emerge in the late 1960s with 
the initiative of the Labour Party of Turkey (TİP). Kurds living in main cities of Turkey 
began to organise meetings to discuss the regional underdevelopment and the need for 
political recognition of the existence of Kurds in eastern Turkey. TİP was banned 
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because of its support for the Kurds and after this came the 12 March 1971 coup 
d’état.492 After military rule ended, Kurdish organisations with Marxist and leftist 
ideologies began to emerge again. The PKK emerged out of one of these groups in 
1974. The PKK was founded with the aim of liberating Kurdistan and establishing an 
independent, united and socialist Kurdish state.493 Soon after the 12 September 1980 
military coup, in 1983 the PKK began its guerrilla warfare, which has lasted until today. 
The PKK engaged in attacks and bombings against the Turkish police and army and 
against civilians in the eastern provinces and the main western cities of Turkey. The 
PKK guerrillas received their training in northern Iraq and western Iran from 
Palestinian and Syrian instructors.494 Throughout the conflict, several villages were 
destroyed by the Turkish army and by the PKK forces, and many people have been 
forcefully deported or have migrated to other parts of Turkey or abroad.495 By the 1990s 
the PKK declared that they are no longer striving for full independence and invited the 
government to engage in negotiations.496 But the Turkish state did not respond to these 
requests and the fighting continued. In 1999, the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was 
captured and, although the armed conflict stopped for a short period, it has largely 
persisted until today.  
As of June 2012, the relationship between the Turkish state and the PKK is in a 
stalemate. Öcalan indicates that the PKK is ready to negotiate a solution with the 
Turkish government that involves decentralisation for the Kurds within the existing 
boundaries of Turkey. Öcalan calls this solution ‘democratic confederalism’.497 He also 
states that a failure to reach such a solution soon will result in boundary changes for 
Turkey thanks to the transformations taking place in the Middle East and the increasing 
globalisation of the Kurdish issue. The co-president of the BDP (Barıs ve Demokrasi 
Partisi – Peace and Democracy Party), Selahattin Demirtaş, has been calling the 
government to respond to Öcalan’s demands for negotiation. He also suggested a 
reorganisation of the administrative structure of Turkey based on the principle of 
decentralisation and warned that Turkey may find a Kurdistan state as a neighbour in 
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her southern borders soon.498 However, the Turkish state has consistently considered the 
PKK movement as separatist terrorist group and as a threat to Turkey’s unitary 
character. Erdoğan and his government have indicated several times that they will not 
negotiate with a terrorist organisation.499 Moreover, the government has initiated a legal 
campaign since the end of 2009, which investigates the urban branches of the Kurdistan 
Communities Union (KCK). So far a large number of suspects have been detained, 
including elected member of parliament of the BDP as well as several mayors, lawyers, and 
many others. The state prosecutors looking at the KCK cases claim that the KCK is an 
umbrella organisation encompassing the PKK and other organisations, and accuses the 
suspects of crimes such as membership of a terrorist organisation, aiding a terrorist 
organisation and attempting to destroy the country’s unity and integrity. The BDP 
perceives this operation as a governmental attempt to suppress the BDP and its 
members.500   
A significant aspect of the events since the 1980s in relation to Kurds in the 
region is the increased level of military conflict between Kurdish groups and the states 
in which they operate, and the increased involvement of international actors in the 
region, particularly in northern Iraq. Although in this process none of the Kurdish 
groups made a claim to create a Kurdish state as indicated on the greater Kurdistan 
map, they adhered to the idea that this map reflected the divided homeland of the 
Kurdish nation. The PKK initially aimed for an independent and united Kurdistan in 
the region, later began to articulate their demands within the boundaries of Turkey. 
What is interesting in this period is the increased emphasis on autonomous Kurdish 
regions, in northern Iraq and eastern Turkey by the main Kurdish parties. The aims for 
an official autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq was realised in the 2000s. In 
Turkey the PKK’s demand for autonomy within Turkey also has been the most 
                                                 
498 Interview with Selahattin Demirtaş by Neşe Düzel, ‘'Türkiye'nin güney sınırları resmen Kürdistan 
olacak' [Turkey’s southern borders will officially be Kurdistan,’ Taraf, 10.04.2012, 
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499 ‘Erdoğan terörle mücadele stratejisini açıkladı’ [Erdoğan announced his strategy to fight against 
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last accessed 11.05.2012. 
500 ‘Around 90 medical students detained in anti-KCK operations’, Today’s Zaman, 6 June 2012, 
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June 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-282777-.html, last accessed 16 June 2012.  
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significant aspect of its political rhetoric in the 2000s in the context of an ongoing 
military conflict with the Turkish armed forces. 
In contrast to the hostile relationship between Kurdish organisations and their 
home countries, their relationship with other regional states is usually based on mutual 
strategic support. Each local Kurdish movement has opposed Kurdish movements in 
other states, principally through allying themselves with those states. Since mid-1960s, 
Iran has provided logistical and military support for the Iraqi Kurds, particularly the 
KDP, and Syria has been supporting the PUK. The KDP and PUK have had high-level 
representatives in Turkey since the 1990s, which shows Turkey’s recognition of the two 
parties. The PKK has received the support of Syria and Iran.501 It has even been the case 
that Kurds in one state sided with the rulers of neighbouring states against their own 
Kurds. For instance Iranian Kurds would ally with Baghdad against Iraqi Kurds and 
Iraqi Kurds would ally with Tehran against Iranian Kurds.502 The PKK and the KDP 
engaged in armed conflict when the KDP removed its support to provide camps for the 
PKK after a deal made between the Turkish government and the KDP.503  
Each movement is also subjected to internal rivalries and is dominated by 
parochial and tribal policies.504 The Kurdish movement in Iraq is divided, mainly 
between the KDP and the PUK. As mentioned earlier, the conflict between Mustafa 
Barzani’s KDP and Talabani’s PUK in Iraq in the 1990s is a clear example of this. Even 
though the rivalry between the two parties seems to have been resolved with the 
emergence of the new Iraqi regime, they still have different spheres of influence in 
northern Iraq. Sulaymaniyah is mainly under the influence of the PUK, Erbil is the 
shared capital, and the northern parts of the region are controlled by the KDP. O’Leary 
states that “The support bases of the KDP and the PUK may look geographical,  and to 
correspond to a clash between Kurmanji and Sorani dialectsof Kurdish,  but Peshmerga 
were recruited into both parties from all over Kurdistan, and there are supporters of 
each party throughout the Region. The parties are certainly historically differentiated by 
ideology, with the PUK originally being heavily Marxist, and the PUK was formed in 
direct hostility to the dominance of the Barzani family in the KDP. Now, ironically, the 
                                                 
501 Van Bruinessen, ‘Iraq: Kurdish Challenges’. 
502 The KDP helped the Iranian regime militarily against the Iranian Kurds during and after the Iranian 
revolution. Martin van Bruinessen, ‘The Kurds between Iran and Iraq’, MERIP Middle East Report, 1986, 
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503 Van Bruinessen, ‘After the capture of Abdullah Öcalan’. Martin van Bruinessen, ‘The Ethnic Identity 
of the Kurds’, in Peter Alford Andrews (ed), Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey, Ludwig Reichert: 
Wiesbaden, 1989, p. 4. 
504 Halliday, ‘Can we write?’, p. 16. 
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PUK has experienced a major split, with the formation of Goran, partly in reaction to 
the domination of the PUK by the Talabani family.” In the period ahead, O'Leary 
expects the PUK to be in much greater danger of break-up than the KDP: “it is more 
fissiparous; it was originally built from an alliance of multiple parties; and fall-out over 
corruption in Sulaimania and the ageing of Talabani, who spends much of his time in 
Baghdad, do not bode well for the party's future.”505 The Kurdish movement within 
Turkey is fragmented mainly between Kurds supporting the PKK and Kurds supporting 
the Turkish state. Many leading Kurdish families have members in the government as 
well as in the PKK.506 Consequently, although Kurdish nationalism exists as a sentiment 
among Kurdish nationalists, a politically unified Kurdish nationalism is yet to form 
within each state.507 
Today the Kurdish movement, consisting of a number of separate movements, 
has some differences compared to its predecessors especially in terms of the increase in 
grassroots support for Kurdish nationalism. This is due to the drastic changes the 
societies in the region have been going through. The Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, 
Saddam’s campaigns against the Kurds in Northern Iraq, the conflict between the PKK 
and the Turkish Army Forces, and many other events and conflicts caused a 
considerable amount of chaos and instability. As a result of various military conflicts as 
well as for employment and educational purposes, large numbers of Kurds have 
migrated to other parts of the region or to Western countries. The peasant or urban 
craftsman remained distant from Kurdish nationalist activities in the first half of the 
twentieth century. However, in the second half of the century, as a result of migration, 
increased levels of education and literacy among the Kurds, and the urbanisation and 
settlement of nomadic tribes, Kurdish nationalist sentiment and ideology has spread to 
the grassroots.508 The increasing number of Kurdish activists in the diaspora is also 
providing another form of grassroots support for Kurdish nationalism.  
The KDP declares that Kurds are one nation and they are the largest ethnic 
group in the world without a state. It invites all Kurds to join a struggle for their 
democratic and national rights and to pursue self-determination. It also declares its 
support for the struggle of Kurdish people in Turkey, Iran, Syria and Russia for national 
                                                 
505 Interview with Prof. Brendan O’Leary, 31 October 2011, London.  
506 Van Bruinessen, ‘Kurds, tribes and states’. 
507 Vali finds this paradoxical, he writes, ‘we have Kurdish nationalists without Kurdish nationalism – a 
historical anomaly that is nevertheless true.’ Vali, ‘Kurds and Their ‘Others’, p. 54. 
508 Van Bruinessen, ‘Kurds in Movement’ 
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rights.509 Massoud Barzani, the KDP leader and president of the KRG in Iraq, has said 
that political and moral support for Kurds in other regional states affects their attitude, 
but also acknowledged the fact that Kurds in each state has distinct characteristics 
defined by their country of residence and this has led them having different claims from 
each other.510 The Iraqi Kurdistan National Assembly Speaker, Adnan Mufti, has 
pointed to the importance of support among the Kurds inhabiting different states. But 
he also said that different Kurdish movements do not interfere in each other’s affairs.511 
Overall, leaders of main Kurdish parties seem to have accepted that the Kurdish nation 
is divided and will remain divided, even if they attain statehood in Turkey, Iran and Iraq 
separately.512 
 
Conclusion 
Rather than assuming that Kurdish nationalism developed based on the idea of a given 
Kurdish homeland, this chapter and the previous chapter showed the importance of 
considering the construction of the Kurdish homeland through several processes such 
as the dissemination of Western nationalist ideology among the Ottoman Muslim 
population, the Kurdish reaction towards the increased strength of Armenian 
nationalism, the political, economic and military chaos caused by WWI and division of 
the Ottoman territories, and the internationalisation of the principle of self-
determination after 1918. It offered an overview of the emergence and development of 
Kurdish nationalism after 1918 and it analysed the uses of the notion of Kurdistan and 
its maps by Kurdish nationalists and outsiders. The territory and the ideal homeland of 
Kurdistan are the most significant aspects in understanding the emergence and 
development of Kurdish nationalism. The importance of territory for the Kurdish cases 
derives from the domination of tribal leaders and from the wide dissemination of self-
determination combined with the attempt of the Great Powers to create viable nation-
states for post-imperial territories.  
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This chapter also argued that the Kurdish nationalist movement can best be 
understood by looking at the historical and political contexts that defined its emergence, 
development and evolution. It provided an overview of the interactions between 
Kurdish movements and their host states and other regional states, and Kurdish 
attempts at seeking international support for their cause. It showed that the proliferation 
of the nationalist movements and the conceptions of Kurdistan have been in constant 
tension with the idea of a united Kurdish nation and greater Kurdistan. However, over 
time, the notion of a greater Kurdistan has come to be adopted as the historical Kurdish 
homeland by both Kurdish nationalists and outsiders. Such identification takes the 
concept of Kurdistan as a given feature of Kurdish identity, not as a national aspiration, 
and sees the history of the region as identical to the history of Kurdish nation. 
Since the end of WWI, the main factor that defined the activities of Kurdish 
nationalist groups in the region have been the new state boundaries that remained 
mostly unchanged until today. This has provided an enduring inter-state context for 
Kurdish nationalism. Within this context, the idea of Kurdistan as unfairly divided by 
new state boundaries has become an important defining factor in shaping Kurdish 
nationalist groups’ aims and activities. These groups continuously used the idea of 
Kurdistan and its maps in order to illustrate the existence of Kurdish territories and to 
gain the support of an international audience. This chapter explained the transformation 
of Kurdistan from a regional/administrative concept to an ideal national homeland and 
the use of the idea of Kurdistan and its maps used by Kurdish nationalist groups since 
the early aftermath of WWI. 
In addition to these Kurdish nationalist groups that have operated within a 
regional inter-state context, there is also a reality of a Kurdish movement within and 
beyond this region. In order to give a complete picture of the reasons for the use of the 
territorial feature by Kurdish nationalists, attention should also be directed to the 
Kurdish diaspora. The following chapter looks at activities in the diaspora and Kurdish 
groups’ interactions with international society in order to further illustrate the 
specifically important role played by the Kurdish activists in the diaspora in successfully 
promoting the idea of greater Kurdistan to international society. 
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Chapter 6: Kurdish Nationalism in the Diaspora 
 
Introduction 
This chapter looks at the activities of Kurdish nationalists in the diaspora and their 
interaction with international society. It aims to illustrate the arguments developed 
throughout the thesis by analysing the role played by Kurdish activists in the diaspora in 
promoting the idea of a greater Kurdistan to actors in international society. This chapter 
shows that activists in the Kurdish diaspora have published and publicised the 
rightfulness of the Kurdish demand for self-determination and the existence of an 
ethnic Kurdish territory to international society. This is thanks to their location outside 
the homeland and their ability to communicate their ideas directly to international 
society. They have been particularly effective in using the contemporary international 
normative context related to human and democratic rights, particularly the right to self-
determination, to promote the legitimacy of their pursuit of autonomy or independence 
and to convince the outside world that Kurdistan is the ethnic territory of the Kurds. 
The increasing role of diasporas in international affairs, their growing ability to mobilise 
(due to developments in technology, communication and transport) and their role in 
influencing (through lobbying) their host-state’s foreign policies and regional and 
international affairs, gives strength to their propaganda. Kurdish activists in the Kurdish 
diaspora, much like other diaspora groups such as the Armenian, Palestinian, Kosovar 
Albanian, Tamil and Irish diasporas, have influenced the perceptions and attitudes of 
their host-states and international organisations toward their home-countries and their 
communities back in the homeland. 
As argued throughout the thesis, Kurdish nationalists succeeded in drawing 
support and sympathy from would-be nationals and from international society for their 
claims that Kurdistan existed as an ethnic territory throughout history and for the claim 
that the map of Kurdistan represents the ethnic territory of the Kurds. Kurdish 
nationalists draw this level of support and sympathy because most states and 
international organisations readily accept the normative assumptions underpinning the 
principle of self-determination – the rights of ethno-national groups combined with the 
human, cultural and democratic rights (as explained in Chapters 2 and 3). The Kurdish 
nationalists claim that the history of the region is identical to the history of the Kurdish 
nation is another reason that facilitates the perception that Kurdistan represents a given 
ethnic territorial identity (as explained in Chapters 4 and 5). Many scholars and writers 
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working on the Kurds, some government agencies and the publications of some 
international media groups use the notion of Kurdistan and its map to refer to the 
Kurdish homeland and also accept the related assumptions in Kurdish historiography 
(as explained in the Introduction). Kurdish nationalist activities in the diaspora play a 
significant role in delivering this message to other actors in international society and 
draw sympathy for their cause. 
This chapter contributes to the Kurdish studies literature through an analysis of 
the international interactions of Kurdish activists in the diaspora within an international 
context. The role of Kurdish nationalist activists in the diaspora in the development and 
mobilisation of Kurdish nationalism is understudied in the literature. Although the few 
studies that look at this specific topic provide useful insights, they typically fail to 
explain what they mean by the notion of ‘Kurdish diaspora’, instead using it in very 
general terms.513 Although diasporas have remained understudied from an IR 
perspective, in the past decade or so there has been an increase in the number of studies 
on diasporas and diasporic nationalism, and this chapter draws extensively on this 
literature.514 
‘Kurdish nationalist activists in the Kurdish diaspora’ refers to the groups within 
the Kurdish immigrant community that actively pursue political aims related to their 
ideal homeland and their co-ethnics in that land. As a sub-state nationalist group, they 
are strongly attached to the idea of Kurdistan and challenge the official boundaries of 
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the regional states where their co-ethnics reside. Members of these groups pursue 
nationalist activities in their international location and at the same time nurture and 
support Kurdish nationalism in the region. This chapter considers the Kurdish 
nationalists operating in the diaspora, as well as other stateless groups in their diasporas, 
as nationalist actors whose focus is upon promoting the idea of a homeland as an ethnic 
territory in the international realm. Although such nationalist groups in the diaspora 
utilise transnational methods in their interactions and most of their activities take place 
within a transnational space, their goals are nationalist and their activities are directed 
towards both the national and international realms. Moreover, Kurdish actors operating 
within the Kurdish diaspora have played a crucial role, more so than the regional 
nationalist movements, in promoting the Kurds as a unified nation with a specific ethnic 
territory.  
This chapter has three parts. The first part provides some introductory remarks 
on diaspora politics and discusses the general assumption in the literature that the 
Kurdish diaspora are best understood as ‘transnational actors’. Partly agreeing with this 
argument, it mainly sees Kurdish nationalists in the diaspora as nationalists who engage 
in ‘long-distance nationalism’, as defined by Benedict Anderson, thanks to the 
‘ethnicisation of life’ in Western states and increased forms of fast and cheap 
communication.515 The second part gives an account of the history of the patterns of 
Kurdish migration and of the activities of Kurdish nationalists in the diaspora up to the 
present. The third part of the chapter looks at the ways in which nationalists in the 
diaspora influence outsiders’ perceptions of their national identity and their right to 
autonomy or statehood. By looking at Kurdish nationalist actors in the diaspora, the 
chapter offers three related arguments: 1) long-distance nationalist actors in the 
diaspora, due to their stronger adherence to the idea of a unified nation, are more 
assertive in the promotion of their claims than nationalist groups in the region; 2) their 
location in liberal-democratic host-states and the political freedom provided by these 
states in organising and engaging in cultural and political activities away from the 
scrutiny of home country regimes give these groups increased opportunities to mobilise 
and lobby for their cause; 3) they effectively utilise the discourse of contemporary 
international politics which puts increasing importance on the discourse of the 
democratic and political rights of ethnic communities. Actors in the Kurdish diaspora 
                                                 
515 Benedict Anderson, ‘Western nationalism and eastern nationalism: is there a difference that matters?’, 
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have focused on two aspects of this discourse: firstly, the existence of a common 
national language as the most significant indicator of a homogeneous national identity; 
and secondly, individual and collective human rights abuses as the justification for 
ethnic autonomy or separatism.  
 
Diaspora Politics 
The notion of diaspora has been increasingly used to analyse peoples, relations, and 
processes outside the confines of established territorial political realms. The term 
‘diaspora’ originates from the words dispersion and to sow or scatter. Diaspora originally 
referred to the dispersion of Jews to Babylonia in the sixth century BCE or to their 
more extensive dispersion during Roman times, but it has since evolved to refer to the 
dispersion of any people from their original homeland.516 The diaspora literature offers 
several criteria for a community to be defined as a diaspora. The two most widely used 
definitions come from the works of Safran and Cohen. Their definitions have many 
commonalities when it comes to the attributes of diasporas, such as the dispersion from 
an original core to at least two different places, the maintenance of a memory or myth 
of the homeland, a belief within the diaspora that they are not fully accepted by host 
countries, the idea of returning to their homeland, a commitment to the maintenance or 
restoration of this homeland, and lastly, the importance of a connection to the 
homeland in defining the group’s consciousness.517  
Both Cohen and Safran emphasise the necessity for an expanded definition of 
diaspora due to an increase in the quantity and types of dispersion. Increased 
international migration, transnational activities, and developments in communication 
and transport facilities, especially since the 1960s, have enabled dispersed peoples to 
maintain their national identity outside their national habitat and to engage actively in 
practices associated with their national identity. These have increased, firstly, as a result 
of faster and cheaper ways of transportation and communication. Thanks to these 
developments, groups can easily change their location of residence for political, 
economic or cultural purposes. They can remain in contact with each other and with 
their country of origin, and sustain and disseminate crucial ideas such as a common 
                                                 
516 Robin Cohen, ‘Diasporas, the nation-state, and globalization’, in Wang Gungwu (ed.), Global History and 
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identity, a homeland and a movement arguing for a return to that homeland.518 
Secondly, throughout the twentieth century new emerging states and nationalisms have 
generated dissidents, minorities, refugees and diasporas.519 Thirdly, voluntary migrations 
for reasons such as economic wealth, personal enrichment or family reunification have 
increased. As a result, the notion of diaspora has begun also to refer to ‘immigrant, 
expatriate, refugee, guest-worker, exile community, overseas community, [and] ethnic’ 
groups.520 Therefore, these political, economic and cultural processes require a more 
extended definition of diaspora. 
Reflecting this expansion in meaning, there are three different approaches to the 
study of diaspora in the current literature as explained by Adamson and Demetriou.521 
The first approach takes a traditional conception of diaspora and re-defines it in 
accordance with contemporary changes brought about by globalisation.522 The second 
approach looks at the social conditions of diasporas and their transnational self-
identification processes in relation to host states and local ethnicities.523 The third 
approach examines the political activities of diasporas, mainly studied by Shain and 
Barth.524 The focus of this chapter is closest to the third strand because it aims to look at 
nationalist activities within the Kurdish diaspora rather than providing an overview of 
Kurdish immigrant society and their activities. Therefore, the focus of this chapter 
                                                 
518 Adamson and Demetriou, 497; Fiona Adamson, ‘Crossing borders: international migration and 
national security’, International Security, 31 (1): 165-199, 191-192. 
519 Cohen, ‘Diasporas, the nation-State and globalization’, 123-130. For an overview on the meaning and 
general history of the notion of migration see Zolberg. Zolberg identifies three types of international 
migration: political persecution, by choice, and as a result of necessity (due to natural disasters, hunger, 
poverty, and underdevelopment) and focuses on political persecution in his article. Marienstras argues 
that whilst migration is a prerequisite for the formation of a diaspora, not all immigrant communities 
transform into diasporas. Whether they are voluntary or forced migrants, ‘time has to pass’ before we can 
know whether they really are to become members of a diaspora. Richard Marienstras, ‘On the notion of 
diaspora’, in Gérard Chaliand (ed.), Minority peoples in the Age of Nation-States, London: Pluto, 1989, as 
quoted in Robin Cohen, ‘Diasporas and the nation-state: from victims to challengers’, International Affairs, 
1996, 72 (3): 507-520, p. 516. 
520 Khachig Tölölian, ‘The nation state and its others: in lieu of a preface’. Diaspora, 1991, (1): 3-7, 4-5 as 
quoted in James Clifford, ‘Diasporas’, Cultural Anthropology, 1994, 9 (3): 302-338, 303; Adamson, ‘Crossing 
borders’, 171.  
521 For detailed explanation on the three strands see Adamson and Demetriou, 499. 
522 Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction, London: UCL Press, 1997; Gabriel Sheffer, ‘Ethnic 
diasporas: a threat to their hosts?’ in Myron Weiner (ed.), International Migration and Security, Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 2003, 263-85. 
523 Stuart Hall, ‘Cultural identity and diaspora’, in Jonathan Rutherford (ed.), Identity: Community, Culture, 
Difference, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990, 222-237; Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and 
Double Consciousness, London: Verso, 1993; Clifford, ‘Diasporas’.  
524 Shain, Marketing; Shain and Barth; Østergaard –Nielsen; For more information on the meaning and 
study of diasporas see Cohen, ‘Diasporas and the nation-state: from victims’; Adamson, ‘Crossing 
Borders’; Safran; Cohen, ‘Diasporas, the nation-state and globalization’; Roger Waldinger and David 
Fitzgerald, ‘Transnationalism in question’, American Journal of Sociology, 2004, 109 (5): 1177-95. The journals 
Diaspora, Identities, and Global Networks are good source of information on the study of the diasporas. 
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excludes the members of Kurdish diaspora who are indifferent to the Kurdish 
nationalist goals and who do not engage in political activities for the achievement of 
these goals.525 Scholars adopting the third approach argue that diasporas are active 
political actors who engage in promoting rival identities to that of the sovereign state in 
which they reside or to the state from which they come.526 In this sense, political 
mobilisation in relation to a homeland becomes an important feature of diasporas. 
This chapter adopts a conception of diaspora that embraces key features of 
Cohen’s and Safran’s definitions of the diaspora, notably their emphasis on the idea of a 
dispersed community that is connected to a homeland (or a claimed homeland) and a 
political attachment to a national/ethnic/cultural identity. It also incorporates the 
emphasis given by Clifford and others to the importance of transnational connections. 
Additionally, it particularly focuses on the political activities of Kurdish groups in the 
diaspora in relation to a homeland, and thus it uses Shain and Barth’s insights. Such a 
conceptual preference facilitates understanding the influence of activists in the diaspora 
in the development of Kurdish nationalism and in the promotion of the idea of 
‘Kurdistan’ amongst the Kurds, amongst regional states and in international society. 
Most of the literature on diasporas, including the few scholars who study 
diasporas from an IR perspective, argue that diasporas are distinct from other state and 
non-state actors due to their ability to maintain a national identity and their capability to 
influence international affairs through their activities in the transnational realm.527 
Although they see diasporas as attached to a specific identity and territory, they argue 
that their activities and strategies are transnational and deterritorialised. Nationalist 
diaspora groups indeed operate in a deterritorialised and transnational manner. This 
refers to their cross-border interactions with other co-ethnics in their home country and 
in other host-states, and with other states and international organisations away from 
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origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious 
homeland—whether that homeland is symbolic, independent or under foreign control. Diaspora 
members identify themselves, or are identified by others—as part of the homeland’s national community, 
and as such are often called upon to participate, or are entangled, in homeland-related affairs.’ Shain and 
Barth, 452.  
527 Three academic journals, Diaspora, Identities, and Global Networks defend the transnationalist view. See 
Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 1181.  
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their original territorial homeland.528 Although nationalist activists in the diaspora 
operate within a territory or territories outside their institutionalised state territory, they 
undertake activities that are related to a specific – real or ideal – territory. Actually, if 
anything, they are more attached to the idea of a national territory than their co-
nationals in the homeland.529 Therefore, the political activities they engage in through 
transnational networks are framed in national homeland terms.  
The links nationalist activists in the diaspora create between co-ethnics in 
different locations look more like Anderson’s long-distance nationalism, which he 
defines as  ‘a nationalism that no longer depends as it once did on territorial location in 
a home country’.530 The examples Anderson gives for such cases are the Sikh 
nationalists in Australia, Croatian nationalists in Canada, Algerian nationalists in France, 
and Chinese nationalists in the US. Thanks to increasingly sophisticated and cheap 
communication facilities these groups can exert significant influence on the politics of 
their original country.531 Moreover, Anderson argues that diasporas are exposed to 
ethno-politics in their host-countries, which he describes as the ‘ethnicization of 
political life in the wealthy, postindustrial states’ and this encourages the creation of 
long-distance nationalism.532 Western democratic-liberal regimes provide suitable 
conditions for political and ethnic immigrants to develop and reinforce cultural 
identities, to establish cultural and political organisations that allow for mobilisation, and 
to seek support and sympathy in international society and among would-be nationals. 
Therefore, if there are circumstances in the host-state that lead to the nationalist groups’ 
aims and activities in the diaspora to be perceived as more legitimate, the diaspora 
groups tend to mobilise more actively and lobby for their cause in the international 
realm. 
   
                                                 
528 Ibid., 1178. For transnationalism in IR see Stephen Krasner, ‘Power politics, institutions, and 
international relations,’ in Bringing Transnational Relations Back In, Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995, 257-80. 
529 Shain and Barth, 459. 
530 Anderson, ‘Western,’ 42.  
531 Ibid., 42.  
532 Anderson, ‘Exodus’, 326. 
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Political Activities within the Kurdish Diaspora533  
Kurdish Migration Beyond the Region 
Kurdish activists in the diaspora formed as a result of the migration of millions of 
Kurds throughout the twentieth century. Migration is not a new issue for the Kurdish 
people. During the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, Kurdish migration was mainly 
voluntary and occurred for economic and educational purposes, particularly to İstanbul 
and some of the larger European cities. Most of the Kurdish migrants in İstanbul in this 
period were from peasant backgrounds and worked in low skilled manual labour 
occupations (especially as porters – hammal). But there were also many members of 
Kurdish tribal families who went to İstanbul for educational purposes or to serve as 
Ottoman bureaucrats. They were the most active Kurdish community in İstanbul in the 
late nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries. Some members of these families 
went, usually temporarily, to Europe for educational purposes, or as Ottoman 
diplomats, or as political dissidents (mostly as part of the Young Turk Movement). For 
example, as mentioned in Chapter 4, members of the Bedirhan family published the first 
journal on Kurdish society, Kurdistan, in 1898 in Europe. 
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of new states 
in the formerly Ottoman territories, many Kurds dispersed from their original location. 
As explained in Chapter 5 in detail, Kurdish tribal leaders and elites who sought Kurdish 
independence or a mandate system after the end of WWI and did not support the 
Turkish independence movement of Mustafa Kemal, escaped to Syria and Europe after 
1923 and engaged in militant and political activities against Turkey. They formed 
Kurdish nationalist societies and provided direct economic, military and political 
support to Kurdish rebellions in Turkey, Iran and Iraq. Soon after the French mandate 
withdrew from Syria, these intellectual and nationalist Kurds went to Europe and 
continued their activities there. Additionally, beginning with the establishment of Turkey 
and right up until the present day many Kurds have changed their location through 
voluntary and forced migration (sürgün). This has resulted in a great number of Kurds 
                                                 
533 Most of the Kurdish diaspora today is constituted by Kurds that came from Turkey. The second 
biggest group is from Iraq. The Kurdish diaspora mostly resides in Germany, Sweden, France, the UK, 
the Netherlands, the US and Australia. There is no reliable and accurate census on the number of 
immigrant Kurds in Europe and elsewhere., but general estimates from the year 1995 are as follows: 
600.000 in Germany, 100.000 in France, 70.000 in Netherlands, 60.000 in Switzerland, 50.000 in Belgium, 
50.000 in Austria, 25.000 in Sweden, 20.000 in the UK, 20.000 in Greece, 8.000 in Denmark, 4.000 in 
Norway, 3.000 in Italy, 2.000 in Finland, 15.000 in the US and 6.000 in Canada. Institute Kurde de Paris 
website, http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama, last accessed 11 September 2009. 
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now living in mainly industrialised and developed cities like İstanbul, İzmir, Adana and 
Mersin.  
From the 1960s to the 1990s Kurds emigrated from their locations to different 
parts of the world, particularly to Western Europe, North America and Australia. Most 
of the Kurdish migration in the 1960s took place from Turkey to Europe. Kurdish 
immigrants constituted part of the guest-workers under inter-governmental agreements 
between Turkey and European countries such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland and 
France.534 The biggest flows of Kurdish migration occurred in the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s as a result of several political events that took place in the Middle East.535 After 
the 1971 military intervention and the 1980 coup d’état in Turkey, the Kurds, together 
with the leftists and the islamists, were subjected to very strict and violent measures and 
this led to a large numbers of Kurds seeking refuge in European countries.536 Some of 
these politicised refugees fled to neighbouring countries, particularly to Iranian 
Kurdistan. From there some of them went to Northern Iraq and then to Europe. These 
refugees lived in the Kurdish villages and guerrilla camps in Iran and mostly adjusted to 
the cultural life there and took part in internal Iranian political conflicts.  
Another influential political development that led to Kurdish migration was the 
agreement reached between the Iranian Shah and Iraq’s leader Saddam Hussein in 1975. 
Before this agreement, the Iraqi Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani was in alliance 
with the Iranian Shah and with the US in his struggle against the Iraqi regime. However, 
when an agreement was made between Iran and Iraq, the Shah withdrew Iran’s support 
for Barzani’s movement and the Iraqi army defeated the Kurdish resistance movement. 
As a result, 50,000 Iraqi Kurds fled to Iran and some of them were given political 
asylum in Western European countries.537 The 1979 Iranian revolution, which led to the 
fall of the regime in Iran and caused a prolonged civil war, is also an important political 
event that led to Kurdish migration. The Kurdish populated areas were greatly affected 
                                                 
534 Institute Kurde de Paris website, http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama, last accessed 11 
September 2009. Germany was the recipient of the largest amount of workers. 
535 For regional politics in relation to Kurds see Mehmet Ali Aslan, Mülteci Kürtler [Refugee Kurds], Ankara: 
Demokrasi, 1988; Entessar, Kurdish Politics; Natali, The Kurds and the State. 
536 Van Bruinessen, ‘Kurds in movement’. For Kurds in Turkey see Gunter, Kurds in Turkey; Metin Heper, 
The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007; Sirkeci, 
Environment of Insecurity in Turkey; Mesut Yeğen, ‘The Turkish state discourse and the exclusion of Kurdish 
identity’, Middle East Studies, April 1996, 32 (2): 216-229. 
537 Van Bruinessen, ‘Kurds in movement’. 
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by the civil war in Iran and many Kurds escaped from Iran to Turkey and then sought a 
way of going to America, Europe or to Australia.538  
The largest amount of Kurdish emigration from Iraq occurred as a result of the 
Iran- Iraq War 1980-1988 and Saddam’s policies towards the Kurds in the 1990s. The 
Iran-Iraq War was partially fought in the Kurdish populated areas of Iraq and Iran and 
greatly affected the lives of Kurds inhabiting those areas.539 After the Iranian military 
attacks, Kurdish guerrillas in Iran and other Kurdish migrants from Iraq and Turkey, 
relocated themselves to areas near the border between Iraq and Iran. The PUK 
provided them with military support. But the KDP allied itself with the Iranian state 
against these Kurds. As the war continued, the conditions became increasingly more 
difficult for these political refugees from Turkey and Iran, and therefore they escaped to 
Europe.540  
After the War, Saddam’s policies and attacks on the Kurds also caused a 
significant flow of Kurdish refugees into neighbouring countries and into Western 
Europe.541 Following the 1988 Anfal campaigns, 60,000 refugees entered Turkey and 
only half of these refugees returned to Iraq. Another Kurdish flow from Iraq occurred 
after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Following Iraq’s defeat as a result of US military 
intervention, the main Kurdish groups in northern Iraq rose against the Iraqi 
government. However, Iraqi troops pursued a very violent attack on the Kurds resulting 
in over one million Kurdish villagers fleeing to Turkey and Iran in April 1991.542 
Kurdish emigration from Turkey, Iraq and Iran, and possibly Syria, continues in 
smaller numbers up until the present day. As a result of the dispersion of Kurdish 
migrants to Europe, the US and Australia throughout the twentieth century and early 
twenty-first century, a considerable Kurdish diaspora community exists in these 
countries today. 
 
                                                 
538 Ibid. http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama, last accessed 11 September 2009. For Kurdish 
immigration in Australia see Batrouney. 
539 Van Bruinessen, ‘Kurds in movement’. 
540 Ibid. 
541 Institute Kurde de Paris website http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama, last accessed 11 
September 2009. For Saddam’s Kurdish policy see Mohammed M.A. Ahmed and Michael M. Gunter, The 
Kurdish Question and the 2003 Iraq War, California: Mazda, 2005; Kenneth Anderson, The Anfal Campaign in 
Iraqi Kurdistan: The Destruction of Koreme, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993; Joost R. Hiltermann, A 
Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
542 Some of these refugees ended up in Western Europe, Northern Iraq and Australia. After the 
campaigns a Safe Haven above the 36th parallel was created by the US for the protection of the Kurds 
from the Iraqi regime. The course of Kurdish political developments in Iraq is explained in Chapter 5. 
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Political Activities of Kurdish Groups in the Diaspora 
As already mentioned, the focus of this chapter is limited to those sections of the 
Kurdish diaspora that have engaged in political activities related to their homeland. The 
political nature of their activities and their strong attachment to a homeland (real or 
ideal) distinguishes these groups from other Kurdish immigrants.  
In the 1950s and 1960s these Kurdish groups established organisations to 
address the problems facing Kurds back in the region of their assumed homeland. The 
oldest such Kurdish organisation is the Centre d’Etudes Kurdes of Paris, founded by 
Kamuran Bedirhan in 1949 after Kurdish intellectuals began to migrate to Paris 
following French withdrawal from Syria. Other Kurdish organisations, such as the 
Kurdish Students Society and the National Union of Kurdish Students, were formed in 
Berlin in the 1950s and 1960s.543 The Netherlands Kurdistan Society and the 
International Society of Kurdistan (ISK) established in Amsterdam 1960s were to 
become among the most prominent of the Kurdish diaspora organisations.544 The ISK 
issued a monthly news bulletin called Kurdish Facts and published the Kurdish Bibliography. 
The Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan (SAK), which was established in the 
UK, was another important Kurdish organisation and it published the magazine Kurdica, 
with the aim of spreading information about the cultural, social and political status of 
the Kurds. Both the SAK and ISK were founded and supported by non-Kurdish 
students and intellectuals who claimed to be friends of Kurdistan.545 None of these 
organisations was large in size. For instance the ISK was a small committee and some 
organisations in Paris or Berlin were one-person committees.546 What these Kurdish 
diaspora organisations had in common was a set of cultural and linguistic aims, such as 
promoting and developing a Kurdish language and protecting the Kurdish cultural 
identity, rather than explicit political aims.547   
                                                 
543 For instance, the Kurdish Students Society in Europe, a left-wing organisation, was founded in 1956 in 
Berlin and was connected to the International Union of Students. It organised annual general meetings 
where matters such as the Kurdish struggle and the conditions of Kurds in different host-countries were 
discussed. The organisation also issued an annual periodical entitled Kurdistan. Another Kurdish student 
organisation, the right-wing National Union of Kurdish Students in Europe, which broke away from the 
Kurdish Students Society in Europe, was founded in 1965 in Berlin. They published the monthly 
newssheet Kurdistan Information in German and funded book publications in Kurdish and Arabic. 
Edmonds, p. 105 Other Kurdish journals include the Kurdish Journal, a periodical published by Kurdish 
students in the US, and Çiya (Mountains) which was published in Berlin and addressed primarily to the 
Kurds of Turkey. Edmonds, 105-106. 
544 Van Bruinessen, ‘Kurds in movement’. 
545 Edmonds, 106. 
546 Van Bruinessen, ‘Kurds in movement’. 
547 Edmonds, 105. 
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More politicised Kurdish organisations only began to emerge after the 1980s 
and it was during this period that a Kurdish ethnic consciousness became more 
prominent among Kurdish immigrants in Europe. This was mainly due to the arrival of 
politically-minded dissidents along with educated Kurdish immigrants and asylum 
seekers from Turkey and Iraq in the 1970s and 1980s. They were acutely aware of the 
fragmented status of the Kurdish identity and so these groups encouraged the 
politicisation of second-generation Kurdish labour migrants who had arrived in Europe 
in the previous decades.548 They established many Kurdish organisations, most 
importantly, the Kurdish Institute of Paris (KIP) in 1983, which was initially a cultural 
organisation but later evolved into an organisation concerned with political activities.549 
In the 1980s and 1990s other Kurdish institutes and organisations were established in 
other European cities and in the US, such as Kurdish Institutes in Stockholm, Brussels 
(1989), Berlin (1994), Moscow (1996), and Washington DC (1996).550  
Many of these Kurdish political groups that have formed since the 1980s can be 
best understood as long-distance Kurdish nationalists who carried out their activities in 
a transnational realm and utilised transnational links and communication methods. 
These Kurdish groups and activists established strong connections to the idea of a 
unified Kurdish national identity and the idea of a Kurdish homeland within their 
immigrant communities. As a result, political mobilisation among the diaspora led 
Kurdish immigrants to strengthen their awareness of their ethnic identity and connect 
themselves with a wider notion of a Kurdish identity beyond their local or tribal 
realities. Moreover, through the lobbying activities of Kurdish political groups in the 
diaspora they attempted to influence the foreign policies of their host-countries toward 
their home-country and ethnic communities. They forged transnational links between 
members of co-ethnic groups in the homeland, the host-state and other host-countries, 
established contacts with journalists and politicians, and mobilised a large number of 
Kurdish immigrants. Eventually, they became an important actor of ‘the European 
political landscape’.551  
Political groups in the Kurdish diaspora adopted the rhetoric of national 
identity, which heavily relies on a homogeneous national language. They believed that 
                                                 
548 Van Bruinessen, ‘Kurds in movement’. 
549 Ibid. On Kurdish diaspora activities in France and Sweden see Khayati. 
550 Among these, the Kurdish Institute of Paris and the Washington Kurdish Institute have been the most 
active, both in political and cultural terms. 
551 Van Bruinessen, ‘Kurds in Movement’. Van Bruinessen writes that this is documented in the IISH 
(International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, Netherlands) collection of Kurdish books, 
periodicals and memorabilia.  
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presenting the Kurdish identity as homogeneous was necessary to obtain international 
support for the Kurdish cause. Therefore the main focus of their activities was heavily 
focused on creating a unified Kurdish language and presenting it to the Western 
community to prove the distinctiveness of the ‘Kurdish nation’. They attempted to 
transform the main Kurdish dialects (Kurmanci – the dominant dialect in Turkey - and 
Sorani – the dominant dialect in northern Iraq and Syria) into literary languages. As 
such, one of the main goals of their publications, broadcasting and language congresses 
was to systematise the Kurdish language and spread its use among both the intellectual 
Kurdish community and the grassroots. Their books and journals were also smuggled 
into Turkey until the Turkish government lifted its ban on publications in languages 
other than Turkish.552 Kurdish intellectuals who escaped from Turkey mainly to Sweden 
during and after the military interventions in 1971 and 1980 accounted for most of the 
publication activity in Kurdish Kurmanci. The Kurdish language courses and mother 
tongue education in Kurmanci Kurdish at schools in Europe increased the number of 
Kurmanci speakers greatly over the decades. They played a crucial role in transforming 
Kurmanci into a Kurdish vernacular and demanding education in their mother tongue 
for the children of Kurdish immigrants. 
 
The Impact of Activities of Kurdish Groups on Kurdish Society in the Diaspora 
An anticipated outcome of the attempt of Kurdish intellectuals and activities in the 
diaspora was that it would raise ethnic consciousness among the Kurdish community. 
Their attempt to create a homogeneous national identity through systematising the 
language and cultural features is similar to the way Anderson describes the imagination 
of national communities.553 However, Kurdish nationalist intellectuals in the diaspora 
did not use the instruments of an existing state apparatus; rather they operated through 
Kurdish organisations and the print media to undertake a project that resembled an 
elite-led top down nation building process.554 They disseminated their publications 
(which were mostly based on Kurdish poems, epic stories, literary dictionaries, and news 
from the home and host-countries in which Kurdish immigrants were residing) among 
the Kurdish community in the diaspora and their co-ethnics back in their home-
countries.  
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Integration among Kurdish society has increased as a result of these faster and 
more frequent forms of communication and interaction.555 Moreover, in this way the 
cultural aspect of their nationalist project became integrated into a wider political 
project. Kurdish activists in the diaspora, in their continuing nation-building and 
mobilising efforts, used the facilities provided by new communication technologies such 
as radio transmitters, satellite TV and the internet in order to disseminate Kurdish 
language and culture and nationalist propaganda. In late 1970s they used radio 
transmitters and transistor receivers for these purposes. In the 1980s, Kurdish folklore, 
songs, and tales, as well as Kurdish nationalist propaganda, were also distributed among 
the Kurds via audiocassettes and videocassettes.556 In the 1990s, visual broadcasting 
technologies became more widely available. MED-TV, the Kurdish satellite television 
station was established in 1995 in the UK and broadcasted to the Middle East as well as 
being widely available in Europe and most of Asia. It was initiated by the PKK, but 
Kurds from all backgrounds with different political views were able to express their 
opinion via MED-TV. Its programs included live debates where people participated via 
telephone, Kurdish language lessons, and movies with Kurdish dialogues.557 
Communication technologies such as faxes, cellular telephones and the internet (news 
groups, e-mails, homepages of individuals, institutions and political movements) have 
also been widely used for disseminating news, information and propaganda. 
Another important aspect of the Kurdish diaspora’s activities lies in their 
interactions with Kurdish nationalists in the region. The connections between different 
sections of Kurdish society have increased significantly and this had important 
implications on the status of Kurdish nationalism in general. Firstly, the Kurdish 
diaspora continuously disseminated nationalist propaganda among Kurdish nationalists 
not only in the diaspora but also in the region.558 This flow of information between the 
groups in the diaspora and the region created a stronger connection between the tribal 
and intellectual sections of Kurdish nationalists and enabled the transfer of a nationalist 
ideology to the grassroots.559 Secondly, most of the Kurdish immigrants, who were not 
initially politicised, became gradually politicised following the arrival of political refugees 
from Turkey in 1970s and 1980s.  
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556 Van Bruinessen, ‘Kurds in movement’. 
557 Ibid. For an in depth analysis of MED-TV see Hassanpour, ‘Satellite footprints’. 
558 Edmonds, 106-107. 
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Moreover, the PKK’s attempts to mobilise migrant Kurds in Europe and recruit 
fighters, especially among the Kurdish diaspora in Germany, contributed to the 
politicisation of Kurdish immigrants and raised their ethnic consciousness.560 The PKK 
has long been aware of the importance of the Kurdish diaspora since its foundation in 
1974 and sent organisers to Germany and Sweden. Activities of the PKK among the 
diaspora offered a sense of identity, meaning and confidence to the second generation 
of guest workers, especially in Germany.561 The PKK was less able to mobilise 
supporters and recruit fighters among Kurdish immigrants in Sweden.562  This was due 
to the fact that most of the Kurdish immigrants in Sweden were educated Kurdish 
writers, journalists, and intellectuals due to its immigration policies and incentives for 
publication and ethno-cultural self-expression, and thus they were already highly 
politicised.563 Like other migrant communities in Sweden, they received very good 
teaching, publishing and broadcasting opportunities.564 Still, the PKK efficiently 
organised among the Kurdish diaspora in Europe and used this outlet to establish 
diplomatic connections with European governments.565 
Although the relationship between the Kurdish diaspora and regional Kurdish 
movements became stronger, this has not necessarily led to the unification of Kurdish 
movements. The level of ethnic, linguistic and political consciousness within Kurdish 
society has indeed increased, but there are many discrepancies both within the Kurdish 
diaspora and between nationalists in the diaspora and in the region. 
Moreover, dialectical differences, mainly between Sorani and Kurmanci, have 
continued to exist among diaspora Kurds. In their attempt to transform the Kurdish 
vernacular into a literary language, Kurdish writers and journalists in Europe established 
cultural institutions and published several journals in Kurdish. However, deciding on 
which dialect of Kurdish should be used resulted in conflict and debate amongst 
Kurdish intellectuals. The KIP published the first Kurdish literary journal in Europe and 
this contained sections in Kurmanji and Sorani. This led Van Bruinessen to argue that 
the ‘Kurdish intelligentsia recognized that there is not a single standard Kurdish dialect 
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and that the geopolitical division of the Kurds could be overcome only by using both 
major dialects’.566 
Kurdish nationalists’ attempts to disseminate the use of Kurmanci Kurdish also 
led to the emergence of micro-dissident nationalisms. Children of migrants in many 
European cities are entitled to education in their mother tongue at schools as a result of 
the multicultural policies adopted by liberal democratic states, which require respect for 
the rights of different ethnic communities in the host-country’s economic, social and 
political life. The most visible aspect of this policy is bilingual education in schools.567 
Increased Kurdish (Kurmanci) education in schools and Kurdish publishing in Europe 
alienated other ethnic communities and increased their awareness of their own distinct 
identity.568 When the children of immigrant families were given the chance for education 
in their mother tongue, immigrant communities from Turkey (Zazas and Alevis) ended 
up having to choose between Turkish and Kurmanci Kurdish. This put Zaza and Alevi 
immigrants in a difficult position and raised their awareness of the differences between 
their dialects and Kurmanci Kurdish.   
Some of the Kurdish nationalists were against the effort to develop Zaza as a 
written language and such debates affected Zaza intellectuals greatly.569 Although some 
of them still consider themselves Kurds and demand official recognition of their distinct 
identity within Kurdish society, others parted from Kurdish nationalism. They began to 
consider Zaza as a different language and Zaza speakers as a distinct people, and they 
even started to call their homeland ‘Zazaistan’.570 In fact, this process led to the 
emergence of Zaza nationalism in Europe and then its subsequent transfer to Turkey. 
The Alevis are another group who went through a similar process. The ethnic 
identity of the Alevis has been ambivalent and their distinction has been very much 
based on their religion, which is different from that of the majority of Sunni Kurds. The 
increase in Sunni Muslim activities in Europe led by Turkish and Kurdish Sunni 
Muslims alienated the Alevis from the Kurdish communities. As a result the Alevis 
distanced themselves from Kurdish nationalist organisations.571 They began to establish 
their own organisations and many Alevis who were previously active in leftist Kurdish 
organisations joined the new Alevi establishment. As in the case of the Zazas, the Alevis 
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began to see themselves as a distinct nation with their own homeland ‘Alevistan’.572 
Both the Zaza and Alevi cases formed in reaction to the increased dominance of the 
Kurdish identity and nationalist organisations in the diaspora. Therefore, although they 
were generally assumed to be Kurdish, Zazas and Alevis have increasingly disassociated 
themselves from the Kurds and expressed their own distinct ethnic and linguistic 
identity. 
A prominent division among the diaspora is their different country of origins 
and the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and political differences among the Kurds in the 
region, which has implications for the Kurdish diaspora. Today, most Kurds in the 
diaspora still to an extent associate themselves with the Kurdish movements in the 
states from which they come – Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Politically, each group tends 
to follow or participate in the nationalist movements of their own country. Their ability 
to stay in contact with their home country thanks to modern forms of communication 
and transport has helped them maintain their ties with their fellow Kurds and maintain 
their distinct identity within the general Kurdish identity.573 For instance, while the PKK 
has its own adherents and associations in Europe, the supporters of Barzani’s KDP 
party constitute a separate diaspora group.574 Kurds coming from different countries 
tend not to interact with each other but rather integrate with Kurds from their own 
country. If one enters one group then he or she might be excluded from others.575  
In spite of this diversity, it is important to note that Kurdish activists in the 
diaspora more systematically and more strongly adhere to the idea that greater 
Kurdistan represents the Kurdish national homeland than regional Kurdish nationalist 
organisations adhere to this idea.576 Despite certain discrepancies between Kurdish 
nationalism in the diaspora and in the region, Kurdish activists in the diaspora have had 
a significant  impact on the advancement of Kurdish nationalism and the promotion of 
Kurds as a homogeneous and state-deserving nation on a homeland which is presented 
as an historical, ethnically homogenous but divided homeland. Throughout their history 
the Kurdish diaspora have produced many historical, sociological and political texts and 
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maps to legitimise and prove the Kurdish right to statehood. However, this romantic 
idea of a greater Kurdistan as the homeland for all Kurds has not succeeded in 
transforming Kurdish nationalism into a unified nationalism.577 Kurdish nationalist 
groups in the diaspora generate discussions and attempt to influence policies in relation 
to their own home-country rather than greater Kurdistan. Therefore, although the idea 
that Kurdistan represents the national territory of the Kurds is very strong in the 
diaspora, adherence to a united greater Kurdistan at the political level is not as strong or 
coherent. 
 
Activities of Kurdish Nationalist Groups in Diaspora in an International Context 
Today, all regional Kurdish nationalist parties, especially the KDP, the PUK and the 
PKK, conduct international relations with European states and international 
organisations. These parties have representatives and offices in Europe and the US 
where Kurdish diaspora members engage in political activities. They take part in the 
international activities of these nationalist movements, such as conducting relations with 
European and US politicians and bureaucrats, and with non-governmental 
organisations, in their attempt to present their claims to international organisations like 
the United Nations. 
Dissident nationalist groups’ activities in the diaspora potentially have significant 
impacts on regional and international politics in cases where they are assertive and 
capable of promoting a distinct ethnic identity and a specific homeland. For example, 
the Kosovar Albanians in the diaspora created the Kosovo Liberation Army, raised 
money for the conflict and recruited fighters among the diaspora.578 Jewish and 
Palestinian diasporas are engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflict and other issues in the 
region.579 Similarly, Kurdish diaspora groups have played an important role in presenting 
the Kurdish nationalist cause to their host states and to international society. They have 
generated a stronger attachment to the idea of a unified Kurdish identity and been more 
successful than regional Kurdish nationalists in internationalising and publicising the 
Kurdish issue. Moreover, Kurdish nationalist groups in the diaspora have efficiently 
used opportunities (such as freedom to organise, publish, broadcast and mobilise) 
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thanks to their residence in liberal-democratic states outside the confines of their home-
countries and also thanks to new communication technologies. 
This section of the chapter aims to explain the effectiveness of Kurdish 
nationalist groups in the diaspora in particular, and other stateless diasporas in general, 
in influencing outsiders’ perceptions of their national identity and their right to 
statehood. It offers three related arguments: 1) due to their stronger adherence to the 
idea of a unified nation, long-distance nationalists are more assertive in the promotion 
of their claims; 2) their location in liberal-democratic host-states to organise and engage 
in cultural and political activities away from the scrutiny of home country regimes gives 
diasporas opportunities to mobilise and lobby for their cause; 3) they utilise effectively 
the discourse of contemporary international politics which puts increasing importance 
on the democratic and political rights of ethnic communities, namely, the existence of a 
common national language as the most significant indicator of a homogeneous national 
identity, and individual and collective human rights abuses as justification for ethnic 
separatism. However, of course, the effectiveness of their influence mostly relies on the 
extent to which their specific policy recommendations align with the interests of the 
host-states or the international organisations they are lobbying.  
 
Assertiveness 
Dissident nationalist groups in the diaspora have stronger attachments to their ethnic 
identity and ideal homeland than their co-ethnics in the region. They feel their distinct 
identity more acutely in a completely alien cultural environment in the host-state. They 
are physically located outside a home-state but they feel mentally located within a 
specific people, therefore they strongly hold on to an ethnic or kinship identity.580 Their 
activities and goals attempt to challenge the territorial sovereignty of a home-country 
and may also imply territorial change for other regional states. Indeed, in the Kurdish 
case, although there is no strong attachment to the idea of a politically united greater 
Kurdistan, the idea that Kurdistan represents the national territory of the Kurds is very 
strong in the diaspora.581 Adherence to Kurdistan at a national level is much stronger 
among the groups in the diaspora than among nationalists back home. 
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One of the reasons for this is that Kurdish nationalist campaigns in the 
international realm have been driven by intellectuals and aimed at perceiving (and 
presenting) the Kurds as a homogenous all-Kurdish nation.582 In the region however, 
the goals of Kurdish nationalist movements vary according to their social structure and 
the political conditions within the state in which they reside. Kurdish nationalist parties 
in each country put forth different demands depending on different conditions in each 
country. This is one of the reasons why the literature discussing the Kurds puts a bigger 
weight on the Kurds in the regional countries rather than the Kurdish diaspora. 
Nationalist Kurds in Iraq aim to establish further and strengthen their autonomous 
status. Syria’s Kurdish nationalists demand civil and social rights.583 The Kurds in Iran 
and Turkey, request increased linguistic, cultural and social rights, increased democratic 
representation, and some desire autonomy.584 In short, regional Kurdish nationalist 
organisations have mainly focused on their status and claims within their country of 
residence, whereas the ideas of a unified Kurdish identity have been stronger in the 
minds of Kurdish groups in the diaspora. 
Although the activities of nationalist groups in the diaspora may take benign 
forms such as lobbying, and providing financial and intellectual support for their 
nationalist movements, many long-distance nationalists in diaspora communities have 
repeatedly used criminal and violent means.585 One of the striking facts about the 
relationship between stateless diaspora groups and their co-ethnics in the home-country 
is that diasporas contribute to violent conflicts in their home country and make life 
dangerous for their co-ethnics by providing resources and financial funding for 
conflicts. Sections of the Kurdish diaspora have supported criminal, militant and 
terrorist activities such as providing financial and organisational aid for the PKK and 
recruiting young people to fight in the guerrilla war in Turkey. As a result, the Kurdish 
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diaspora’s activities have contributed to the armed conflict, instability and polarisation in 
Turkey and the wider region. But at the same time, it is the regional movements that 
initiated organisation among the diaspora. Therefore the role of regional movements in 
shaping the relationships in the diaspora should not be overlooked. 
When a stateless nationalist group in the diaspora aims to undermine the 
authority and legitimacy of established states and obstruct regional stability, their 
assertiveness and tendency to engage in or support violent and criminal activities makes 
them influential actors in regional and international affairs.586 Most dissident nationalist 
groups in the diaspora take mistreatments of their ethnic-community by a home-
government as a just reason to disrupt the stability of the political regime in the 
homeland.587 Their political attachment to an ideal homeland based on an assumed 
distinct identity poses a challenge to the political regime of their home country. Of 
course, not all nationalist groups in the diaspora have challenged their home country’s 
sovereignty and it is impossible for a diaspora alone to overthrow the regime in their 
country of origin. Still, activist groups among the Kurdish, Sikh, Palestinian, Kosovar 
Albanian and Tamil diasporas, have posed significant challenges to those regimes by 
cooperating with other supportive parties and by undertaking lobbying in host-countries 
and in the international arena in an assertive manner.588 
 
International Connections 
‘International connections’ refer to the activities undertaken by nationalist groups in the 
diaspora to influence the foreign policies of host-countries and other states in relation to 
their home-country or ethnic communities. These groups aim to shape the way in which 
international society approaches issues related to their ethnic communities. They 
typically try to raise political, economic and social support for their cause in host-states 
and in the international arena. They publicise the perceived sufferings and injustices of 
their ethnic-community at international conferences, they interact with international 
human rights organisations and with powerful individuals. They engage in activities such 
as lobbying in order to put pressure on the host-government to denounce the policies of 
their home government, supporting the boycotts and measures taken by their host-
states or international organisations against their home country regimes, providing 
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information and intelligence about their home country for their host-government, and 
initiating propaganda campaigns against the home country regime.589 
Thanks to their location and ability to use several methods, they are able to 
influence and define the way national identity is understood by members of 
international society. Moreover, their location outside the boundaries of their home 
state allows them independence and the ability to engage in mobilisation, networking 
and lobbying for their nationalist cause and to provide support for separatist nationalist 
movements in their home countries. But of course, the effectiveness of this pressure 
very much relies on the foreign political agenda of the host-state governments and the 
opinion of scholarly and media groups.  
The influence of nationalist activists in the diaspora on their host-countries’ 
foreign policies also relies on the political regime of the host-state. If the regime 
provides suitable conditions for them to engage in activities to raise ethnic and cultural 
awareness and mobilise among their communities, nationalist activists tend to become 
more assertive in promoting their goals. Liberal-democratic governments generally 
provide political and ethnic immigrants with opportunities to develop and reinforce 
cultural identities, to establish cultural and political organisations that allow for 
mobilisation, and provide them with opportunities to seek the support and sympathy in 
international society. The idea of democratic self-determination for ethnic communities 
and the emphasis on the pluralism of the ethnic communities are particularly prevalent 
in the political discourse of liberal-democratic states. As mentioned earlier, Anderson 
argues that diaspora groups are exposed to ethno-politics in their host-states and this 
plays an important role for these groups to engage in long-distance nationalism.590 
Therefore, if the political system and social structure of the host-state provides a 
suitable context for the aims and activities of nationalist groups in the diaspora to be 
seen as legitimate, these groups tend to mobilise more actively and lobby for their cause 
in the international realm.  
Another important factor in defining the level of influence of diaspora 
nationalist groups over their host-countries is whether the system of the host-state has 
mechanisms that enable pressure groups to affect the policy-making of the state. If the 
system of the host-state is based on democratic participation and pluralist democracy, in 
which social forces and civic actors relatively easily access governmental policy 
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deliberations, the chances of these groups to affect policies increase.591 They influence 
host-state government’s decision-making processes through lobbying and convincing 
members of parliaments to represent their goals, and through contributing money to the 
campaigns of the candidates so that they will represent their interests when they get 
elected.592 The Kurdish diaspora constitutes a good example of the effective use of 
methods available to diasporas. Particularly since the 1970s, Kurdish nationalist groups 
in Europe and the US have been playing an increasingly important role in 
internationalising the Kurdish issue and influencing the foreign policies of European 
countries and the US.593 They have raised awareness in the international arena regarding 
the mistreatment of the Kurds at the hands of their home-countries and influenced 
Western states’ policy decisions in relation to Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Saddam’s Anfal 
campaigns in Iraq, the increasing number of Kurdish refugee flows, difficult 
circumstances in the refugee camps, the creation of a safe haven, and the capture of 
Abdullah Öcalan all coalesced to increase international interest in the Kurds. 
The activities of Kurdish groups have typically focused on two issues: 
promoting a homogeneous Kurdish identity with a specific homeland, and creating 
discontent at the home country regimes’ perceived or actual abuses of individual and 
collective rights of their co-ethnics. They have articulated a Kurdish national identity 
with a common language and a symbolic territory and this articulation was at the core of 
the discourse they used in their interactions with European states.594 They have claimed 
that the territory of Kurdistan is occupied and divided by alien nation-states and that 
this injustice needed to be rectified. These groups promoted the Kurdish question not 
only as an issue that concerns regional states of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, but also as 
an issue that concerns Europe and the US, strongly advocating the belief that Europe 
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and the US should be involved in this political conflict and take part in its solution.595  
The works of Kurdish nationalist scholars that articulated the Kurdish sufferings and 
mistreatments, and the historical legacy of the Kurdish nation and their territory were 
disseminated to provide credibility to, and raise support for, the Kurdish cause. Among 
these works, Mehrdad Izady’s (a Kurdish scholar and writer in the US) The Kurds: A 
Concise Book is widely used and has almost become the ‘bible’ for Kurds and 
Kurdophiles.596 
The KIP and the Washington Kurdish Institute have been particularly active in 
promoting the Kurdish identity and human rights abuses. They have engaged in political 
activities such as lobbying host-countries and organising meetings and discussions 
between European and American politicians and Kurdish political activists.597 Kurdish 
human rights organisations have also flourished during this process, particularly after 
the increase in the number of asylum seekers and political refugees in the 1980s and 
1990s. Among these, the Western Kurdistan Association, established in 1995 in 
London, organises educational courses, such as Supplementary School for Kurdish 
immigrants’ children, broadcasts radio programmes, and helps Kurdish refugees with 
issues such as immigration, welfare, housing and health.  
The diaspora organisations representing the PKK in Europe have engaged in 
diplomatic activities toward European states, especially after the 1990s. Although the 
PKK was later banned in some of the European countries, in many countries it continued 
to operate through related groups and committees. For instance, in Germany Kurdish 
committees connected to the PKK conducted relations with German government 
officials who even met with the PKK leader, Öcalan, in Syria and Lebanon.598 These 
diplomatic missions were a result of the PKK’s attempts to move from a military to a 
diplomatic struggle. The PKK’s diplomatic attempts aimed at convincing the European 
states to put pressure on Turkey to recognise the cultural and political rights of the 
Kurds in Turkey.599  
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The Kurdish Parliament in Exile, which has connections to the PKK, has had a 
significant role in drawing the attention of European states and politicians to the Kurds. 
Established in 1995, it had its first meeting in the Netherlands, then in Denmark, Russia 
and Italy. Its main headquarters are in Brussels. Although established by the Kurds from 
Turkey, the Parliament also has members from other parts of the region. Its activities are 
similar to those any diplomatic mission would pursue. It conducts relations with parties 
and personalities in Europe as the representative of the Kurds.600  
Another important Kurdish organisation is the Kurdistan National Congress 
(KNC).  The KNC holds the explicit aim of creating Kurdish unity and an independent 
Kurdistan. Established in 1985, the KNC organises international meetings in European 
cities in order to bring together Kurdish party representatives, Kurdish intellectuals, 
academics both from the region and the diaspora. The Charter of the KNC indicates 
that they are an unarmed organisation that operates above party lines, working to put 
‘Kurdish Unity’ and an ‘Independent Kurdistan’ on the agenda of the great powers and 
international organisations in order to abolish the ‘unfair and artificial borders that cut 
Kurdistan into five pieces.’601 The Kurdish National Congress of North America 
(KNCNA) is the US branch of the KNC and mainly involves representatives from 
Kurdish movements in Turkey. It aims to achieve the formation of a unified Kurdistan 
or the establishment of four Kurdish nation-states and it has openly called for self-
determination for the Kurds.602 Generally, Kurdish groups in Europe are more effective 
in shaping their host-states’ policies toward their home-countries than the groups in the 
US. The reason for this is usually attributed to the strategic alliance between the US and 
Turkey.603 
Another group, the Peace in Kurdistan Campaign, established in 1994 in 
London, is more active in political matters and is a good example to illustrate the way in 
which Kurdish groups interact with international society. They organise events and 
campaigns that bring together Kurdish activists in the diaspora, Kurdish nationalist 
groups back in the home-countries, host-country politicians and Kurdish and non-
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Kurdish academics. This group acknowledges the existence of a Kurdish national 
territory but seeks a solution within Turkey for the Kurdish problem rather than 
advocating for Kurdish separation. A recent event organised by the Peace in Kurdistan 
Campaign illustrates how Kurdish activists in the diaspora attempt to influence the host-
state countries’ foreign policies toward their home country. The event was titled “Open 
Discussion on the ‘Road Map to Negotiations’ – Towards a Political Solution to the 
Kurdish Question in Turkey” and took place in London on the 16 May 2012. The event 
hosted a representative of the BDP in Turkey (the political wing of the PKK in Turkey), 
members of the Peace in Kurdistan Campaign, a British MP from the Labour Party, an 
ex-British MP, Kurdish and non-Kurdish academics working on the Kurds, and 
Kurdish and non-Kurdish activists supporting the Kurdish cause.  
The aim of the event was to advertise the third volume of Öcalan’s prison 
writings, entitled ‘Road Map to Negotiations’, and to explain what Öcalan means by a 
‘democratic solution to the Kurdish question’ and what is required to achieve this 
solution. The book represents Öcalan’s proposal for peace, which was secretly discussed 
between Öcalan and Turkish state representatives between 2009 and 2011. During this 
event, members of the Kurdish community were asked to write a letter to their 
parliamentary representatives requesting that increased pressure be placed upon Turkey 
for the release of Öcalan and for the re-starting of the dialogue between the Turkish 
state and Öcalan. This event, as well as other events organised by Kurdish groups in 
other European capitals and the US, highlights the interaction that is taking place 
between Kurdish nationalists in the home country, Kurdish nationalists in the diaspora, 
host-country politicians and scholars. 
Overall, the activities of the Kurdish diaspora have played an important role in 
publicising the plight and the nationalist claims of their ‘nation’. They tried to draw the 
attention of international society, including the state governments and international 
organisations, to the sufferings of Kurdish people in the regional states and their 
struggle for justice and democracy. These activities were largely successful enough to 
change public discourse and the way the world perceives the Kurds. According to Van 
Bruinessen, until the 1980s Kurdish military activities in the region were perceived as 
the tribal resistance of Kurdish landlords against the central governments who had 
political and administrative dominance. However, after the 1980s, the Kurdish military 
and political activities began to be seen as nationalist liberation movements for 
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autonomy and independence.604 Although most of these movements are still led by tribal 
leaders and there are significant divisions among Kurdish leaders deriving from internal 
conflicts over leadership and land, these aspects have become easily overlooked. Such 
developments within the movement for Kurdish independence occurred within the 
wider context of an active and effective diaspora, which aimed to promote a particular 
vision of the Kurdish plight. 
In short, the Kurdish diaspora in many cases acts like a diplomatic mission that 
claims to represent the Kurdish community. They aim to promote the existence of the 
Kurdish nation with a common language, distinct ethnic territory and the Kurdish right 
to statehood. They have openly challenged the policies and official doctrines of their 
home countries and at the core of this challenge has been the symbolic territory of 
Kurdistan that is fully at odds with the territorial sovereignty of the regional states.605 In 
fact, in many instances, they were far more effective than states’ embassies in lobbying 
and influencing the foreign policies of their host-states.606 However, a united Kurdish 
organisation in the diaspora with the overarching aim of creating a united Kurdistan 
does not exist. Rather, these groups represent different sections of the Kurdish 
community and the issues they promote are generally related to the Kurds of the 
country they come from. They all adhere to the idea of a greater Kurdistan as the 
homeland of Kurds and the existence of a Kurdish nation with a distinct language. But 
rather than treat these ideas as goals to be achieved, they express these ideas on every 
occasion to draw justification and strength for the promotion of their individual 
agendas.  
 
Kurdish diaspora’s use of the international political norms 
As argued in Chapters 2 and 3, the widely accepted norms in international politics 
provide a normative basis for the separatist self-determination claims of sub-state 
nationalist groups. The normative assumption behind this trend is that ethno-cultural 
identities can justify claims for the creation of new politico-territorial entities and this 
appears to enhance democratic freedom. This trend can be observed in the formation of 
new states after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent increased 
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secessionist claims of distinctive identities.607 Democratisation and ethnic freedom, 
according to Sheffer, have increased the ability and desire of ethnic groups to become 
more politically assertive. For him, the fact that most contemporary confrontations and 
conflicts are pursued by militant ethnic groups is an indicator of this.608 
Nationalist Kurdish intellectuals who migrated to Europe or took refuge there 
were acutely aware of the fragmented status of the Kurdish identity and of the necessity 
to present Kurdish identities as a single homogeneous entity. They were also aware of 
the importance of a unified language in proving the existence of a homogenous identity 
and, as a logical extension to this, proving a right to statehood. The main goal of their 
publications, broadcasting and language congresses was to systematise a Kurdish 
language and spread its use not only within intellectual circles but also by common 
Kurds. They were aware of the fact that the rhetoric of national identity heavily relies on 
a homogeneous national language. Therefore they focused on creating a Kurdish 
language and presenting it to the Western community to prove the distinctiveness of the 
‘Kurdish nation’, which would make their aim to create Kurdistan more credible. They 
also linked their arguments about the specificity of the ethnicity territory to the map of 
greater Kurdistan as the cartographic depiction of their homeland. The banner used by 
KNC is an example of the use of the Kurdistan map by these groups. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: The KNC banner 
 
Kurdish groups in the diaspora have effectively used the norms in international 
politics, especially in relation to human rights and democratic rights, to advance their 
goals. They brought cases of individual human rights abuses in home countries to the 
agenda of international society. They applied to the European Court of Justice and 
opened cases against states, especially Turkey, for torture, illegal detention, and 
executions committed by the regime. They lobbied using complaints about restrictions 
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on their ability to experience cultural, linguistic and political rights in the home-
countries. The most important example of such groups is the Kurdish Human Rights 
Project (KHRP) established in 1992 in London ‘in response to the genocide, war crimes 
and human rights violations occurring across the Kurdish regions of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, 
Syria, the Caucasus and elsewhere’.609 This group engages in submitting appeals to the 
European Court of Human Rights, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe and UN bodies. The KHRP has been very influential in attracting the attention 
of international society to Turkey’s treatment of its Kurdish population.610 
Overall, Kurdish nationalist activist groups in the diaspora have presented the 
Kurdish nationalist struggle and the armed conflict in Iraq and Turkey that aimed for 
the liberation and democratisation of the Kurdish people and presented their activities 
as a struggle against repression. In this manner, international political norms on human 
rights and democratisation provided a fruitful arena for advocating the case of the 
Kurds as a struggle for democracy and presenting the home-governments as repressive. 
Their claims regarding their linguistic and ethnic homogeneity, specific ethnic territory 
and deprivation of individual and collective rights due to their ethnic identity were 
brought to the attention of international society and directly linked to the promotion of 
a nationalist agenda.   
 
Conclusion 
Like other stateless groups in diasporas, Kurdish nationalist groups in the diaspora, due 
to their international location and their ability to interact with institutions and officials at 
local, national and international levels, are more able to mobilise and publicise the 
Kurdish case to international society. Moreover, the general assumption in 
contemporary international political discourse on the link between ethnic identity and 
democratic struggle has provided a suitable normative basis for such groups to pursue 
these goals. This is one of the reasons why dissident nationalist groups in the diaspora 
strongly hold on to an ethnic or kinship identity that they claim as distinct. Presenting 
their distinctiveness to international society is their most effective tool and Kurdish 
activists in the Kurdish diaspora have successfully utilised this tool. 
The number of Kurdish immigrants in Europe, the US and elsewhere has 
steadily increased since the 1960s. They have increasingly become more aware of their 
ethnic identity, especially after the 1980s. They transformed Kurmanci into a Kurdish 
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literary language, gradually became politicised, established cultural, nationalist and 
political organisations, and adhered to the idea of a united Kurdish nation and the idea 
of Kurdistan as their homeland. They mobilised and created connections among the 
Kurdish community in multiple host-countries through transnational links and carried 
out long-distance nationalism within the diaspora and in connection to the region. They 
provided financial, organisational, intellectual and personnel support for regional 
Kurdish nationalist movements. They lobbied in their host-states to put pressure on 
their home-country government and presented themselves as a distinct ethnic 
community. Their growing presence within the domestic structures of their host-states 
allowed them to attract the attention of European states and international organisations 
to their perceived or actual suffering at the hands of their home-state governments and 
their struggle for justice and independence. 
In summary, the chapter has made four related claims: Kurdish nationalists in 
the diaspora are long-distance nationalist actors, who are active in an international arena 
and use transnational methods; the Kurdish activists in the diaspora have played a 
crucial role in the development of Kurdish nationalism both inside and outside the 
region; their direct access to the international political arena due to their location and 
therefore their lobbying, together with an increased appreciation of ethnic struggles in 
the name of democracy and justice, has enabled the Kurdish diaspora to promote the 
idea of Kurdistan as the ethnic territory of the Kurds and has drawn support and 
sympathy among the would-be nationals and international society. They have used the 
rhetoric of suffering, the incidents of human rights abuses and their right to statehood 
to manipulate the way host-states, other states, international organisations, scholars, 
journalists and the international media perceive their case. 
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined how a particular sub-state nationalist group interacts with 
international society to generate support and sympathy among would-be nationals and 
within international society for their territorial claims. Contemporary examples abound 
of how demands for autonomy or independence use a specific understanding of the 
principle of self-determination based on claims of being a distinct ethnic identity: 
Eritrea’s separation from Ethiopia in 1991; the states formed in post-Yugoslavia and the 
post-Soviet territories; Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in 
2008; cases such as East Timor, Abkhazia, Khalistan, Palestine, Catalonia, and many 
others. Most of these separatist or autonomist demands are framed in ethnic terms, a 
tendency which this thesis has sought to explain in terms of the increasing validity this 
framing bestows upon such claims.  
By combining insights from the fields of nationalism and IR studies, and by 
placing the focus on national identity, non-state groups and international norms, this 
thesis has presented a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the 
ethnicist self-determination claims of sub-state national groups and their interaction 
with international society than has been hitherto offered. More specifically, Kurdish 
nationalist claims to an autonomous/independent Kurdistan have served as a case to 
analyse this process in detail. To enable this analysis, I have proposed a three-fold 
argument:  
(1) Political assertions regarding the identity of a specific piece of land and 
cartographic depictions of that territory are powerful in influencing outsiders’ 
perceptions because of the normative context in which they are framed.  
(2) Such claims are further reinforced by the perception that the history of a 
territory is identical to the history of the people living on it. Typically, an association 
between a people and a territory in political terms, although in reality a relatively novel 
link, is often assumed to exist throughout all of history.  
(3) The diasporal activities of nationalists who, thanks to their location outside 
the homeland and their ability to communicate their ideas directly to international 
society, play an important role in asserting the rightfulness of their demand for self-
determination and in promoting the idea of an ethnic territory to international society.  
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This three-fold argument pointed, in turn, to three key features of the relationship 
between international society and sub-state nationalist groups. 
 
Firstly, political assertions about an ethnically-defined territory and national self-
determination can have a powerful influence on outsiders’ perceptions when they are 
presented within the normative framework which informs international society. These 
norms, particularly that of the right of self-determination in relation to a sub-state 
group’s ethnically-defined claims to territory, suggest a combination of ethnicist 
understandings of national identity and human and democratic rights. This thesis has 
demonstrated that there is a strong association between sub-state nationalist groups’ 
claims for autonomy or independence based on a specific territory and the norms of 
human and democratic rights. These can be observed in the articles and resolutions of 
various international organisations and their legal and political covenants as well in the 
actions and decisions of sections of international society. This international normative 
context influences and shapes the perceptions of outsiders towards the nationalist 
groups’ territorial assertions. 
 This international normative context in relation to ethnically-defined territorial 
claims is rooted in the way self-determination, nationalism and liberal democracy are 
linked to each other. This thesis has shown that the connection between self-
determination, liberal democracy and nationalism can take different forms depending on 
how nationhood is understood - either as a civic and solidarist understanding that 
emphasises citizenship or as an ethnic understanding that emphasises the common 
‘objective’ traits of a group of people. Looking at the historical evolution of the legal 
and political meaning of self-determination, this thesis explained why today self-
determination claims of sub-state groups are promoted as claims to form culturally 
homogenous states. There is a strong relationship between tolerant and civic forms of 
nationalism and liberal democratic principles, but there is also a strong and more recent 
connection between liberal international norms and the ethnicist-primordialist form of 
nationalism that has been largely under-explored. 
In developing this particular argument, this thesis has drawn on the ideas of IR 
scholars which explain the role of norms and ideas on politics, acknowledge the 
importance of understanding the relationship between nationalism and international 
society, and recognise the necessity of studying domestic factors and domestic non-state 
actors as international actors in providing a complete explanation of how international 
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society works. Mayall argues that the creation of new states throughout the twentieth 
century can be explained through understanding the ways in which the principles of 
sovereignty and national self-determination have adapted to each other. Using this 
starting point the thesis argued that, in relation to sub-state nationalist groups’ claims to 
independence and autonomy, the relationship between sovereignty and self-
determination has evolved in such a way that the self-determination claims of sub-state 
groups became claims to self-sovereignty. The promotion of the idea of self-
determination as one of the foundational principles for the post-War international order 
during and after the 1919 Paris Peace Conference played a significant role by providing 
favourable circumstances for elites in non-European territories to make their voices 
heard. The support given by the USSR to the anti-imperial movements in the name of 
self-determination in the non-European world also had a great impact on the 
dissemination of the principle around the world. These historical definitions and uses of 
the concept, combined with uses in the decolonisation and post-Cold War period, 
contributed to the evolution of self-determination and to the expansion of the meaning 
of the principle to non-state groups’ rights to sovereignty. 
This thesis found Philpott’s notion of ‘international context’ useful to 
conceptualise the expanded meaning of self-determination in relation to sub-state 
groups and how its meaning became associated with democratic and human rights. 
‘International context’ refers to the head of states and organisations that create and 
disseminate certain ideas. Extending this definition to also include non-state actors and 
widely accepted international norms helped to explain how non-state actors interact 
with the international sphere and how they influence international politics through 
adopting, using and disseminating norms of legitimacy. 
Understanding the interaction between states, non-state actors and the 
framework of norms required a more integrated understanding of the ‘international’, 
and therefore this thesis used Halliday’s ‘international society as homogeneity’ to explain 
this interaction. According to Halliday, in specific historical and political contexts, 
certain ideas produced and disseminated by the great powers, states and organisations 
are presented as the most desirable, just and right ideas. In short, political actions based 
on these ideas become the most appropriate way of doing politics. ‘International society 
as homogeneity’ challenges the idea that there is a clear distinction between the 
domestic and international spheres and appreciates the role of sub-state actors in the 
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international sphere. Conceptually this enables the analysis of sub-state groups’ 
interactions with international society beyond state boundaries.  
This thesis also utilised Risse and Sikkink’s argument that the repetition of 
existing ideas and predictions in the international context may transform them into 
social facts, or lead to the socialization of norms, particularly in relation to human rights. 
Their argument is useful in explaining the role ideas play in politics and the power of 
ethnically-defined territorial claims framed in terms of human and democratic rights. 
What is considered legitimate within the international framework influences the 
perceptions and political actions of actors. For instance, the media and academia 
potentially shape the perceptions of policymakers and their policy decisions in relation 
to certain issues because of their ability to transmit and disseminate norms and 
perceptions. 
 Using these conceptual and theoretical insights and analysing Kurdish 
nationalists’ claims to an ethnic Kurdish territory, this thesis showed that the 
international context influences the perceptions and activities of sub-state groups, states 
and other actors in international society when it comes to defining rights to self-
determination and who can exercise these rights. Within contemporary international 
politics, the range of acceptable and legitimate policies, activities, rules and norms are 
generally defined by the spheres of democratic rights and human rights. This is 
particularly evident when examining international society’s approach to exploring 
solutions to ethnic conflict. This thesis did not claim that the right to self-determination 
of all ethnic groups has become an international norm accepted by all members of 
international society, but rather highlighted the emergence, acceptance and application 
of a specific meaning of self-determination in international politics. This meaning has 
significant parallels to the way sub-state nationalist groups interpret self-determination. 
Kurdish nationalist claims to self-determination based on a direct reference to the 
notion of Kurdistan, and the Kurdish diaspora’s efforts to promote the Kurdish cause 
to international society, can be understood within an international normative context 
that combines the rhetoric of democratic and human rights with ethnic conceptions of 
nationhood. 
 
Whilst, it is vital to take into account the international normative context, this alone is 
not enough to explain my arguments comprehensively. This takes us to the second 
feature of the relationship between sub-state nationalist groups, their ethnic self-
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determination claims, and international society. The international historical context, the 
relationship of a sub-state group with the state in which it is located, internal power 
structures within a sub-state nationalist group, and the way these groups interact with 
international society are also important determinants that need to be taken into account.  
The development and evolution of Kurdish nationalism and its relationship to 
its territorial feature, Kurdistan, can best be understood within a historical and political 
setting. Key determinants of this setting are: processes of bargaining between local tribal 
elites and the central state during the implementation of the centralisation policies of the 
Ottoman Porte; attempts by urban and provincial tribal elites to increase their power 
and dominion during the weakening and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire; later, the 
division of the Ottoman territories; the promotion of plans for the creation of Armenia; 
Wilson’s principle of self-determination which provided the perfect motivation and 
legitimacy for the tribal elite to increase and secure their power and security; the 
development of new nation-states in the region and their relationship with the Kurdish 
movements in their country and other state countries; and, the available framework of 
legitimate international principles and political activities in each historical period. In the 
second half of the twentieth century, the spread of territorial nation-states in other parts 
of the world through decolonisation and then the collapse of the USSR reinforced the 
territorial nation-state ideal and provided further political and ideological impetus for 
the promotion of Kurdistan as the Kurdish national homeland. Using Breuilly’s 
definition of nationalism as a form of politics, which assumes that nationalist 
movements relate nationalism to the aims of attaining or using state power, this thesis 
argued that Kurdish elites linked their nationalism to the aim of attaining state power, 
initially within the context of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and later in the 
form of separatist nationalism in the new states formed in the ex-Ottoman territories. 
 Based on this background, the thesis argued that the emergence of the concept 
of Kurdistan as a national homeland can best be understood by reference to material, 
political and ideational processes, rather than through an essentialist historical view that 
sees Kurdistan as a consistent and given feature of Kurdish national identity. The 
essentialist historical view deploys contemporary conceptions of national territory by 
building upon an idea of Kurdistan that had previously been used to define 
administrative or geographic regions. One of the key characteristics of this conception is 
to assume that the history of the region is identical to the history of the Kurdish nation. 
The perception that the history of the region is identical to the history of the Kurdish 
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nation and that Kurdistan is a given feature of Kurdish identity, not a national 
aspiration, strengthens Kurdish nationalists’ use of Kurdistan and its maps in order to 
promote their self-determination claims. Moreover, their contemporary conception of 
national territory is loaded with ethnicist and primordial interpretations of Kurdish 
territory and national identity. In order to illustrate this argument, the thesis explained 
the transformation of Kurdistan from a regional/administrative concept to an ideal 
national homeland and the use of the idea of Kurdistan and its maps by Kurdish 
nationalist groups since the early aftermath of WWI. 
 In relation to the territorial feature of Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish 
nationalists’ claims to an ethnically-defined territory, this thesis has argued that the link 
nationalists forge between the history of a territory and the history of the people living 
on it is important in strengthening the claims to an ethnically-defined territory. All 
nationalisms build their identity using existing or assumed historical links, but this is 
particularly noticeable in the case of nationalisms that have emerged in the last century. 
In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, political identity has become more closely 
associated with territorial control than ever before. Therefore self-determination in the 
form of secession appears to be a logical outcome of the structure of the international 
system today.611 
 Most sub-state nationalist groups aspire to the realisation of their ‘ethnic 
territory’ in the form of autonomy or independence. In the Kurdish case, and as well as 
in many of the other nationalist territorial claims, the ‘aspirant territory’ transforms into 
an ‘existing territory’ in the eyes of increasingly wider sections of Kurds and in the eyes 
of international society. This is further reinforced by the popular appeal of ethnicist 
approaches to national identity. For instance, Smith perceives the core of ethnic 
communities as ancient social formations that have persisted in modern times and he 
emphasises the role of territorial memories in the construction of national identities.612 
Although he accepts that territory is socially constructed and it is humans who give 
meaning to that territory, he also seems to assume that specific territorial associations 
asserted by nationalists are given and he argues that their assertions should have an 
influence on the political life of a group of people. Many scholars working on self-
determination and nationalism have also proposed similar views supporting the 
argument that ethnic group identity should be the decisive factor in re-drawing 
territorial boundaries.  
                                                 
611 Bishai, 140. 
612 Smith, ‘States and homelands’, 188 and see endnote 7 in p. 200. 
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 Overall, in relation to Kurdistan and Kurdish nationalism, this thesis, rather than 
uncritically accepting a pervasive Kurdish nationalism throughout history with a given 
understanding of Kurdistan, has adopted a view that emphasises historically and 
politically contingent factors. This was not done with a view to critiquing the credibility 
of Kurdish nationalist claims to Kurdistan, but rather to show that the ethnicist 
interpretations of national identity facilitate the positive reception of Kurdish claims 
among would-be nationalists and in international society. It argued that, within the 
historical political and normative framework, both at the international level and in the 
case of Kurdish nationalism, creating homogenous ethnic boundaries began to appear as 
the best way to establish stable democratic regimes that are respectful of the human 
rights of both collectivities and individuals. This enabled Kurdish nationalists to 
generate support and sympathy for their ethnically-defined claims to territory and 
national self-determination. 
 
The third feature that this thesis has focused on is the activities of diaspora nationalists 
and their interaction with international society, particularly their role in promoting their 
claims among the members of international society. Following Anderson’s notion of 
‘long-distance nationalism’, the thesis has defined Kurdish nationalists operating in the 
diaspora as nationalist actors whose focus is upon promoting the idea of a homeland as 
an ethnic territory in the international realm. Although such nationalist groups in the 
diaspora utilise transnational methods in their interactions and most of their activities 
take place within a transnational space, their goals are nationalist and their activities are 
directed at both national and international realms.  
Building on this background, this thesis has argued that the transnational 
location outside the homeland and the ability to communicate their ideas directly to 
international society, render the activities of diaspora groups more effective than 
regional nationalist actors in publicising the rightfulness of their demands for self-
determination and in promoting the idea of an ethnic territory to international society. 
These actors are particularly competent in using the contemporary international 
normative context related to human and democratic rights, particularly the right to self-
determination, to promote the legitimacy of their pursuit for autonomy or 
independence. The increasing role of diasporas in international affairs, their growing 
ability to mobilise (due to developments in technology, communication and transport) 
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and their role in influencing (through lobbying) their host-state’s foreign policies and 
regional and international affairs, gives strength to their propaganda.  
Kurdish activists in the diaspora, much like other groups such as the Armenian, 
Palestinian, Kosovar Albanian, Tamil and Irish diasporas, have influenced the 
perceptions and attitudes of their host-states and international organisations toward 
their home-countries and towards their nationalist movements back in the homeland. 
Kurdish nationalist groups in the diaspora undertake their activities to promote the 
assumption that Kurdistan is an ethnic territory. Long-distance Kurdish nationalist 
actors, due to their stronger adherence to the idea of a unified nation, are more assertive 
in the promotion of their claims than many of the nationalist groups in the region. Their 
location in liberal-democratic host-states, and the political freedom provided by these 
states in organising and engaging in cultural and political activities away from the 
scrutiny of home country regimes, give these groups increased opportunities to mobilise 
and lobby for their cause. Additionally, they effectively utilise the discourse of 
contemporary international politics, which puts increasing importance on the 
democratic and political rights of ethnic communities.  
 
 Considering the large number of such struggles – the Kurds, Tamils, Chechens, 
Abkhazians, Sikhs, and others – the question of why ethnically-defined claims to 
territory and national self-determination generate sympathy in international society is an 
important issue that requires explanation. Therefore, even though Kurdish nationalists 
have not generated the international norms that provide a normative context for their 
activities and have limited political power compared to states and many other actors in 
international society, Kurdish nationalist groups play an important role in the 
dissemination of certain norms and attempt to affect international politics through 
engaging with other actors in international society. By doing this, they provide 
legitimacy to their goals and at the same time, disseminate and reinforce certain norms 
and political activities. 
Considering the question of how sub-state Kurdish nationalist groups generate 
support and sympathy among would-be nationals and in international society for their 
claims to an ethnically-defined territory and national self-determination this thesis 
suggested three key lessons, each of which is elaborated below: 
(1) The need to avoid an uncritical acceptance of the essentialist understandings of ethnicity and 
territory: Assuming the existence of a pervasive Kurdish nationalism throughout history 
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with a given understanding of Kurdistan inhibits understanding and the need to study 
historically contingent political, economic, social and ideological factors which really are 
determinant. 
(2) The need to incorporate an international perspective into the analysis more extensively: 
Generating a complete understanding of the political implications of Kurdish nationalist 
activities on Kurdish nationalism, on regional states and on international society requires 
an analysis of the case from an international perspective that takes into account both the 
evolution of the international normative context as well as the international historical, 
political and ideational context.  
(3) The need to adopt a multi-disciplinary approach: The findings of this thesis suggest 
that an analysis of the relationship between Kurdish society and international society 
requires a systematic theoretical and analytical approach that combines different fields 
of study. This will enhance our understanding of Kurdish nationalism by utilising the 
conceptual and theoretical tools that studies in IR and nationalism provide, and allow 
comparisons between the Kurdish case and other cases. 
Analysing how sub-state Kurdish nationalist groups generate support and 
sympathy among would-be nationals and in international society for their claims to an 
ethnically-defined territory and national self-determination supports the efforts of some 
IR scholars to incorporate the study of nationalism and sub-state actors into the study 
of the ‘international’. It illustrates the usefulness of addressing sub-state groups’ 
interactions with international society in two complementary ways: through an 
awareness of the political and international ideational context in which sub-state groups 
interact with other actors in international society, and through drawing on the insights 
from IR and studies on nationalism concerning the territorial component of 
nationalisms and self-determination. This enables researchers to understand better the 
challenges nationalist separatist movements pose to state sovereignty, territorial stability, 
and regional and international security.  
 
This thesis has only investigated the Kurdish case. The, histories and 
internal/external circumstances of other cases of sub-state nationalism will each display 
specific characteristics. Nevertheless, the general arguments about the importance of 
taking into account the international aspect in a systematic conceptual and theoretical 
way together with awareness of the historical and political context can be applied in 
studying all sub-state nationalist groups.  
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It should also be noted that rather than claiming to contribute to the fields of IR 
and studies of nationalism in a theoretical manner, this thesis aimed to expand on 
existing arguments in the IR literature concerning the necessity of incorporating 
nationalism, sub-state actors and diasporas into the study of IR, and further supported 
these arguments by using the Kurdish case to illustrate its claims. This thesis has made a 
conceptual contribution to both IR and studies on nationalism by providing a nuanced 
understanding of the notion of self-determination, which would be a useful tool in 
understanding the activities of sub-state groups within an international framework. This 
is an understanding of national self-determination that relies on liberal principles such as 
self-rule and democracy, but at the same time reifies primordial features of national 
identity.  
Liberal democracy and national self-determination are two important principles 
enshrined within current international affairs, both in legal and political contexts. A new 
meaning of self-determination has emerged that is particularly related to sub-state 
national groups. This meaning of self-determination is still focused on liberal democratic 
and human rights, but claims that the achievability of these rights is more legitimate if 
the community in question is culturally and ethnically homogenous. In these cases, the 
way self-determination is understood and interpreted appears to reify both liberal 
principles and the given cultural characteristics of the communities in question. This 
could be used as a basis for the creation of new political entities based on distinct 
cultural characteristics. Kurdish activists are deliberately using this meaning of self-
determination to promote their claims. Political, social and military activities that 
promote such claims have important implications for the societies in question, on other 
societies in the region, on the regional states and on international security. The nature of 
these implications and their negative or positive effect is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
but it would be a valuable area of future research to pursue.  
Another interesting area of future research related to the argument of the thesis 
is the study of the impact of the use of maps on sub-state nationalist politics and their 
interactions with international society. Kurdish nationalists have repeatedly used the 
map of Kurdistan to indicate the Kurdish ethnic territorial boundaries. Kurdish 
nationalists’ constant use of maps of Kurdistan facilitates the assumption that Kurdistan 
is an ethnic territory. It could be argued that the promotion and reception of the 
Kurdistan map takes place within, and benefits from, the international framework of 
ideas that increasingly recognises the creation of ethnic territories in order to improve 
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the human rights and democratic rights of peoples. Another aspect that makes the 
Kurdistan map influential as a propaganda tool is that this map provides a clear and 
credible message when promoting the idea that Kurdistan is an existing national 
territory. Uses of these maps mostly share the same ground in terms of Kurdistan’s 
existence and do not consider the concept’s existential challenges and its ambiguity as 
problematic. In this context, maps are useful political tools to promote such nationalist 
assumptions. Kurdish nationalists use the map of Kurdistan to spread the message that 
the territory indicated in the map is the Kurdish homeland and that it is vital for their 
cultural and ethnic existence as a community. 
In the current international system, state boundaries are associated with the 
national entities as shown on the world political map. They are seen as ‘abstractions of 
reality’ and therefore they can change or establish territorial perceptions.613 This 
assumption derives from the way users of maps perceive them. As Jeremy Black states, 
‘Most purchasers and users see the development of map-making as a science based on 
changes in mathematics, perspective and surveying … Most users rely on the apparent 
accuracy and objectivity of maps; they do not see the very process of mapping as 
political.’614 The map broadcasts the message to outsiders that the territory shown on 
the map is a real territory, not a political construction. The assumed association between 
the map of a territory and the population within that territory facilitates the view that 
the people inhabiting the territories within the borders of map are homogenous. The 
understanding that territory is a given feature of ethnic groups reinforces this view. 
Therefore, a cartographic depiction of an aspirant homeland implies that the land 
indicated on the map is the manifestation of their territorial identity. 
Maps are influential tools for delivering a message to outsiders because it is assumed 
that maps serve as medium to reflect realities. In their use of the map of Kurdistan, 
scholars, journalists, and the foreign affairs departments of some states claim that their 
purpose is analytical and descriptive and that they do not seek to deliver a specific 
message by using these maps. To an extent, this is indeed a fair claim. As Black states, 
maps cannot be dismissed simply because of their political and subjective aspects.615 
However, the problem arises from the outsiders’ quick acceptance of the aspirant 
Kurdistan as depicting an ethnic Kurdish territory. As a result of the ethnicist 
conceptions of nations and their territorial features, and the effective use of maps, it is 
                                                 
613 Arthur H. Robinson, Elements of Cartography, New York: Wiley, 1995, 7. 
614 Jeremy Black, Maps and Politics, London: Reaktion Books, 1997, 9-10. 
615 Ibid., 168. 
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possible to observe the transformation of the ‘aspirant Kurdistan’ to an ‘existing 
Kurdistan’ in the eyes of both would-be nationals and outsiders. 
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